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- CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike
- 최근 소스 활동
- 2026년 4월 22일 14:54
- 감지된 SKILL.md 언어
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설치 방법
기본적으로 소스를 먼저 확인하는 Prompt가 선택됩니다. 직접 명령으로 전환하거나 로컬 사본을 다운로드할 수도 있습니다.
소스 파일 검토
설치 여부를 결정하기 전에 SKILL.md와 SkillsMP에 표시된 보조 파일을 읽어 보세요.
메뉴
기본적으로 소스를 먼저 확인하는 Prompt가 선택됩니다. 직접 명령으로 전환하거나 로컬 사본을 다운로드할 수도 있습니다.
설치 여부를 결정하기 전에 SKILL.md와 SkillsMP에 표시된 보조 파일을 읽어 보세요.
SOC 직업 분류 기준
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
직접 명령은 검토 Prompt를 거치지 않습니다. 실행하기 전에 소스를 확인하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill cis-bind-v100-10-2명령은 한 줄로 유지됩니다. 복사하기 전에 가로로 스크롤해 전체 내용을 확인하세요.
로컬 사본을 원하시나요? SkillsMP에서 현재 제공할 수 있는 파일을 다운로드하세요.
SKILL.md 표시 중
macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
| name | cis-bind-v100-10-2 |
| description | Ensure BIND Processes Run in the named_t Confined Context Type (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","selinux"] |
| cis_id | 10.2 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.11 Benchmark v1.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux","selinux"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-732"] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
SELinux includes customizable targeted policies that may be used to confine the BIND named server to enforce least privileges so that the server has only the minimal access to specified directories, files and network ports. Access is controlled by process types (domains) defined for the named process. There are about a dozen related types defined in a default named SELinux policy. The default SELinux policies work well for a default BIND installation, however testing of the SELinux policies with the specific BIND operations is highly recommended. All directories and files to be accessed by the named server process must have security labels with appropriate types. The following file context types are a sample of the most commonly used:
named_cache_t - Directories and files with dynamically updated contentsnamed_conf_t - Directories and Configuration files to be read, but not updatednamed_exec_t - BIND related ExecutablesThe seinfo may be used list the types that are configured. For example, the following will list the relevant types that begin with named_
# seinfo -t | grep ' named_'
The semanage fcontext command may be used to list file context mapping. For example:
# semanage fcontext -l | grep ':named_'
With the proper implementation of SELinux, vulnerabilities in the BIND named server may be prevented from being exploited due to the additional restrictions. For example, a vulnerability that allows an attacker to read inappropriate system files may be prevented from execution by SELinux because the inappropriate files are not labeled with necessary named specific context. Likewise writing to an unexpected directory or execution of unexpected content can be prevented by similar mandatory security labels enforced by SELinux.
Not specified.
Perform the following steps to determine if the recommended state is implemented: Check that the BIND named process is confined to the named_t SELinux context. The type is listed in the third colon separated field and should be named_t.
# ps -eZ | grep named
system_u:system_r:named_t:s0 1792 ? 00:00:00 named
The service is non-compliant if the output does not show a process type or shows a process type other than .
named_tIf the running named process is not confined to the named_t SELinux context. Then check the labeled context for the named binaries and set the binary files to have a context of named_exec_t as shown below. The named-checkconf executable should have named_checkconf_exec_t type.
# ls -Z /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/named-checkconf /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/named
system_u:object_r:named_checkconf_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
If the executable files are not labeled correctly, they may be relabeled with the chcon command, as shown, however the file system labeling is based on the SELinux file context mapping polices and the file system will on some occasions be relabeled according to the policy.
# chcon -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
# chcon -t named_checkconf_exec_t /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
Since the file system may be relabeled based on SELinux policy, it's best to check the SELinux policy with semanage fcontext -l option. If the policy is not present, then add the pattern to the policy using the --add option. The restorecon command shown below will restore the file context label according to the current policy, which is required if a pattern was added.
# ### Check the Policy
# semanage fcontext -l | grep '/usr/sbin/named*'
/usr/sbin/named regular file system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0
/usr/sbin/named-checkconf regular file
system_u:object_r:named_checkconf_exec_t:
s0
# semanage fcontext -l | grep /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
/usr/sbin/unbound-anchor regular file system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0
# ### Add to the policy, if not present
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/named
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_checkconf_exec_t /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
# ### Restore the file labeling accord to the SELinux policy
# restorecon -v /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/named-checkconf /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
Restarting the BIND named service will also be required.
The name_t is the default type for ISC BIND named if SELinux is enabled.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v6 | 14.4 Protect Information With Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| v7 | 14.6 Protect Information through Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism |