Skip to main content 홈 크리에이터 seaworld008 commonly-used-high-value-skills security-review
security-review Security code review for vulnerabilities. Use when asked to \"security review\", \"find vulnerabilities\", \"check for security issues\", \"audit security\", \"OWASP review\", or review code for injection, XSS, authentication, authorization, cryptography issues. Provides systematic review with confidence-based reporting.
설치로 이동 Skills Marketplace 커뮤니티가 만든 AI 스킬을 발견하고 탐색하세요.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
직접 명령은 검토 Prompt를 거치지 않습니다. 실행하기 전에 소스를 확인하세요.
npx skills add https://github.com/seaworld008/Commonly-used-high-value-skills --skill security-review명령은 한 줄로 유지됩니다. 복사하기 전에 가로로 스크롤해 전체 내용을 확인하세요.
로컬 사본을 원하시나요? SkillsMP에서 현재 제공할 수 있는 파일을 다운로드하세요.
Zip 다운로드 다운로드 중... Design production-grade multi-agent orchestration systems. Covers five core patterns (sequential pipeline, parallel fan-out/fan-in, hierarchical delegation, event-driven, consensus), platform-specific implementations, handoff protocols, state management, error recovery, context window budgeting, and cost optimization.
name security-review description Security code review for vulnerabilities. Use when asked to \"security review\", \"find vulnerabilities\", \"check for security issues\", \"audit security\", \"OWASP review\", or review code for injection, XSS, authentication, authorization, cryptography issues. Provides systematic review with confidence-based reporting. zh_description 用于安全、评审，支持安全扫描、审计、加固和风险治理。 version 1.0.0 author seaworld008 source github:getsentry/skills source_url https://skills.sh/getsentry/skills/security-review license Apache-2.0 tags ["review", "security"] created_at 2026-06-21 updated_at 2026-06-21 quality 5 complexity intermediate allowed-tools Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Task
Security Review Skill
Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.
Scope: Research vs. Reporting
CRITICAL DISTINCTION:
Report on : Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the userResearch : The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting
Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:
Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)
Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?
How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)
What framework protections exist?
Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.
Confidence Levels
Level Criteria Action HIGH Vulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmed Report with severityMEDIUM Vulnerable pattern, input source unclear Note as "Needs verification"LOW Theoretical, best practice, defense-in-depth Do not report
Do Not Flag
General Rules
Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)
Dead code, commented code, documentation strings
Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration
Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)
Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)
These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:
Source Example Why It's Safe Django settings settings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTSSet via config/env at deployment Environment variables os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL')
Config files config.yaml, app.config['KEY']Server-side files
Framework constants django.conf.settings.*Not user-modifiable
Hardcoded values BASE_URL = "https://api.internal"Compile-time constants
SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL} {path} " )
SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url' ))
Framework-Mitigated Patterns Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:
Pattern Why It's Usually Safe Django {{ variable }} Auto-escaped by default React {variable} Auto-escaped by default Vue {{ variable }} Auto-escaped by default User.objects.filter(id=input)ORM parameterizes queries cursor.execute("...%s", (input,))Parameterized query innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>"Constant string, no user input
Django: {{ var|safe }}, {% autoescape off %}, mark_safe(user_input)
React: dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}
Vue: v-html="userInput"
ORM: .raw(), .extra(), RawSQL() with string interpolation
Review Process
1. Detect Context What type of code am I reviewing?
Code Type Load These References API endpoints, routes authorization.md, authentication.md, injection.mdFrontend, templates xss.md, csrf.mdFile handling, uploads file-security.mdCrypto, secrets, tokens cryptography.md, data-protection.mdData serialization deserialization.mdExternal requests ssrf.mdBusiness workflows business-logic.mdGraphQL, REST design api-security.mdConfig, headers, CORS misconfiguration.mdCI/CD, dependencies supply-chain.mdError handling error-handling.mdAudit, logging logging.md
2. Load Language Guide Based on file extension or imports:
Indicators Guide .py, django, flask, fastapilanguages/python.md.js, .ts, express, react, vue, nextlanguages/javascript.md.go, go.modlanguages/go.md.rs, Cargo.tomllanguages/rust.md.java, spring, @Controllerlanguages/java.md
3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable) File Type Guide Dockerfile, .dockerignoreinfrastructure/docker.mdK8s manifests, Helm charts infrastructure/kubernetes.md.tf, Terraforminfrastructure/terraform.mdGitHub Actions, .gitlab-ci.yml infrastructure/ci-cd.mdAWS/GCP/Azure configs, IAM infrastructure/cloud.md
4. Research Before Flagging For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:
Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.
Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?
Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?
What framework protections apply?
Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.
5. Verify Exploitability For each potential finding, confirm:
Is the input attacker-controlled?
Attacker-Controlled (Investigate) Server-Controlled (Usually Safe) request.GET, request.POST, request.argssettings.X, app.config['X']request.json, request.data, request.bodyos.environ.get('X')request.headers (most headers)Hardcoded constants request.cookies (unsigned)Internal service URLs from config URL path segments: /users/<id>/ Database content from admin/system File uploads (content and names) Signed session data Database content from other users Framework settings WebSocket messages
Does the framework mitigate this?
Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization
Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize
Is there validation upstream?
Input validation before this code
Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)
6. Report HIGH Confidence Only Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.
Severity Classification Severity Impact Examples Critical Direct exploit, severe impact, no auth required RCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets High Exploitable with conditions, significant impact Stored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data Medium Specific conditions required, moderate impact Reflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal Low Defense-in-depth, minimal direct impact Missing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context
Quick Patterns Reference
Always Flag (Critical) eval(user_input) # Any language
exec(user_input) # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data) # Python
yaml.load(user_data) # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data) # PHP
deserialize(user_data) # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user) # Node.js
Always Flag (High) innerHTML = userInput # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user} # React XSS
v-html="userInput" # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}" # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}` # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}") # Command injection
Always Flag (Secrets) password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"
Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging) # SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url']) # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?
# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file']) # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}") # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?
# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next']) # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content) # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password) # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random() # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets module
Output Format ## Security Review: [File/Component Name]
### Summary
- **Findings** : X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level** : Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence** : High/Mixed
### Findings
#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location** : `file.py:123`
- **Confidence** : High
- **Issue** : [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact** : [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence** :
```python
[Vulnerable code snippet]
Needs Verification
[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
Location : file.py:456Question : [What needs to be verified]
If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."
---
## Reference Files
### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |
### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js
- `go.md` - Go-specific security patterns
- `rust.md` - Rust unsafe blocks, FFI security
- `java.md` - Spring, Java EE patterns
### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container security
- `kubernetes.md` - K8s RBAC, secrets, policies
- `terraform.md` - IaC security
- `ci-cd.md` - Pipeline security
- `cloud.md` - AWS/GCP/Azure security
