| name | chutes-platform-ops |
| description | Chutes.ai platform operator flows: OAuth app inventory + audits, client-secret rotation at fleet scale, token introspection and revocation, authorization management, model alias CRUD as an operator task. Use when the user asks to audit their OAuth apps, rotate secrets across many apps, introspect or revoke tokens, inspect authorizations, or manage model aliases as a team-level operator. Triggers on: chutes oauth app audit, list oauth apps, stale oauth apps, rotate all secrets, token introspect, token revoke, authorizations, /idp/apps, /idp/token, alias CRUD, fleet operator, chutes doctor. |
chutes-platform-ops
Status: VERIFIED LIVE 2026-04-13, read-only flows re-verified 2026-06-11 — list_apps.py, audit_stale_apps.py, rotate_all.py --dry-run, and alias_crud.py --list re-exercised against the dev Chutes account on 2026-06-11 (alias create/delete and real rotation last exercised 2026-04-13). introspect_token.py and revoke_token.py cannot be live-exercised without a real OAuth access token; both are documented here and marked individually BETA. Additionally, the openapi spec (fetched 2026-06-11) declares both token endpoints take form-urlencoded bodies while these scripts send JSON — see Steps 4–5.
What this skill does
Complements chutes-sign-in (single-app) and chutes-deploy (single-chute) with fleet-scale operator flows:
- App inventory. Paginate
/idp/apps, filter to mine, join with authorization counts.
- Stale-app audit. Find OAuth apps with zero active authorizations, or old apps you forgot about.
- Bulk secret rotation. Rotate many apps at once with dry-run support.
- Token hygiene. Introspect / revoke OAuth access tokens in incident response.
- Alias fleet management. List / create / delete / re-point aliases as a governance surface (same endpoints as
chutes-deploy:alias_deploy.py but focused on ops, not deploy).
Walkthrough
Step 1 — inventory
python <skill-scripts-dir>/list_apps.py
python <skill-scripts-dir>/list_apps.py --all
python <skill-scripts-dir>/list_apps.py --with-authorizations
Prints a table of your OAuth apps joined with live authorization counts:
=== OAuth apps (mine): 17 of 490 platform-wide ===
name app_id client_id created active auths
Chutes Frontend Chat 520b9540... cid_0b8xa2tqxoul... 2026-05-01 True 1
Chutes Dropzone Local f8769b1c... cid_nkjg2ilriy5q... 2026-04-10 True 2
Agent Test App 38c3f2d6... cid_eura0kxgeqbm... 2026-03-12 True 0
...
Filtering (re-verified live 2026-06-11):
?mine=true is still ignored (it is not a recognized param in openapi); the response stays platform-wide paginated (490 total on the test account as of 2026-06-11).- NEW:
GET /idp/apps?include_public=false now scopes the listing to your own apps server-side (17 of 490 on the test account). openapi also declares include_shared and a search=<substring> name filter (search verified live: ?search=Test&include_public=false → 6 hits).
?user_id=<other-uuid> returns 403 {"detail":"This action can only be performed by billing admin accounts."}; with your own uuid it has no visible effect (still platform-wide, likely because public apps are unioned in).list_apps.py still paginates all pages and filters by user_id client-side — this works and also covers the --all case; include_public=false is the lighter server-side alternative.
Step 2 — audit stale apps
python <skill-scripts-dir>/audit_stale_apps.py
python <skill-scripts-dir>/audit_stale_apps.py --min-age-days 30
Reports apps that look abandoned:
- Zero authorizations — no user has ever signed in with this app.
- Created > N days ago — aged, candidate for review.
- No activity — heuristic based on missing recent authorizations.
Pure read-only report. Does not delete anything.
=== stale OAuth app audit (mine) ===
apps audited: 17
Zero-authorization apps (8):
- Test apppy app_id=7eae13c6... age=115d
- teryeure app_id=d78bef04... age=114d
- Agent Test App app_id=38c3f2d6... age=91d
...
Recommendation: inspect each before taking action.
