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deep-scan

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Atualizado11 de junho de 2026 às 20:08

Whole-file deep reader — finds bugs by READING risk-ranked files in full and reasoning from first principles, not by grepping for known patterns. Catches the long tail (project-specific wrappers, business logic, cross-function flaws) that pattern-gated producers structurally miss. Token-expensive; budget-bounded and risk-ranked. Promotes leads into .kuzushi/findings.json (source "deep-scan").

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allsmog

allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

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Ocupações relacionadasSOC

Baseado na classificação ocupacional SOC

Analistas de segurança da informaçãoInformática e Matemática·SOC 15-1212

SKILL.md

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name	deep-scan
description	Whole-file deep reader — finds bugs by READING risk-ranked files in full and reasoning from first principles, not by grepping for known patterns. Catches the long tail (project-specific wrappers, business logic, cross-function flaws) that pattern-gated producers structurally miss. Token-expensive; budget-bounded and risk-ranked. Promotes leads into .kuzushi/findings.json (source "deep-scan").
context	command
runner	scripts/cmd/deep-scan-run.mjs
user-invocable	false

Deep scan

Find the bugs the pattern scanners can't see. Every other producer starts from a ripgrep hit; this one starts from the files. It reads the highest-risk files in full and reasons about what could actually go wrong — the way a human auditor finds the bug that doesn't look like any CVE.

Prefer the provider-neutral command: KUZUSHI_MODEL="${KUZUSHI_MODEL:-openai-codex:gpt-5.5}" node "<plugin root>/scripts/cmd/deep-scan-run.mjs" --target "<repo root>". It performs prepare -> configured LLM bridge -> finalize without depending on a Claude subagent runtime. To go wider, pass --input '{"maxFiles":50}'; to scope a subtree, '{"scopeDir":"src/api"}'.
Manual fallback only when the runner is unavailable: run node "<plugin root>/scripts/cmd/deep-scan-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>", read each listed file in full, write { candidates: [...] } to draftPath, then run the returned assembleCommand.
For each file, emit hypotheses: verdict (finding / candidate / rejected), a rationale (the trusted assumption that breaks + the attacker path), cwe, and evidenceAnchors.
Pipeline to verification — use the panel by default. Deep-read findings are strong leads but were not gated by a deterministic rule, so they carry the highest false-positive risk. Run /verify --input '{"panel":3}' on them: the multi-lens majority (reachability / guard-bypass / impact) is what keeps the extra recall from arriving as noise. Single-pass /verify is fine for pattern-gated findings; for deep-scan leads the panel is the default, not the exception.
Report the findings, and explicitly state the unreadCount so coverage stays honest — offer a follow-up /deep-scan over the remainder if it's non-zero.

When NOT to use

For a fast, cheap pass over known bug-classes — use the pattern producers (/taint-analysis, /authz, /logic-hunt, /crypto-review, /systems-hunt). Deep-scan is for depth and the long tail, and it costs real tokens.
On a tiny diff — use /diff-review. On a single known file — read it directly.
To confirm an existing finding — that's /verify / /poc.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The pattern scanners already ran, so the repo's covered." → They only saw lines a regex matched. The whole point of deep-scan is the bugs no pattern names; running it is how you find them, not a duplicate pass.
"maxFiles covered the important stuff, ignore unreadCount." → unreadCount > 0 means the repo is not fully read. Report it and offer the follow-up pass; never imply full coverage you didn't achieve.
"Reading every file is too expensive." → That's why it's risk-ranked and budgeted. The trade is tokens-for-recall, made explicitly — not skipped silently.
"It looks like normal framework code." → Framework-shaped code with a custom wrapper is exactly where the pattern tools fail and deep reading wins. Judge the behavior.

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Measure recall / precision / false-proof rate of the pipeline against a ground-truth manifest. Scores either the bundled planted-vulnerability corpus (regression) or a live run's findings.json against a manifest you supply. Deterministic — no agent, no network. Use to prove a change to the producers helps rather than hurts.

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name	deep-scan
description	Whole-file deep reader — finds bugs by READING risk-ranked files in full and reasoning from first principles, not by grepping for known patterns. Catches the long tail (project-specific wrappers, business logic, cross-function flaws) that pattern-gated producers structurally miss. Token-expensive; budget-bounded and risk-ranked. Promotes leads into .kuzushi/findings.json (source "deep-scan").
context	command
runner	scripts/cmd/deep-scan-run.mjs
user-invocable	false

Deep scan

Prefer the provider-neutral command: KUZUSHI_MODEL="${KUZUSHI_MODEL:-openai-codex:gpt-5.5}" node "<plugin root>/scripts/cmd/deep-scan-run.mjs" --target "<repo root>". It performs prepare -> configured LLM bridge -> finalize without depending on a Claude subagent runtime. To go wider, pass --input '{"maxFiles":50}'; to scope a subtree, '{"scopeDir":"src/api"}'.
Manual fallback only when the runner is unavailable: run node "<plugin root>/scripts/cmd/deep-scan-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>", read each listed file in full, write { candidates: [...] } to draftPath, then run the returned assembleCommand.
For each file, emit hypotheses: verdict (finding / candidate / rejected), a rationale (the trusted assumption that breaks + the attacker path), cwe, and evidenceAnchors.
Pipeline to verification — use the panel by default. Deep-read findings are strong leads but were not gated by a deterministic rule, so they carry the highest false-positive risk. Run /verify --input '{"panel":3}' on them: the multi-lens majority (reachability / guard-bypass / impact) is what keeps the extra recall from arriving as noise. Single-pass /verify is fine for pattern-gated findings; for deep-scan leads the panel is the default, not the exception.
Report the findings, and explicitly state the unreadCount so coverage stays honest — offer a follow-up /deep-scan over the remainder if it's non-zero.

When NOT to use

For a fast, cheap pass over known bug-classes — use the pattern producers (/taint-analysis, /authz, /logic-hunt, /crypto-review, /systems-hunt). Deep-scan is for depth and the long tail, and it costs real tokens.
On a tiny diff — use /diff-review. On a single known file — read it directly.
To confirm an existing finding — that's /verify / /poc.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The pattern scanners already ran, so the repo's covered." → They only saw lines a regex matched. The whole point of deep-scan is the bugs no pattern names; running it is how you find them, not a duplicate pass.
"maxFiles covered the important stuff, ignore unreadCount." → unreadCount > 0 means the repo is not fully read. Report it and offer the follow-up pass; never imply full coverage you didn't achieve.
"Reading every file is too expensive." → That's why it's risk-ranked and budgeted. The trade is tokens-for-recall, made explicitly — not skipped silently.
"It looks like normal framework code." → Framework-shaped code with a custom wrapper is exactly where the pattern tools fail and deep reading wins. Judge the behavior.