| name | securing-code |
| description | Use when writing or reviewing code that handles external input, manages access, touches data or crypto, or changes dependencies. Triggers: endpoints, auth/authz, DB/ORM, file handling, secrets, "is this secure?", "security review". NOT for formatting, pure UI, or explaining code. |
Securing Code
Invocation Notice
Inform the user when this skill is being invoked: securing-code.
When to Use
- Implementing any feature, endpoint, service, or component
- Writing auth, session management, or access control logic
- Handling file uploads, secrets, crypto, or sensitive data
- Reviewing code changes for security issues
- Checking a diff, branch, or PR for security correctness
When Not to Use
- General code review without a security focus —
code-review invokes this skill internally for its security lens
- Explaining code without modifying it
- Formatting or linting only
- Writing documentation unrelated to security controls
Tier 1 — Core Principles (Apply to Every Task)
These apply regardless of task type — implementation or review.
Secure Design Principles
- Assume breach — design as if the system will be compromised; no single point of trust
- Validate all external input — reject anything invalid; never try to "fix" bad input
- Validate first, then escape — for the output context; use sanitization only when escaping is not possible, via a hardened library; prefer allowlists over blocklists
- Fail closed — on error, roll back completely and deny access; never fail open
- Least privilege — grant minimum permissions necessary at every layer
- Defense in depth — layer controls; never rely on a single protection
- Zero trust — verify on every request, not just once at login
Code Generation Requirements
All of the following must be satisfied when generating or modifying code:
- Parameterized queries for all database access (SQL and NoSQL) — never concatenate user input
- Framework-native auth — use framework or third-party auth/session/access-control; do not build custom authentication
- Per-request authorization — enforce on every endpoint, AJAX call, page, and resource request including object-level checks
- Secret management — load secrets from a secret manager; never hardcode keys, tokens, or passwords
- Approved cryptography — AES-256-GCM for encryption, SHA-256/SHA-3 for hashing, Argon2id for passwords, Ed25519/ECDSA P-256 for signatures
- Context-aware output encoding — encode all user-controlled data before rendering (HTML, JS, URL, CSS contexts)
- Safe error handling — catch all exceptions, log details internally, show generic messages to users; fail closed with full rollback
- Rate limiting — apply on all endpoints; no wildcard boundaries (
*); no unlimited operations
- No unsafe deserialization — never deserialize untrusted data; never pass user input to system calls
- Memory-safe languages preferred — if C/C++, apply bounds checking and safe functions
- Security headers and cookies — set security headers; use
Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax (Strict for high-risk sessions); if SameSite=None, pair with Secure + CSRF defenses
- CSRF protection — enable when the framework supports it for state-changing operations; add manually if not
- Deployment hygiene — never run as root in production; initialize all variables; treat compiler warnings as errors
High-Risk Changes — Confirm Before Implementing
The following categories have a large blast radius or affect the trust model.
Surface them and get explicit user approval before writing code, even if the user's request implies them:
- New or modified authentication / session flow (login, MFA, password reset, OAuth callback)
- New CORS configuration or relaxing an existing one (added origins,
credentials: true, wildcard)
- New external service integration (third-party API, webhook receiver, OAuth provider)
- New file upload, download, or user-controlled storage path
- New category of sensitive data being stored (PII, payment, health, credentials)
- Granting elevated permissions, new roles, or service-account scope expansions
- Disabling, loosening, or bypassing rate limits, security headers, CSP, or framework auto-escaping
- Changes to cryptographic primitives, key rotation, or token lifetimes
For these, state what is changing and the risk, then wait for confirmation.
A user request to "add login" is permission for the feature, not for a specific auth design — confirm the design first.
Response Behavior
- State security assumptions before writing code (auth model, data classification, framework)
- Flag skipped requirements — anything simplified or omitted for brevity is a gap attackers find
- Append "Security Notes" to all code responses: what the code does to meet each requirement, and what the developer still needs to configure (headers, secrets, IAM, logging)
- Never propose insecure shortcuts "for simplicity" or "for now"
- Document exceptions explicitly — if a business requirement forces a deviation, state it and propose the safest alternative
Counter-Rationalizations
Push back on these framings — from the user or yourself — when they appear as justification for skipping a control:
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|
| "It's an internal tool, security doesn't matter" | Internal tools get compromised; attackers pivot through the weakest link. |
| "We'll add security later" | Retrofitting is far harder than building it in; "later" usually means "in prod". |
| "No one would try to exploit this" | Automated scanners find everything reachable; obscurity is not a control. |
| "The framework handles it" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees — they still have to be wired correctly. |
| "It's just a prototype / spike / demo" | Prototypes ship. The auth shortcut becomes the production auth. |
| "This endpoint isn't exposed publicly" | Network boundaries change; SSRF, misconfig, and lateral movement reach it anyway. |
Routing
Implementation Tasks
-
Apply Tier 1 above (always)
-
Open references/tier2-implementation.md and follow the checklist for your task type:
| Task | Section |
|---|
| General feature / component | §2.1 |
| REST or GraphQL API endpoint | §2.2 |
| Auth, sessions, or access control | §2.3 |
| Secrets, crypto, or data protection | §2.4 |
| Supply chain or CI/CD | §2.5 |
-
For security-complex domains, also load the matching Tier 3 reference:
| Domain | Reference |
|---|
| Input handling | references/tier3-input-validation.md |
| File upload / download | references/tier3-file-upload.md |
| Database-heavy features | references/tier3-database.md |
| Auth / session flows | references/tier3-threat-modeling.md |
| C / C++ / embedded | references/tier3-memory-safety.md |
Review Tasks
- Apply Tier 1 above (always)
- Load
references/tier2-review.md for the review workflow and checklist
- Load relevant Tier 3 references for the domains covered by the change (same routing table as Implementation Tasks above)
- Use
references/owasp-2025.md to verify coverage against all 10 OWASP categories
References
references/tier2-implementation.md — task-specific implementation checklists (§2.1–§2.5)
references/tier2-review.md — code review workflow, OWASP-mapped checklist, output format
references/tier3-input-validation.md — allowlist validation, output encoding, CSP
references/tier3-file-upload.md — file upload validation, storage, retrieval
references/tier3-database.md — injection prevention, DB access control, encryption
references/tier3-error-handling.md — safe error handling, security event logging
references/tier3-memory-safety.md — C/C++ memory safety, compiler flags, sanitizers
references/tier3-language-specific.md — Python, JS/Node, Java, C#/.NET forbidden patterns and safe alternatives
references/tier3-threat-modeling.md — STRIDE, trust boundaries, risk rating
references/owasp-2025.md — OWASP Top 10 2025 with control mapping to skill tiers