name	rotate-key
description	Rotate a leaked or expired API-key env variable across every .env and .mcp.json file in a project, safely and without ever printing the secret. Use when a key was committed/leaked/exposed (e.g. an agent pasted it into config files) and needs replacing everywhere at once, or on scheduled credential rotation.
disable-model-invocation	true
argument-hint	["VAR_NAME"]
allowed-tools	Bash(rotate:), Bash(rotate --list:), Bash(rotate --version:*)

rotate-key

Rotate the value of a secret env variable across every .env / .env.* / .envrc / .mcp.json file in the current project, using the rotate CLI.

The whole point is to do this without leaking the secret into the transcript, the model's context, or logs. Follow these rules exactly.

Preconditions

rotate must be installed and on PATH (rotate --version). If it is not, tell the user: brew install yangsi7/tap/rotate or curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yangsi7/rotate-env/v0.1.3/install.sh | bash.
You need the variable name (e.g. ELEVENLABS_API_KEY). If $ARGUMENTS is empty, ask the user which variable to rotate.

Procedure

Preview first (never skip). Run a dry-run to show which files hold the key. This writes nothing and the value is masked:
```
rotate <VAR_NAME>
```
Show the user the list of files that would change and confirm this is what they expect.
Get the new value without exposing it. Do NOT ask the user to paste the secret into the chat, and NEVER put it on the command line (no --value flag; argv is world-readable via ps). Instead have the user provide it out-of-band, in order of preference:
- a file: they save the new key to ~/new.key, then you run rotate --apply --yes --value-file ~/new.key <VAR_NAME>;
- an env var they export in their own shell (export ROTATE_NEW_VALUE=...) before you run rotate --apply --yes <VAR_NAME>.
If neither is possible, instruct the user to run the apply command themselves in their terminal.
Apply. Once the value is supplied out-of-band, rotate everywhere non-interactively:
```
rotate --apply --yes <VAR_NAME>
```
Report the [ok] rotated ... in N file(s) result. The value stays masked (ab****yz) in all output, so it is safe to relay.
Remind the user to revoke the OLD key at the provider and to delete any temporary ~/new.key file.

Safety rules (do not violate)

Never echo, print, cat, or otherwise surface the secret value. rotate masks it; you must not un-mask it.
Never pass the secret as a command-line argument. Use --value-file or $ROTATE_NEW_VALUE.
Prefer --backup (rotate --apply --yes --backup <VAR_NAME>) when the user wants a rollback.
Scope with --root <dir> if the user only wants a subtree; default is the current directory, recursively.

rotate-key

Rotate the value of a secret env variable across every .env / .env.* / .envrc / .mcp.json file in the current project, using the rotate CLI.

The whole point is to do this without leaking the secret into the transcript, the model's context, or logs. Follow these rules exactly.

Preconditions

rotate must be installed and on PATH (rotate --version). If it is not, tell the user: brew install yangsi7/tap/rotate or curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/yangsi7/rotate-env/v0.1.3/install.sh | bash.

You need the variable name (e.g. ELEVENLABS_API_KEY). If $ARGUMENTS is empty, ask the user which variable to rotate.

Procedure

Preview first (never skip). Run a dry-run to show which files hold the key. This writes nothing and the value is masked:

rotate <VAR_NAME>

Show the user the list of files that would change and confirm this is what they expect.

Get the new value without exposing it. Do NOT ask the user to paste the secret into the chat, and NEVER put it on the command line (no --value flag; argv is world-readable via ps). Instead have the user provide it out-of-band, in order of preference:

a file: they save the new key to ~/new.key, then you run rotate --apply --yes --value-file ~/new.key <VAR_NAME>;
an env var they export in their own shell (export ROTATE_NEW_VALUE=...) before you run rotate --apply --yes <VAR_NAME>.

If neither is possible, instruct the user to run the apply command themselves in their terminal.

Apply. Once the value is supplied out-of-band, rotate everywhere non-interactively:

rotate --apply --yes <VAR_NAME>

Report the [ok] rotated ... in N file(s) result. The value stays masked (ab****yz) in all output, so it is safe to relay.

Remind the user to revoke the OLD key at the provider and to delete any temporary ~/new.key file.

Safety rules (do not violate)

Never echo, print, cat, or otherwise surface the secret value. rotate masks it; you must not un-mask it.

Never pass the secret as a command-line argument. Use --value-file or $ROTATE_NEW_VALUE.

Prefer --backup (rotate --apply --yes --backup <VAR_NAME>) when the user wants a rollback.

Scope with --root <dir> if the user only wants a subtree; default is the current directory, recursively.