| name | exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1 |
| description | Exploit misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) ESC1 vulnerability to request certificates as high-privileged users and escalate domain privileges during authorized red team assessments. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | red-teaming |
| tags | ["red-team","active-directory","ad-cs","esc1","certificate-abuse","privilege-escalation","domain-escalation"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| d3fend_techniques | ["File Metadata Consistency Validation","Certificate Analysis","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","Platform Hardening"] |
| nist_csf | ["ID.RA-01","GV.OV-02","DE.AE-07"] |
Exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1
Overview
ESC1 (Escalation Scenario 1) is a critical misconfiguration in Active Directory Certificate Services where a certificate template allows a low-privileged user to request a certificate on behalf of any other user, including Domain Admins. The vulnerability exists when a template has the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag enabled (also called "Supply in Request"), combined with an Extended Key Usage (EKU) that permits client authentication (Client Authentication, PKINIT Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, or Any Purpose). This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the certificate request, effectively impersonating any domain user. ESC1 was documented by SpecterOps researchers Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen in their "Certified Pre-Owned" whitepaper (2021) and remains one of the most common AD CS attack paths. The MITRE ATT&CK framework tracks this as T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates).
When to Use
- When performing authorized security testing that involves exploiting active directory certificate services esc1
- When analyzing malware samples or attack artifacts in a controlled environment
- When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
- When building detection capabilities based on offensive technique understanding
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
Objectives
- Enumerate AD CS infrastructure and certificate templates using Certify or Certipy
- Identify vulnerable ESC1 templates with "Supply in Request" enabled
- Request a certificate specifying a Domain Admin in the SAN field
- Authenticate using the forged certificate via PKINIT to obtain a TGT
- Escalate privileges to Domain Admin using the obtained Kerberos ticket
- Document the full attack chain for the engagement report
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- T1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
- T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- T1484 - Domain Policy Modification
- T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account
Workflow
Phase 1: AD CS Enumeration
- Enumerate Certificate Authority (CA) servers in the domain:
