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Write the required Claude Code permission allow-list into a target repository so that /appsec-advisor:create-threat-model runs without permission prompts. One-shot setup; idempotent.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
SOC 직업 분류 기준
| name | setup-target |
| description | Write the required Claude Code permission allow-list into a target repository so that /appsec-advisor:create-threat-model runs without permission prompts. One-shot setup; idempotent. |
You are performing a one-shot setup that writes the required Claude Code permission rules into a target repository's .claude/settings.json. This skill does not analyse code, dispatch agents, or modify repository content beyond .claude/settings.json.
Recognized flags:
--repo <path> --output <path> --plugin-dir <path> --scope <scope>
Parse these and set REPO_ROOT, OUTPUT_DIR, PLUGIN_DIR, SCOPE.
Default REPO_ROOT to the current working directory (do NOT fall back to the
plugin repo root — this skill is always about a target repo, not the plugin
itself). Default OUTPUT_DIR to $REPO_ROOT/docs/security. Default SCOPE
to project (writes <repo>/.claude/settings.json — committed by the repo
maintainer so all contributors get prompt-free runs automatically).
If the invocation contains any token that is not one of the recognized flags
above — or is not the value consumed by --repo / --output /
--plugin-dir / --scope — DO NOT proceed. Print the block below verbatim
to stderr, substituting <TOKEN>, then exit with status 2:
Error: unknown argument '<TOKEN>'
/appsec-advisor:setup-target accepts only:
--repo <path> Target repository to configure (default: cwd)
--output <path> Output directory for scan artefacts (default: <repo>/docs/security)
--plugin-dir <path> Plugin install directory (default: $CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT)
--scope <scope> Settings scope: project (default) | local | user
project → <repo>/.claude/settings.json (committed, shared; default)
local → <repo>/.claude/settings.local.json (gitignored, personal)
user → ~/.claude/settings.json (global, all projects)
Run `/appsec-advisor:setup-target --help` for details.
mkdir -p "$REPO_ROOT/.claude"
Call check_permissions.py with --update so it merges the required entries
(and promotes any user-only entries to project scope):
python3 "$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/check_permissions.py" \
--repo-root "$REPO_ROOT" \
--output-dir "$OUTPUT_DIR" \
--plugin-dir "$PLUGIN_DIR" \
--scope "$SCOPE" \
--update
Capture stdout, stderr, and exit code.
If the helper exited 0, print its stdout verbatim, then add exactly one line:
Restart Claude Code (or reload the session) in <REPO_ROOT> for the new permissions to take effect.
If the helper exited non-zero, print its stderr verbatim and exit with the same code.
Do NOT add any other text — no preamble, no summary, no closing remark.
Perform a threat assessment of a repository and produce a threat-model.md. Supports --repo to analyze external repos and --output to set the output directory. Optionally also writes threat-model.yaml with --yaml flag.
Maintainer/dev skill that triages an anonymised diagnostic bundle (appsec-diag-*.tgz, produced by scripts/diagnostic_bundle.py) a user sent after a pipeline failure. Runs the deterministic inspect, then cross-references the plugin source (scripts/, agents/phases/, AGENTS.md) and known-bug history to produce a grounded root-cause hypothesis. Does NOT re-run the pipeline and never needs the user's repo.
Answer ANY question about the threat model in this repo — read-only Q&A over the committed threat-model.yaml. The default surface for every natural-language query about the model, however simple: does one exist at all ("is there a threat model here?", "gibt es hier ein bedrohungsmodell?"), how it stands ("how bad is it?", "is it still current?"), anything about its contents ("what are the critical findings?", "does it cover SSRF / IDOR / auth?", "which findings touch the payment service?", "is there a fix for F-003?", "welche kritischen findings gibt es?", "deckt mein bedrohungsmodell XSS ab?"), and meta questions ("what does P1 mean?", "what is STRIDE here?"). Grounds every data answer in the model and cites F-ids; never analyzes code, re-scores, spawns agents, or writes files. Prefer this over show-threat-model for anything phrased as a question — show only prints a fixed summary block on explicit request. To act on findings use review-threat-model; to (re)generate use create-threat-model.
Print the standard summary block of the current threat model — scan identity, findings by severity, the remediation backlog (P1/P2/P3) and mitigation coverage, the worst-case scenarios, control posture, and whether the model is still up to date. A DISPLAY command, not a question-answering surface: use it only for an explicit request to see that block ("show me the threat model summary", "zeig mir die threat-model-uebersicht", "print the overview"). Reuses the same change detection that decides if an incremental scan is needed. Does not analyze code, write files, or compose prose — it prints a rendered block verbatim and cannot answer anything the block does not already contain. Do NOT route a natural-language question here, not even "is there a threat model?" / "gibt es hier ein bedrohungsmodell?" — every question goes to ask-threat-model, which answers directly and can produce this block too.
User-facing triage of an existing threat model — an overview-first console over an already-generated threat-model.yaml (backlog by priority, severity mix, worst-case scenarios), then one of three modes. "Just look around" browses findings read-only by severity, security aspect, requirement, or control posture. "Fix or accept findings now" applies the code fix for findings you pick — or accepts the risk instead — one at a time for review. "Build a remediation plan" decides mitigate / accept-risk per finding and emits a remediation-plan.md without code changes. Within a session you can also discuss a single finding by id (F-/T-/M-/W-), a read-only aside that changes nothing. Runs later and independently of create-threat-model; reads the model, never regenerates or re-scores it. Not an artifact-quality check (that is eval-threat-model). To only *ask* about the model without acting on it, use ask-threat-model.
Convenience alias for create-threat-model in incremental mode — re-analyzes only the components that changed since the last run. Unlike the bare create-threat-model, it does NOT bootstrap — it aborts with a clear message when no threat model exists yet, so an "update" can never silently turn into a first full assessment. An explicit mode flag the user passes (--full, --rebuild, --rerender, --resume) is honored instead of the injected --incremental. Everything else (flags, --repo, --output, behavior, output) is identical to create-threat-model.