hardcoded-secrets

name

hardcoded-secrets

description

SAST detection methodology for hardcoded / embedded secrets (CWE-798, CWE-259, CWE-321), including API keys, passwords, private keys, tokens and cloud credentials in source, git history, committed .env, CI config, and shipped mobile/front-end bundles, plus high-entropy and default-credential detection. Use when reviewing source, config, or build artifacts for embedded secrets. Writes confirmed findings to findings/28-hardcoded-secrets.md.

Hardcoded Secrets — SAST Methodology

Class: Hardcoded Secrets · CWE-798 · OWASP: A07 Identification & Authentication Failures Findings file: findings/28-hardcoded-secrets.md

1. Overview

A hardcoded-secret flaw exists when a credential — password, API key, private key, signing key, token, or connection string — is embedded in source, configuration, build artifacts, or version-control history rather than injected from a secure secret store at runtime. The secret is then readable by anyone with repo, artifact, or client-bundle access, and cannot be rotated without a code change. The core test: is there a literal (or trivially-derived) credential value in the tree or its history, and does it grant access to a real system? Detection is signature- and entropy-driven; confirm by classifying the secret type and its blast radius.

2. Where it lives

• Source literals: password = "...", apiKey = "...", SECRET_KEY = "...", connection strings, and inline Authorization: Bearer ... headers.
• Config and env files committed to the repo: .env, application.properties, settings.py, appsettings.json, config.yml, Terraform .tfvars, k8s manifests/Secrets (base64 is not encryption).
• Git history — a secret removed in HEAD but still present in an earlier commit; and stale branches/tags.
• CI/CD config and logs: GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfiles, Dockerfiles (ENV/ARG secrets), and echoed pipeline variables.
• Client-shipped artifacts: mobile app bundles (APK/IPA strings), front-end JS bundles/source maps, and desktop binaries — anything the attacker can download.
• Test fixtures and seed data that reuse real credentials.

3. Sources (tainted input)

This is not a taint-flow class — the "source" is the repository, its history, and its build artifacts. The signal is a string that looks like and functions as a credential: a known-format token (provider-prefixed), a private-key PEM block, a URL with embedded userinfo, or a high-entropy blob assigned to a secret-named identifier. Exploitability depends on whether the secret is live and what it authorizes — so classify the provider and scope.

4. Sinks (dangerous operations)

Here the "sink" is any place a literal credential is written or used directly.

# Python — dangerous
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"
DATABASE_URL = "postgres://admin:S3cr3t!@db.internal:5432/app"   # creds in DSN
django SECRET_KEY = "django-insecure-8f3k...9d"                  # signing key literal

// Node / front-end — dangerous
const stripe = new Stripe("sk_live_51H8x... ");   // LIVE secret key in bundle
const JWT_SECRET = "supersecret123";               // token signing key literal
fetch(url, { headers: { Authorization: "Bearer ghp_16C7e..." }}); // PAT in source

// Java — dangerous
String password = "P@ssw0rd!";                     // default/admin credential
private static final String API_KEY = "AIzaSyD...";// GCP API key literal

// CI / config — dangerous
env:
  AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE          # cloud cred in pipeline config
  SLACK_TOKEN: xoxb-2401...-...                     # bot token committed

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----                     # private key committed to repo
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA...
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

5. Sanitizers / safe patterns

Safe:

• Load secrets at runtime from a secret manager (Vault, AWS/GCP/Azure secret managers, sealed KMS) or from environment variables injected by the platform — not committed to the repo.
• Keep .env/secret files git-ignored; commit only .env.example with placeholder values.
• Use short-lived, scoped credentials (OIDC-federated CI, instance roles) instead of long-lived static keys.
• Run a secret scanner in pre-commit and CI (gitleaks/trufflehog) and enable provider push-protection; rotate on any exposure.
• For client apps, treat anything shipped as public — use per-user tokens minted server-side, never an embedded master key.

Fails / not a real sanitizer:

• Base64 / hex / ROT / XOR "obfuscation" — trivially reversible; the secret is still present.
• Removing the secret in HEAD but not from history — git log/git show on earlier commits still exposes it; the credential must be rotated, not just deleted.
• .gitignore added after the file was already committed — the tracked copy remains.
• Splitting the secret across constants / building it at runtime from pieces — reassembly is mechanical; entropy is still in the binary.
• "Internal only" / low-value assumptions — assume the repo and artifacts leak; scope and rotate anyway.
• Public/publishable keys treated as secret (or vice versa) — distinguish a Stripe pk_ (public) from sk_/rk_ (secret); flag the latter.

