picoclaw-security-guardian

name	picoclaw-security-guardian
version	0.0.3
description	Picoclaw security posture skill with advisory awareness, configuration drift detection, and supply-chain verification guidance.
homepage	https://clawsec.prompt.security
author	prompt-security
license	AGPL-3.0-or-later
picoclaw	{"emoji":"🦐","category":"security","requires":{"bins":["node"]},"test_requires":{"bins":["bash","docker","python3","node","openssl","zip"]}}

Picoclaw Security Guardian

Detailed architecture/operator docs: wiki/modules/picoclaw-security-guardian.md.

Release Artifact Verification

For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting SKILL.md, skill.json, or the archive. The skill.json file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs checksums.json with the ClawSec release key.

set -euo pipefail

SKILL_NAME="picoclaw-security-guardian"
VERSION="0.0.3"
REPO="prompt-security/clawsec"
TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}"
BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}"
ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip"
TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT

RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256="711424e4535f84093fefb024cd1ca4ec87439e53907b305b79a631d5befba9c8"

curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')"
if [ "$ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256" != "$RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: signing-public.pem fingerprint mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

openssl base64 -d -A -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" -out "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin"
openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \
  -inkey "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" \
  -sigfile "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" \
  -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" >/dev/null

hash_file() {
  if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  else
    sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  fi
}

verify_manifest_file() {
  asset="$1"
  path="$2"
  expected="$(jq -r --arg asset "$asset" '.files[$asset].sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
  if [ -z "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
  actual="$(hash_file "$path")"
  if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
}

expected_archive="$(jq -r '.archive.sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
if [ -z "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing archive.sha256" >&2
  exit 1
fi
actual_archive="$(hash_file "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME")"
if [ "$actual_archive" != "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: archive checksum mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

verify_manifest_file "SKILL.md" "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
verify_manifest_file "skill.json" "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

echo "Signed release manifest, archive, SKILL.md, and skill.json verified."

Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds.

Goal

Provide Picoclaw with the same support-matrix security capabilities ClawSec tracks for mature platform modules:

Skill name	supported platform	security feed	config drift	agent posture-review lane	chain of supply verification
picoclaw-security-guardian	Picoclaw	Yes	Yes	Separate package	Yes

Threat model

Picoclaw is a lightweight AI gateway that can expose chat channels, a Web UI, tool execution, MCP servers, credentials, schedulers, and embedded/router deployments. This skill focuses on the trust boundaries where those features become security-sensitive.

Default safety posture

• Read-only by default.
• No scheduler creation in v0.0.1.
• No outbound network by default.
• Writes only explicit report/profile outputs under $PICOCLAW_HOME/security/clawsec/ unless the operator supplies test-local temporary paths.
• Advisory checks fail closed when verification state is not verified unless the operator passes --allow-unsigned for a documented emergency/offline window.

Security advisory awareness

Use scripts/check_advisories.mjs with a local feed/cache and verification state:

node scripts/check_advisories.mjs   --feed ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/feed.json   --state ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/feed-verification-state.json

The script filters advisories for picoclaw, ai-gateway, empty/all-platform advisories, or affected package entries containing picoclaw. The expected feed input is the consolidated signed ClawSec advisory feed, so it can contain NVD CVEs, approved community advisories, and provisional GHSA-without-CVE records.

Drift protection

Generate a deterministic profile:

node scripts/generate_profile.mjs   --output ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/current-profile.json

Compare against an approved baseline:

node scripts/check_drift.mjs   --baseline ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/baseline-profile.json   --current ~/.picoclaw/security/clawsec/current-profile.json   --fail-on critical

Critical drift includes public Web UI enablement, Web UI auth disablement, workspace restriction disablement, unsigned/insecure verification mode, verified-feed regression, and watched-file/release-artifact fingerprint changes.

Chain-of-supply verification

Verify a Picoclaw release artifact against a checksum manifest plus detached signature. Signed manifest verification is required for a passing supply-chain verdict:

node scripts/verify_supply_chain.mjs \
  --artifact ./picoclaw \
  --checksums ./checksums.json \
  --signature ./checksums.json.sig \
  --public-key ./feed-signing-public.pem

Checksum-only mode is integrity-only, not provenance. Use --allow-unsigned-checksums only for short, documented offline triage windows; it should not satisfy production install verification.

Operator review notes

• Treat public UI binding (0.0.0.0, -public) as a critical review item until auth and network allowlists are proven.
• Treat MCP servers as separate trust boundaries; review each server's filesystem, network, and credential access.
• Treat third-party OpenWrt/LuCI wrappers as separate supply-chain artifacts. Verify provenance before installing them on routers.
• Never leave unsigned advisory mode enabled in recurring or production checks.

Validation

python utils/validate_skill.py skills/picoclaw-security-guardian
node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/profile.test.mjs
node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/drift.test.mjs
node skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/supply_chain.test.mjs
bash -n skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/picoclaw_security_guardian_sandbox_regression.sh

Pre-release install regression

Before publishing v0.0.1 release artifacts, run the isolated install lane from the repo root:

skills/picoclaw-security-guardian/test/picoclaw_security_guardian_sandbox_regression.sh

The regression installs the skill through Picoclaw's own find_skills / install_skill path from a local ClawHub-compatible registry into an isolated Docker-hosted Picoclaw workspace with isolated HOME, PICOCLAW_HOME, and PICOCLAW_WORKSPACE. It verifies signed release-artifact preflight inputs, confirms Picoclaw's skill loader can list/load the installed skill, then runs the installed copy's profile, drift, advisory fail-closed, advisory filtering, and supply-chain verification paths against Picoclaw-style config.json and launcher-config.json files.