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Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
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npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill t1569-003-systemctl명령은 한 줄로 유지됩니다. 복사하기 전에 가로로 스크롤해 전체 내용을 확인하세요.
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SOC 직업 분류 기준
SKILL.md 표시 중
| name | T1569.003_systemctl |
| description | Adversaries may abuse systemctl to execute commands or programs. |
| category | input-validation |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1569.003","execution","linux","sub-technique"] |
| technique_id | T1569.003 |
| tactic | execution |
| all_tactics | ["execution"] |
| platforms | ["Linux"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/003 |
| tech_stack | ["linux"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-94"] |
| chains_with | ["T1569","T1569.001","T1569.002"] |
| prerequisites | ["T1569"] |
| severity_boost | {"T1569":"Chain with T1569 for deeper attack path","T1569.001":"Chain with T1569.001 for deeper attack path","T1569.002":"Chain with T1569.002 for deeper attack path"} |
Sub-technique of: T1569
Adversaries may abuse systemctl to execute commands or programs. Systemctl is the primary interface for systemd, the Linux init system and service manager. Typically invoked from a shell, Systemctl can also be integrated into scripts or applications.
Adversaries may use systemctl to execute commands or programs as Systemd Services. Common subcommands include: systemctl start, systemctl stop, systemctl enable, systemctl disable, and systemctl status.
Platforms: Linux
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
Creates a new systemd service unit file in /etc/systemd/system/ and enables it using systemctl enable followed by systemctl start. Adversaries commonly abuse this workflow to establish persistence or execute arbitrary commands under the context of systemd.
This simulates the full attacker workflow: writing the unit file, reloading the systemd daemon, enabling the service to survive reboots, and starting it immediately. This is consistent with techniques observed in ransomware precursor activity and post-exploitation frameworks targeting Linux infrastructure.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
echo "[Unit]" > /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "Description=Atomic Test Service" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "After=network.target" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
>> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl
systemctl start
systemctl status
Dependencies:
Creates a systemd service unit file in /tmp and loads it using systemctl start with an absolute path. Adversaries may write service unit files to world-writable directories such as /tmp to avoid triggering alerts on new file creation in standard service directories, or to execute payloads transiently without permanently installing a service.
Loading a service unit from an arbitrary path rather than a standard systemd directory is unusual behaviour that should be detectable by monitoring systemctl command arguments.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
echo "[Unit]" > #{service_path}
echo "Description=Atomic Tmp Service" >> #{service_path}
echo "" >> #{service_path}
echo "[Service]" >> #{service_path}
echo "ExecStart=#{command_to_run}" >> #{service_path}
echo "" >> #{service_path}
echo "[Install]" >> #{service_path}
echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> #{service_path}
systemctl link #{service_path}
systemctl start $(basename #{service_path})
systemctl status $(basename #{service_path})
Dependencies:
Creates a systemd service unit file in /dev/shm and loads it using systemctl. /dev/shm is a memory-backed filesystem that is world-writable on most Linux systems and does not persist across reboots, making it particularly attractive to adversaries seeking to execute transient payloads while evading file-based forensic detection.
This technique has been observed in post-exploitation scenarios where attackers deliberately avoid writing to disk-backed locations to limit forensic artefacts.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
echo "[Unit]" > #{service_path}
echo "Description=Atomic SHM Service" >> #{service_path}
echo "" >> #{service_path}
echo "[Service]" >> #{service_path}
echo "ExecStart=#{command_to_run}" >> #{service_path}
echo "" >> #{service_path}
echo "[Install]" >> #{service_path}
echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> #{service_path}
systemctl link #{service_path}
systemctl start $(basename #{service_path})
systemctl status $(basename #{service_path})
Dependencies:
Creates a service unit file that initially runs a benign command, then modifies the ExecStart directive using sed to substitute a malicious command before reloading and restarting the service. Adversaries may hijack existing services to blend in with normal service activity and avoid triggering detections focused solely on new service creation.
This technique reflects the tradecraft observed in more sophisticated intrusions where blending into existing process trees is a priority over creating net-new services.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
echo "[Unit]" > /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "Description=Legitimate Looking Service" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "[Service]" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "ExecStart=/bin/true" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "[Install]" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
echo "WantedBy=multi-user.target" >> /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
systemctl daemon-reload
sed -i 's|ExecStart=.*|ExecStart=#{malicious_command}|' /etc/systemd/system/#{service_name}.service
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl start #{service_name}.service
systemctl status #{service_name}.service
Dependencies:
Uses systemd-run to execute a command as a transient systemd service without creating a persistent unit file on disk. Adversaries may use systemd-run to execute arbitrary commands under the context of systemd while bypassing controls that monitor for new unit file creation, since transient services exist only in memory for their lifetime.
This is a particularly stealthy technique as it leaves minimal on-disk artefacts and the service disappears from systemctl list-units once execution completes.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
systemd-run --unit=#{unit_name} --wait #{command_to_run}
systemctl status #{unit_name}.service 2>/dev/null || echo "Transient service has already completed and exited."
Dependencies:
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Systemctl by examining the target platforms (Linux).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1569.003 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Limit user access to systemctl to only users who have a legitimate need.
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Systemctl technique applicable | Low | Execution |
| CWE ID | Title |
|---|---|
| CWE-94 | Improper Control of Generation of Code |