security-audit

name	security-audit
description	Security checklist specific to c-lord — subprocess injection, env leaks, input validation

Security Audit — c-lord Specific

This project runs arbitrary Claude Code sessions triggered by Discord messages. Security is the #1 priority.

When to Activate

• Before any commit that changes runner.py, _run_helper.py, or any Cog
• When adding new user-facing commands
• When modifying subprocess execution or argument passing
• When adding new environment variables or configuration
• Periodically as a full audit

Threat Model

Threat	Vector	Mitigation
Command injection	User message passed to CLI args	create_subprocess_exec (no shell), -- separator
Flag injection	Prompt starting with -	-- separator before prompt
Session hijack	Fake session ID	Strict regex validation ^[a-f0-9\-]+$
Skill injection	Malicious skill name	Strict regex validation ^[\w-]+$
Secret exfiltration	Claude Bash tool reads env	Strip secrets from subprocess env
Nesting attack	Claude spawns another c-lord	Strip CLAUDECODE from env
Token theft	Bot token in logs/errors	Never log tokens, strip from env

Checklist

Subprocess Safety

• All subprocess calls use asyncio.create_subprocess_exec (NEVER shell=True)
• -- separator is always placed before user-provided prompt text
• No string formatting/interpolation of user input into command strings
• Session IDs validated with re.match(r"^[a-f0-9\-]+$", session_id)
• Skill names validated with re.match(r"^[\w-]+$", name)

Environment Security

• _STRIPPED_ENV_KEYS includes all secret environment variables
• DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN is stripped from subprocess env
• CLAUDECODE is stripped (prevents nesting detection bypass)
• No secrets in log output (check logger.info/debug/warning/error calls)
• .env file is in .gitignore

Input Validation

• All user-provided strings are validated before use
• Discord message content is never directly interpolated into commands
• Thread IDs and channel IDs are validated as integers
• No user input reaches dangerous evaluation functions

Error Handling

• Error messages don't leak internal paths or secrets
• Stack traces are logged (not sent to Discord)
• Failed sessions clean up properly (no zombie processes)

Dependencies

• All dependencies are pinned in uv.lock
• No unnecessary dependencies
• discord.py is from the official PyPI package

Quick Scan Commands

# Search for dangerous patterns
grep -rn "shell=True" c_lord/
grep -rn "subprocess\.call" c_lord/
grep -rn "subprocess\.run" c_lord/

# Check that secrets are stripped
grep -n "_STRIPPED_ENV_KEYS" c_lord/claude/runner.py

# Verify .env is gitignored
grep "\.env" .gitignore

Response Protocol

• CRITICAL (injection, secret leak): Stop immediately. Fix before any other work.
• HIGH (missing validation): Fix before committing.
• MEDIUM (logging concern): Fix in the same PR.
• LOW (style/hardening): Track as a follow-up issue.