security-review

name	security-review
description	Team baseline for security review — a best-effort heuristic security pass over a diff or change-set. Auto-triggers for review this for security, any vulnerabilities here, security pass on this diff, is this code secure, check this for security issues, or security review this. Uses installed scanners when available; installs nothing. Defers to any other installed skill whose description identifies it as handling security review, SAST, or vulnerability analysis, including `adobe-security-*`; prefer it over this slim baseline. Do not use for spec-compliance review (use `/jig:independent-review`), general PR craft (use `/jig:pr-review`), or secret prevention (`jig-secret-scan`).
user-invocable	true

Spec 052 introduced this skill as jig's team baseline for security review, under ADR-0013's "jig provides the floor; bring your own depth" principle. Like /jig:pr-review (spec 012), /jig:arch-review (spec 014), and /jig:contracts (spec 022), it ships as SKILL.md only — no .py helper. It is fundamentally a judgment skill; the determinism it needs (detect a scanner on PATH, run it, read a diff) Claude runs inline. If any other skill is installed whose description identifies it as handling security review, SAST, or vulnerability analysis, the Claude Code skill router prefers that one over jig's baseline — the deferral is category-based, not name-specific, so a richer skill named anything (security-review, adobe-security-reviewer, sast-scan, vuln-audit, etc.) wins. Jig's slim version remains the auto-trigger when no such skill is installed.

What this skill does

Produces a breadth-over-depth heuristic security pass over a diff, a branch's changes, or a pasted snippet, in a four-bucket markdown envelope:

1. Summary — a one-paragraph read of what changed and the overall security posture (clean / needs fixes before merge / needs a deeper look).
2. Blockers — concrete must-fix security issues. Each cites a file:line and a one-sentence rationale.
3. Nits — lower-urgency hardening suggestions. Same shape as blockers.
4. Strengths — security-positive choices worth repeating (parameterized queries, secrets read from env, input validated at the boundary).

It works in two modes that compose:

• Orchestrate-if-present. When a real scanner (semgrep, bandit, gosec, npm audit / osv-scanner) is on PATH, it runs the ones present and folds their output into the review. It installs nothing.
• Defer-if-richer. When a richer security/SAST/vuln skill is installed, the router prefers it; jig's baseline yields.

When neither a scanner nor a richer skill is present, the heuristic baseline below is the floor — even a tooling-less user gets a real, structured pass. This is not a SAST engine and not a guarantee — see Honest framing.

When to use vs. when to defer

There are several things people confuse with this skill. Pick the right one:

• Any other installed security / SAST / vulnerability-analysis skill. The deferral is category-based, not name-based: a skill named anything whose description claims security review, SAST, or vulnerability analysis is preferred. The routes the Claude Code router may resolve to include the user's own skill (commonly ~/.claude/skills/security-review/), Adobe's adobe-security-* family (depth jig deliberately does not ship), or a built-in security-review. If one is present, defer to it — explicitly invoke it if you want to be sure. The deferral is a router hint, not a filesystem probe (see Gotchas).
• /jig:pr-review — sibling jig skill for general PR craft review (scope / blockers / nits / strengths across correctness, readability, test coverage). This skill is the security lens specifically. Reach for /jig:pr-review for overall code-review craft; reach for this skill when the question is "is this secure?" The two compose: pr-review for craft, security-review for the security pass.
• /jig:independent-review — sibling jig skill for spec-compliance review of a finished slice (does the implementation satisfy spec.md's acceptance criteria?). That is a spec-shape review against a written spec. This skill is a diff-shape security review. Reach for /jig:independent-review when a slice is in REVIEWED-or-similar state with a spec.md to evaluate against.
• The jig-secret-scan PreToolUse hook (spec 052-02) — the secret prevention floor. It blocks an obvious secret from being written to disk at agent-edit time. This skill is review, not prevention. The hook stops a secret going in; this skill reads a change-set after the fact and flags security issues (including secrets that slipped past the hook, e.g. in a file the agent didn't write). They are different primitives at different times — keep both.

Rule of thumb: "is this secure?" → this skill (or the richer installed one). "does this match the spec?" → /jig:independent-review. "is this good code?" → /jig:pr-review. "stop me committing a secret" → the jig-secret-scan hook.