Step 3 — bulk secret rotation
python <skill-scripts-dir>/rotate_all.py --match "Test*" --dry-run
python <skill-scripts-dir>/rotate_all.py --match "Test*" --yes
Matches app names against a glob, iterates matching apps, calls POST /idp/apps/{app_id}/regenerate-secret for each, and writes the new secret to a per-app keychain profile (e.g. oauth.rotate-20260414T013559-<slug>). Default: dry-run.
Safety guarantees:
--dry-run prints the matched set and exits without writing.--yes is required to actually rotate; omitting it makes the script refuse even without --dry-run.- No parallelism — rotations happen one-at-a-time so a mid-run crash doesn't fan out.
- New secrets are stored in fresh keychain profiles so the old ones are not overwritten until you explicitly
manage_credentials.py delete.
- The script never prints a
csc_ value; only redacted previews.
Step 4 — token introspection (incident response)
python <skill-scripts-dir>/introspect_token.py --token <token_from_session>
Wraps POST /idp/token/introspect (RFC 7662). Returns {active, scope, client_id, username, exp, sub, ...}.
When to use: you suspect a token leaked, or you want to confirm a specific OAuth session is still valid.
Status BETA: this script has NOT been live-verified because the verification environment has no real OAuth access token on hand (would require completing a full SIWC browser flow). Additionally, the openapi spec (fetched 2026-06-11) declares the request body as application/x-www-form-urlencoded with fields token (required), token_type_hint, client_id, client_secret — but this script currently sends a JSON body. Whether the server also accepts JSON is unverified as of 2026-06-11; expect the script to need a form-encoding fix before it can graduate.
Step 5 — token revocation
python <skill-scripts-dir>/revoke_token.py --token <access_or_refresh_token>
Wraps POST /idp/token/revoke. Returns {revoked: true} on success. Use this on detected credential leaks or forced-logout scenarios.
Status BETA: same as introspection — not yet exercised live, and openapi (2026-06-11) declares a form-urlencoded body (token required, token_type_hint optional) while the script sends JSON. Same caveat applies.
Step 6 — alias fleet management
python <skill-scripts-dir>/alias_crud.py --list
python <skill-scripts-dir>/alias_crud.py --create --alias team-fast --chute-id <uuid> --chute-id <uuid>
python <skill-scripts-dir>/alias_crud.py --delete --alias team-fast --yes
Same endpoints as chutes-routing:build_pool.py and chutes-deploy:alias_deploy.py, but with an operator lens: bulk list with size, create with explicit chute_ids (no intent filter), delete with --yes gate.
Alias schema (re-verified live 2026-06-11): GET /model_aliases/ returns a bare JSON array (no pagination envelope); each object carries exactly {alias, chute_ids, created_at, updated_at} and the list is scoped to your account. There is no user_id/owner_id field, so alias_crud.py --list --mine filters everything out (returns 0 aliases) — don't use --mine; the plain --list is already yours. POST /model_aliases/ body is {alias, chute_ids: [uuid, ...]} per openapi ModelAliasCreate (both fields required; create/delete last exercised live 2026-04-13).
When to use each:
chutes-routing:build_pool.py — when you're choosing a pool from an intent.chutes-deploy:alias_deploy.py — when you're pinning an alias during or right after a deploy.chutes-platform-ops:alias_crud.py — when you're managing the alias fleet as an operator task disconnected from any specific deploy or intent.