6. Detection methodology

1. Scan for provider-formatted tokens and key material.

   rg -n 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'                                   # AWS access key id
   rg -n 'ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'                                   # AWS temporary key id
   rg -n 'AIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{35}'                             # Google API key
   rg -n 'gh[pousr]_[0-9A-Za-z]{36}'                          # GitHub tokens
   rg -n 'sk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}|rk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}'  # Stripe secret keys
   rg -n 'xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}'                       # Slack tokens
   rg -n 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.'        # JWTs
   rg -n 'BEGIN (RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY'    # private key blocks
   rg -n '(?i)(password|passwd|pwd|secret|api[_-]?key|token|client[_-]?secret)\s*[:=]\s*["'"'"'][^"'"'"']{6,}'
   rg -n '(?i)(postgres|mysql|mongodb|redis|amqp)://[^ \n"'"'"']*:[^@/ ]+@'  # creds in DSN
   

2. Scan git history and untracked artifacts: git log -p, git grep across refs, and grep built bundles / .map files / decompiled mobile strings.
3. Confirm it is a real credential: provider format match, PEM block, or a high-entropy string (≈ ≥3.5 bits/char over 20+ chars) assigned to a secret-named identifier — not a placeholder (changeme, xxxx, example, <...>).
4. Classify scope: what does it authorize (cloud account, DB, third-party API, token signing)? Is it live/production vs test/sandbox?
5. Check for genuine externalization: is the value actually loaded from env/ secret manager, or is the literal the real value (fallback default is still a finding)?
6. Determine live/rotated status: present in history requires rotation regardless of HEAD.

7. Modern & niche variants

• API keys / passwords / private keys / tokens in source: the base case — literals assigned to secret-named identifiers, Authorization headers, or PEM blocks committed directly.
• Secrets in git history / committed .env: removed from HEAD but alive in an earlier commit, a reverted change, or a stale branch. .env files committed before being git-ignored. History exposure means the secret is compromised and must be rotated, not merely deleted.
• Secrets in CI config: hardcoded env:/ARG values in GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfiles, and Dockerfiles; secrets echoed into build logs.
• Cloud credentials: AWS AKIA…/ASIA… access keys (often paired with a secret key literal), GCP service-account JSON ("type": "service_account","private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----…"), and Azure connection strings (DefaultEndpointsProtocol=…;AccountKey=…) — each grants broad account access.
• JWT signing keys: an HMAC secret or private key used to sign tokens; leaking it lets an attacker forge arbitrary tokens (auth bypass / privilege escalation — chains into weak-crypto/authz).
• DB connection strings: DSNs with inline user:password@host, giving direct database access.
• High-entropy string detection: catch unknown-format secrets by Shannon entropy on values assigned to secret-named keys or long base64/hex blobs, to cover custom tokens not matched by a provider regex.
• Default credentials: shipped admin/admin, root/empty, or framework default keys (e.g. a placeholder SECRET_KEY left unchanged) — CWE-259/1188.
• Secrets in mobile / front-end bundles: keys embedded in APK/IPA or JS bundles/source maps are effectively public — extract via strings/unzip or by reading the shipped JS. Anything client-side is not a secret; flag master/API keys embedded there.

8. Common false positives

• Placeholders and templates: changeme, your-api-key-here, <TOKEN>, example, values in .env.example / documentation.
• Public keys/identifiers intentionally shipped: Stripe pk_, publishable client IDs, public certificate/PEM public keys, OAuth client IDs.
• Test fixtures using well-known dummy values (e.g. AWS AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE) — still note if a real-looking secret sits beside it.
• High-entropy strings that are hashes, UUIDs, content digests, or minified code — not credentials.
• A literal that is only a fallback default overridden in every real environment — lower confidence, but flag if it is a working default.

9. Severity & exploitability

Base High for a live credential in source or history. Critical when it grants broad or privileged access — cloud account keys (AWS/GCP/Azure), a JWT/ token signing key (forge any session), a production DB DSN, or a root private key — or when the repo/artifact is public. Lower to Medium/Low for sandbox/test-only keys, revoked/expired credentials, or values confined to a private repo behind strict access with a rotation path. A secret in client-shipped artifacts is always at least High (publicly extractable). See references/severity-model.md.

10. Remediation

Rotate the exposed credential immediately — deletion alone does not remediate a secret that reached history or a shipped artifact. Move secrets to a secret manager or platform-injected environment variables; commit only placeholder .env.example files and git-ignore real ones. Prefer short-lived, scoped credentials (OIDC/instance roles) over static keys. Purge history where feasible, enable pre-commit/CI secret scanning with push protection, and never embed master/API keys in mobile or front-end bundles — mint per-user tokens server-side.

11. Output

Append each confirmed finding to findings/28-hardcoded-secrets.md using references/finding-template.md. Set Class: Hardcoded Secrets and CWE: CWE-798 (use CWE-259 for hardcoded password, CWE-321 for hardcoded crypto key). In Chain potential name primitives such as leaked credentials (the canonical chain feeder — provides access consumed by SSRF-metadata, lateral-movement, and authz chains), token-signing key (→ auth bypass / privilege escalation, feeds the weak-crypto forgery chain), and direct data access (DB DSN → read/write). Note when the finding consumes a leak primitive from another finding (SSRF/ path-traversal/LFI exposing this secret).

Primitives (controlled): provides SECRET_LEAK; consumes none

References

• CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials; CWE-259 Hard-coded Password; CWE-321 Hard-coded Cryptographic Key; OWASP A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures and A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration; OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet; provider token-format references (AWS, GCP, GitHub, Stripe, Slack).