Orchestrate installed scanners (never bundle)

This skill runs the tools you already have; it installs nothing and bundles nothing. Before the heuristic pass, detect what is on PATH and run the ones present, folding their findings into the four-bucket envelope.

Scanner-present path. For each scanner detected on PATH, run it scoped to the change-set and merge its output:

Scanner	Surface	Detect	Typical invocation
semgrep	Multi-language SAST	command -v semgrep	semgrep --config auto <paths>
bandit	Python SAST	command -v bandit	bandit -r <python paths>
gosec	Go SAST	command -v gosec	gosec ./...
npm audit	JS/TS dependency CVEs	command -v npm + package-lock.json	npm audit --json
osv-scanner	Cross-ecosystem dependency CVEs	command -v osv-scanner	osv-scanner --lockfile=<file>

Treat scanner output as input to your judgment, not the verdict: de-duplicate against the heuristic findings, drop noise that is clearly out of the change's scope, and promote genuine high-severity hits to Blockers with the scanner named in the rationale.

Scanner-absent path (graceful degradation). When none of these is on PATH, say so once in the Summary ("no security scanner detected on PATH; this is a heuristic-only pass") and fall back to the heuristic baseline categories — the review still ships, just without scanner corroboration. Degrading gracefully to heuristic-only is the designed floor, not a failure mode: a tooling-less user still gets a structured security pass.

Never pip install, npm install -g, go install, or otherwise fetch a scanner. If a scanner would help and isn't present, note it as a Nit ("consider wiring semgrep in CI") — do not install it.

Heuristic baseline categories

With no scanner and no richer skill, this is the floor: a structured pass over the change-set across eight named categories. For each, the bullets are "what triggers a finding."

• Secrets — hard-coded API keys / tokens / passwords / private keys; credentials in source, config, or test fixtures; secrets echoed to logs. (Prevention is the jig-secret-scan hook; this catches what slipped past it.)
• Injection — string-built SQL / shell / LDAP / NoSQL queries; unescaped interpolation into commands or templates; eval-on-input.
• Authn/authz — missing or post-hoc authorization checks; broken object-level access (IDOR); trusting client-supplied identity / roles; auth logic that fails open.
• Crypto misuse — weak or broken algorithms (MD5/SHA-1 for security, DES, ECB mode); hard-coded keys/IVs; Math.random() for tokens; homegrown crypto; missing TLS verification.
• Input validation — unvalidated/unsanitized external input crossing a trust boundary; missing bounds/type checks; path traversal from user-controlled paths; SSRF from user-controlled URLs.
• Unsafe deserialization — pickle / yaml.load / Java native-deserialization / Marshal on untrusted data; type confusion from untrusted object graphs.
• Dangerous functions — eval / exec / system / subprocess shell=True / child_process.exec on dynamic input; reflection or dynamic import driven by user input.
• Dependency risk — pinned-to-vulnerable or unpinned dependencies; known-CVE packages; abandoned/typosquat-shaped names; lockfile drift. (A npm audit / osv-scanner run, when present, corroborates this category.)

The pass is breadth over depth: catch the obvious across any language/stack, and leave the deep language-specific antipatterns and exhaustive rulesets to a real SAST tool or a richer installed security skill.

Review structure / output

Emit a markdown report with exactly these four H2 sections — the same four-bucket envelope jig's other review skills use:

## Summary
<one paragraph: what changed, the security posture, and — if no scanner
was on PATH — a one-line "heuristic-only pass" note>

## Blockers
- `path/to/file.py:42` — <category>: <one-sentence rationale>. Must fix
  before merge because <why>.
- (or: "None.")

## Nits
- `path/to/file.py:7` — <category>: <one-sentence hardening suggestion>.
- (or: "None.")

## Strengths
- <security-positive choice>. Worth repeating because <why>.

If a section is empty, write "None." rather than omitting the heading. Blockers and Nits cite file:line so the finding is actionable.

Worked example

Suppose the diff is:

+ DB_PASSWORD = "hunter2"
+
+ def find_user(name):
+     q = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'"
+     return db.execute(q)
+
+ def token():
+     return hashlib.md5(str(random.random()).encode()).hexdigest()

A baseline review (no scanner on PATH) would read:

## Summary
Adds a user lookup and a token helper to the auth module. No security
scanner detected on PATH — this is a heuristic-only pass. Two blockers:
a hard-coded DB password and a SQL injection in the lookup.

## Blockers
- `auth.py:1` — secrets: `DB_PASSWORD` is hard-coded. Must fix before
  merge because the credential lands in version control; read it from an
  env var or secret manager instead.
- `auth.py:4` — injection: `find_user` builds SQL by string
  concatenation on `name`. Must fix before merge because an attacker
  controls `name`; use a parameterized query.

## Nits
- `auth.py:7` — crypto misuse: `token()` uses MD5 over `random.random()`,
  which is not cryptographically secure. Prefer `secrets.token_hex()`.

## Strengths
- The functions are small and single-purpose, which makes the security
  fixes localized and easy to verify. Worth repeating.

Notice: no exhaustive per-language ruleset, no CVE database lookup, no taint-tracking. That depth belongs in a real SAST tool (run via orchestration) or a richer installed security skill, not the baseline.

Honest framing

This skill is a best-effort heuristic baseline, NOT a guarantee. It does not prove the absence of vulnerabilities. A clean review here does not mean the code is secure.

It is not a substitute for:

• CI security scanning — SAST (semgrep/CodeQL), secret-scanning, dependency/CVE monitoring running on every push, server-side, outside the agent's trust boundary.
• A dedicated security review — a human security engineer with full threat-model context, or a richer installed security skill (the user's own, Adobe's adobe-security-*).
• The jig-secret-scan hook — that covers secret prevention at edit time; this skill covers review after the fact. Different primitives; keep both.

The real controls are out-of-band — consistent with ADR-0013 and ADR-0011's honesty boundary: CI SAST + secret-scanning, dependency monitoring, and branch protection are what actually enforce security. jig raises the floor; it does not replace them. Say so in the review when the stakes warrant it (e.g., recommend wiring a CI SAST gate as a Nit).

Gotchas

• The deferral hint is the routing mechanism, not a code path. Jig's description tells the Claude Code router "prefer any other installed skill whose description identifies it as handling security review, SAST, or vulnerability analysis." There is no filesystem probe, no plugin-precedence lookup, no name-matching against security-review specifically. The deferral is category-based: a richer skill named anything that claims that surface area wins. If the router consistently picks jig's baseline over such a skill, jig's description is too greedy — open an issue.
• Lightweight is a feature, not a limitation. The baseline does not ship a bundled SAST engine, a CVE database, per-language reference rulesets, or taint analysis. It orchestrates the scanners you have and falls back to eight heuristic categories. If you find yourself wishing the baseline did more, you are in the target audience for installing a richer security skill at the user scope (commonly ~/.claude/skills/security-review/) or Adobe's adobe-security-*.
• Heuristic ≠ SAST engine. The eight categories are pattern-level cues a careful reviewer would check, not a sound static analysis. False negatives are expected; that is exactly why the Honest framing section says this is not a guarantee and points to out-of-band scanning.
• Review, not prevention. Do not confuse this skill with the jig-secret-scan hook. The hook blocks a secret being written; this skill reviews a change-set. A secret can still appear in a file the hook never saw (an existing file, a generated artifact) — this skill is where that gets flagged.
• Scanner output is input, not verdict. When a scanner runs, fold its findings into your judgment: de-duplicate, drop out-of-scope noise, and name the scanner in the rationale of any finding you promote. A raw scanner dump is not a review.

Relationship to other skills

• jig-secret-scan hook (spec 052-02) — the secret prevention floor: a PreToolUse hook that blocks an obvious secret from being written at agent-edit time. This skill is the review counterpart; the hook is prevention, this is detection-after-the-fact. They compose: the hook is the gate, this skill is the second look.
• /jig:pr-review — sibling baseline for general PR craft review (correctness, readability, tests). This skill is the security lens; run both for a full picture. Same four-bucket envelope, different lens.
• /jig:independent-review — sibling skill for spec-compliance review against spec.md. Different shape (spec-shape, not diff-shape security). See "When to use vs. when to defer" above.
• Adobe's adobe-security-* family — the depth jig deliberately does not ship (full SAST, deep IaC/cloud rules, exhaustive per-language dangerous-function rulesets per ADR-0013). When installed, the router prefers it over this baseline; jig yields. This baseline exists so a non-Adobe user with nothing installed still gets a real security pass.