Endpoint map
| Area | Method | Path |
|---|
| List OAuth apps (platform-wide) | GET | /idp/apps?page=<n>&limit=<n> — add &include_public=false to scope to your own apps server-side; &search=<substring> filters by name (both verified 2026-06-11) |
| Read one app | GET | /idp/apps/{app_id} |
| Update metadata | PATCH | /idp/apps/{app_id} |
| Delete app | DELETE | /idp/apps/{app_id} |
| Regenerate client secret | POST | /idp/apps/{app_id}/regenerate-secret |
| List scopes | GET | /idp/scopes — returns {scopes: {<name>: <description>}} |
| List authorizations (yours) | GET | /idp/authorizations — paginated {total, page, limit, items} |
| Revoke authorization by app | DELETE | /idp/authorizations/{app_id} |
| Introspect token | POST | /idp/token/introspect — openapi (2026-06-11) declares form-urlencoded body: token (required), token_type_hint, client_id, client_secret |
| Revoke token | POST | /idp/token/revoke — openapi (2026-06-11) declares form-urlencoded body: token (required), token_type_hint |
| OIDC userinfo | GET | /idp/userinfo — needs OAuth access token, not cpk_ (401 otherwise) |
| List aliases | GET | /model_aliases/ — bare array of {alias, chute_ids, created_at, updated_at}, account-scoped (re-verified 2026-06-11) |
| Create alias | POST | /model_aliases/ body {alias, chute_ids: [uuid, ...]} (both required per openapi) |
| Delete alias | DELETE | /model_aliases/{alias} |
Wave-2 finding (re-verified 2026-06-11): /idp/scopes returns the same 22 named scopes including admin, profile[:read], balance[:read], billing:read, quota[:read], usage[:read], account:{read,write}, chutes:{read,write,delete,invoke}, images:{read,write,delete}, invocations:read, secrets:{read,write}. The standard OIDC openid scope is still NOT in this list — it is accepted by POST /idp/apps (wave-1 register_oauth_app.py confirmed it), just not enumerated here. Per-chute invoke scopes of the form chutes:invoke:{chute_id} are documented in the Sign-in-with-Chutes docs but not enumerated by /idp/scopes either (unverified as of 2026-06-11).
Wave-2 finding (re-verified 2026-06-11): GET /idp/userinfo returns HTTP 401 when called with a cpk_ management API key. The endpoint is OAuth-access-token-only, per OIDC spec. Document, don't try to call it from operator scripts.
Auth note (verified 2026-06-11): all scripts here send Authorization: Bearer cpk_... to api.chutes.ai — this is the correct header. X-API-Key returns 401 on api.chutes.ai management endpoints (e.g. /users/me).
Scripts in this skill
| Script | Purpose | Status |
|---|
scripts/list_apps.py | Paginate + filter my apps, join with authorizations | VERIFIED (re-verified live 2026-06-11) |
scripts/audit_stale_apps.py | Zero-auth / old-age audit report | VERIFIED (re-verified live 2026-06-11) |
scripts/rotate_all.py | Bulk secret rotation with dry-run + per-app keychain profiles | VERIFIED (dry-run re-verified 2026-06-11; real rotation last exercised 2026-04-13) |
scripts/introspect_token.py | POST /idp/token/introspect wrapper | [BETA] — needs a live OAuth access token to exercise; openapi declares form-urlencoded body, script sends JSON |
scripts/revoke_token.py | POST /idp/token/revoke wrapper | [BETA] — same |
scripts/alias_crud.py | Alias list/create/delete with --yes gate for destructive ops | VERIFIED (--list re-verified 2026-06-11; create/delete last exercised 2026-04-13; avoid --list --mine, see Step 6) |
Safety rules
- Destructive ops require explicit
--yes. rotate_all.py and alias_crud.py --delete refuse to mutate state without it (audit_stale_apps.py has no destructive mode at all). Dry-run is the default everywhere.
rotate_all.py is sequential, not parallel. A mid-run failure leaves a partial rotation and the script reports where it stopped; you re-run with --skip-until <app_id> to continue.- Never print
csc_ values. Rotation stores new secrets via manage_credentials.py under timestamped profiles. Only redacted previews appear on stdout.
- Never delete apps from an audit.
audit_stale_apps.py is advisory; deletion is user-initiated via DELETE /idp/apps/{app_id} explicitly.
- OAuth token operations require caution.
revoke_token.py breaks every session using that token. Log who you ran it against and why.
Related skills
chutes-sign-in — single-app SIWC integrator; pair with this skill for bulk operator work.chutes-routing — build_pool.py is the intent-driven alias creator; alias_crud.py here is the lower-level CRUD.chutes-usage-and-billing — audit spend on the account running these ops.chutes-mcp-portability — chutes_oauth_introspect exposes introspect via MCP (still BETA there for the same reason — needs a live token).
