소스 정보
- 저장소
- CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike
- 최근 소스 활동
- 2026년 4월 22일 14:54
- 감지된 SKILL.md 언어
- 영어
- 스타
- 1,653
- 포크
- 254
설치 방법
기본적으로 소스를 먼저 확인하는 Prompt가 선택됩니다. 직접 명령으로 전환하거나 로컬 사본을 다운로드할 수도 있습니다.
소스 파일 검토
설치 여부를 결정하기 전에 SKILL.md와 SkillsMP에 표시된 보조 파일을 읽어 보세요.
메뉴
기본적으로 소스를 먼저 확인하는 Prompt가 선택됩니다. 직접 명령으로 전환하거나 로컬 사본을 다운로드할 수도 있습니다.
설치 여부를 결정하기 전에 SKILL.md와 SkillsMP에 표시된 보조 파일을 읽어 보세요.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
직접 명령은 검토 Prompt를 거치지 않습니다. 실행하기 전에 소스를 확인하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill cis-ubuntu2004-v300-7-1-11명령은 한 줄로 유지됩니다. 복사하기 전에 가로로 스크롤해 전체 내용을 확인하세요.
로컬 사본을 원하시나요? SkillsMP에서 현재 제공할 수 있는 파일을 다운로드하세요.
macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
SOC 직업 분류 기준
SKILL.md 표시 중
| name | cis-ubuntu2004-v300-7-1-11 |
| description | Ensure world writable files and directories are secured |
| category | cis-iam |
| version | 3.0.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","ubuntu","linux","ubuntu-20.04","file-permissions"] |
| cis_id | 7.1.11 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS Ubuntu Linux 20.04 LTS Benchmark v3.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["ubuntu","linux"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
World writable files are the least secure. Data in world-writable files can be modified and compromised by any user on the system. World writable files may also indicate an incorrectly written script or program that could potentially be the cause of a larger compromise to the system's integrity. See the chmod(2) man page for more information.
Setting the sticky bit on world writable directories prevents users from deleting or renaming files in that directory that are not owned by them.
Data in world-writable files can be modified and compromised by any user on the system. World writable files may also indicate an incorrectly written script or program that could potentially be the cause of a larger compromise to the system's integrity.
This feature prevents the ability to delete or rename files in world writable directories (such as /tmp) that are owned by another user.
None
Run the following script to verify:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_output="" l_output2=""
l_smask='01000'
a_file=(); a_dir=() # Initialize arrays
a_path=(! -path "/run/user/*" -a ! -path "/proc/*" -a ! -path "*/containerd/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/pods/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/plugins/*" -a ! -path "/sys/*" -a ! -path "/snap/*")
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
[ -f ] && a_file+=()
[ -d ];
l_mode=
[ ! $(( & )) -gt 0 ] && a_dir+=()
< <(find -xdev \( \) \( - f -o - d \) -perm -0002 -print0 2>/dev/null)
< <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target | awk )
! (( > ));
l_output=
l_output2=
! (( > ));
l_output=
l_output2=
a_path; a_arr; a_file; a_dir
[ -z ];
-e
-e
[ -n ] && -e
}
Note: On systems with a large number of files and/or directories, this audit may be a long running process.
PASS -- No world writable files exist and sticky bit is set on all world writable directories.
other with the command (chmod o-w <filename>), but always consult relevant vendor documentation to avoid breaking any application dependencies on a given file.chmod a+t <directory_name>)Run the following script to:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
{
l_smask='01000'
a_file=(); a_dir=() # Initialize arrays
a_path=(! -path "/run/user/*" -a ! -path "/proc/*" -a ! -path "*/containerd/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/pods/*" -a ! -path "*/kubelet/plugins/*" -a ! -path "/sys/*" -a ! -path "/snap/*")
while IFS= read -r l_mount; do
while IFS= read -r -d $'\0' l_file; do
if [ -e "$l_file" ]; then
l_mode="$(stat -Lc '%#a' "$l_file")"
if [ -f "$l_file" ]; then # Remove excess permissions from WW files
echo -e " - File: \"$l_file\" is mode: \"$l_mode\"\n - removing write permission on \"$l_file\" from \"other\""
chmod o-w "$l_file"
fi
if [ -d "$l_file" ]; then # Add sticky bit
if [ ! $(( $l_mode & $l_smask )) -gt 0 ]; then
echo -e " - Directory: \"$l_file\" is mode: \"$l_mode\" and doesn't have the sticky bit set\n - Adding the sticky bit"
chmod a+t "$l_file"
fi
fi
fi
done < <(find "$l_mount" -xdev \( "${a_path[@]}" \) \( -type f -o -type d \) -perm -0002 -print0 2>/dev/null)
done < <(findmnt -Dkerno fstype,target | awk '{$1 !~ /^\s*(nfs|proc|smb|vfat|iso9660|efivarfs|selinuxfs)/ && $2 !~ /^(\/run\/user\/|\/tmp|\/var\/tmp)/(print $2}')
}
N/A
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v8 | 3.3 Configure Data Access Control Lists | X | X | X |
| v7 | 14.6 Protect Information through Access Control Lists | X | X | X |
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings:
| Techniques / Sub-techniques | Tactics | Mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| T1222, T1222.002, T1548 | TA0004, TA0005 | M1022, M1028 |