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validator-migration-cutover
Use when migrating validator workloads with freeze, key uniqueness, cutover, rollback, and downstream verification.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
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Use when migrating validator workloads with freeze, key uniqueness, cutover, rollback, and downstream verification.
Codex 또는 Claude로 설치 이 Prompt를 복사해 Codex, Claude 또는 다른 어시스턴트에 붙여 넣으면 Skill 페이지를 검토하고 설치를 진행할 수 있습니다.
SOC 직업 분류 기준
Use when changing or deploying a public blockchain node-guides service, its source data, UI, contribution content, or cache.
Audit servers to identify blockchain nodes, listening ports, and effective network exposure.
Use when exiting, retiring, or decommissioning a validator with transaction, unbonding, key-retention, and shutdown gates.
Use during validator incidents for slashing-risk assessment, forensics, recovery, and external verification.
Use when onboarding or registering a validator with readiness, key-custody, parameter, transaction, and monitoring gates.
Use when recovering validator or full nodes from snapshots with integrity, state, rollback, and sync verification.
| name | validator-migration-cutover |
| description | Use when migrating validator workloads with freeze, key uniqueness, cutover, rollback, and downstream verification. |
Use for moving a validator, sentry, or full-node workload between authorized environments.
This public skill is environment-neutral. Resolve opaque source_ref, target_ref, network_ref, signing role, service, paths, dependencies, and access policy through private knowledge and live state. Never embed or infer private infrastructure.
Confirm:
A migration request authorizes the scoped workload move. Key movement, data deletion, public endpoint changes, and source decommission require the authority applicable to those actions.
For a signing validator, the same consensus key must never be usable by two active signers.
Before any key transfer:
If key uniqueness or signer-state safety is uncertain, stop. Availability loss is preferable to double signing.
Validate the target's capacity, time synchronization, kernel/runtime, binary/image, chain ID, database backend, data ownership, firewall, P2P/RPC policy, and monitoring.
Pre-sync data while non-signing when possible. Capture source and target service definitions, immutable versions, config hashes excluding secret contents, and rollback artifacts.
Rollback is allowed only before the new signer produces blocks, unless the chain-specific procedure explicitly proves a safe reverse cutover. After target signing begins, returning to the source is a new controlled cutover.
Pause or account for automation that can race the cutover:
Record what was frozen and how it will be restored.
For non-signing workloads, omit key transfer but retain target, data, network, dependency, and rollback checks.
Completion requires:
Report the cutover timeline, anti-double-sign evidence, target health, source fence, downstream changes, rollback status, and watch period. Keep the source intact until the separately approved decommission step. Update private infrastructure/network knowledge and daily memory without copying private facts into this package.