adversarial-security-sweep

name	adversarial-security-sweep
description	Multi-pass, multi-lens security review that reinforces detection through independent blind finder passes and an adversarial refute pass. Use when reviewing an owned or authorized codebase/change for vulnerabilities with high confidence, or when a change touches auth, data, crypto, external input, dependencies, or build/config files. Static by default; no live target required.

Adversarial Security Sweep

Trigger

Use this skill when the user wants a thorough security review of code they own or are authorized to review — "audit security", "find vulnerabilities", "harden this", "review this change for security" — and false negatives are costly. Also use it as the security lens of a broader review when a diff touches auth, data, crypto, external input, dependencies, or build/config files.

This is a static/read workflow. For active testing against a running target, use pentest-specialist and its authorization gate first.

Doctrine

Load SECURITY_AND_PENTEST.md. Single-pass review is unreliable; this skill reinforces detection with independent passes and only trusts findings that survive cross-checking (cross-fitting applied to detection — see DIRECTIVE_CHALLENGE_AND_CAUSAL_INFERENCE.md).

Workflow

1. Scope. Confirm the target is owned or authorized. Identify the changed or in-scope surface (diff, module, or repo) and sketch a lightweight STRIDE threat model. Weight build/config and dependency files first — supply-chain compromise is the demonstrated real-world failure mode.
2. Run independent finder passes, one per lens, blind to each other:
   • access-control (authz on every boundary, tenant/account isolation, IDOR)
   • injection/input (SQL/NoSQL/command/template/path, escaping)
   • secrets/crypto (secrets in code/logs/config, weak crypto, transport)
   • supply-chain/config (use references/supply-chain-iocs.md: appended config code, obfuscation markers, child_process/eval in config, dynamic require in ESM, suspicious dependency bumps, zero-width Unicode)
   • ssrf/outbound (user-controlled URLs, metadata endpoints, allow-listing) Delegate individual lenses to bounded sub-agents when the harness supports it; keep the reconciliation on the master thread.
3. Adversarial refute pass. For each candidate finding, independently try to refute it: is it reachable? already mitigated by an existing control? a false positive? Credit severity only on the residual exposure after existing mitigations. Default to "not confirmed" when reachability is uncertain.
4. Loop until dry. Repeat finder passes until a round surfaces nothing new. Deduplicate against everything seen (confirmed and refuted) so refuted items do not reappear.
5. Report to references/security-review-contract.md.

Guardrails

• Owned or authorized targets only.
• Do not rate a finding by its raw scanner label; rate residual exposure after existing mitigations.
• Do not report a category clean unless a lens examined it; list skipped surfaces under not-examined.
• Keep security judgment on the strongest reasoning path; delegate only bounded, verifiable lens work.
• No offensive, evasive, or self-propagating tooling; no real data exfiltration.

Output

Return the run-level and per-finding fields from the output contract: confirmed findings severity-ordered, refuted/downgraded candidates separately, lenses run, finder-round count, adversarial-pass status, not-examined surfaces, and residual risk.