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Tauri shell standards — the IPC 5-step capability flow, command implementation pattern, and capability/permission wiring. Load for new IPC capabilities and changes to commands.rs / tauri-client.ts / capabilities/.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
Shared write-side contract every domain AUTHOR imports — how to implement reliably, the smallest-diff rule, validation gates, and the never-approve-your-own-work rule. The write-side mirror of token-efficiency. Load at the start of any implementation task.
Shared context-discipline contract every agent imports — context-source priority, read budget, confidence-stop, the severity rubric, and terse output. Load at the start of any review or implementation task.
General repo rules enforced by ESLint/TypeScript/CI — PRs-only, never bypass lint, import ordering, type imports, path privacy, commit format. Load for any code change.
Browser-extension + bridge standards — MV3 (Chrome + Firefox), least-privilege permissions, the loopback pairing-token auth model, the shared TS↔Rust wire protocol, and the Chrome Web Store + Firefox AMO store-policy + pre-submission checklist. Load for changes under apps/extension/**, extension_bridge/, and the extension protocol.
React renderer standards — ports & adapters (service hooks), design tokens, motion tokens, @ajh/ui primitives, i18n, feature isolation, React Query, a11y. Load for changes under apps/desktop/src/renderer/**.
Rust/Tauri backend standards — L0–L3 layers, centralized platform/net/error ownership, Rust-first business logic, registries, error handling. Load for changes under apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/**.
| name | tauri-standards |
| description | Tauri shell standards — the IPC 5-step capability flow, command implementation pattern, and capability/permission wiring. Load for new IPC capabilities and changes to commands.rs / tauri-client.ts / capabilities/. |
packages/shared/src/ipc/contracts.ts — add the typed signature (Zod schema).apps/desktop/src-tauri/src/commands.rs — implement the Tauri command (typed AppResult, no Result<_,String>).apps/desktop/src/tauri-client.ts — wire the invoke call.apps/desktop/src/renderer/services/ — add the React Query service hook (no window.api in UI).services/query-client.ts — add the query key.Missing any step = an incomplete capability (HIGH). The contract in packages/shared is the single source of truth.
capabilities/default.json — an exposed-but-unlisted command, or an over-broad capability, is a security finding (defer the security lens to tauri-security-reviewer).Renderer talks to the shell only via the AppClient context (createTauriInvokeClient() in apps/desktop/src/tauri-client.ts). No direct invoke in features/routes/components.
packages/shared — no React, no Node APIs.packages/ui — no Zustand, no IPC, no routing.packages/prompts — no UI, no window.Latest stable Tauri 2.10.x. v2 model = permissions (per-command) + scopes (arg validators) + capabilities (bind sets to windows); no command is exposed by default. https://v2.tauri.app/security/
capabilities/*.json; scope to specific windows/webviews; prefer allow-scopes; never ship *-style fs/shell/http. https://v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/app.security.csp in tauri.conf.json; no unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval (Tauri hashes/nonces local assets). https://v2.tauri.app/security/csp/#[tauri::command] as an untrusted entry point; validate/sanitize args in Rust; keep the command set minimal; gate sensitive commands behind their own narrow capability.app.security.pattern = "isolation" to verify IPC in a sandboxed iframe whenever the frontend renders any remote/untrusted content. https://v2.tauri.app/concept/inter-process-communication/isolation/plugins.updater.pubkey; private key + password offline (CI secret only); HTTPS manifests. https://v2.tauri.app/plugin/updater/cargo audit clean (e.g. RUSTSEC-2026-0098 rustls-webpki can reach the updater/HTTP TLS stack); minimize plugins; track https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/security/advisoriesCommon mistakes: over-broad capabilities (one capability → every plugin permission → every window); leaving shell/fs/withGlobalTauri open in prod; weak/default CSP (unsafe-inline); trusting command args without Rust-side validation; committing the updater private key or disabling signature verification; skipping cargo audit so a transitive advisory ships silently.