secure-agent-orchestration-review

name	secure-agent-orchestration-review
description	Use when reviewing delegation, skill loading, tool access, worker prompts, artifacts, runtime config, state, ownership, or subprocess execution.
origin	pi-crew
triggers	["review delegation","check skill security","audit prompts","security review","orchestration audit"]

secure-agent-orchestration-review

Core principle: every delegated worker crosses trust boundaries. Safe orchestration requires contained paths, explicit ownership, scoped tools, non-invasive defaults, and prompt-injection resistance.

Distilled from detailed reads of security notice, insecure-defaults, sharp-edges, differential-review, guardrail, and skill quality patterns.

Trust Boundaries

Review:

• parent session ↔ child Pi worker;
• user prompt ↔ generated task packet;
• project skills ↔ package skills;
• global config ↔ project config;
• artifacts/logs ↔ future prompts/UI;
• mailbox/respond/steer/cancel ↔ session ownership;
• external skills/docs ↔ prompt injection/tool poisoning;
• runtime env/CLI args ↔ provider/model behavior.

Must-Check Findings

• Unsafe defaults: scaffold mode unexpectedly enabled, dangerous limits, missing depth guards, overbroad tools.
• Path containment: cwd override escape, symlink traversal, unsafe skill names, absolute path leakage.
• Prompt injection: untrusted output treated as instruction, skill metadata overtrusted, missing precedence text.
• Secrets: env/config/log/artifact/diagnostic leakage.
• Destructive commands: delete/prune/reset/force push without explicit confirmation.
• Ownership races: authorization checked outside lock, stale task/manifest written after re-read.
• Supply chain: external skill content imported without review, unknown tool requirements, hidden commands.

Secure Defaults for pi-crew

• Real execution should be explicit and disable-able, but generated config must not accidentally block normal workflows.
• Project overrides should be contained to the project root.
• Missing/invalid config should fall back safely.
• Skills should be loaded by safe name and source-labeled without absolute path disclosure.
• Worker prompts should state instruction precedence and treat artifacts as data.

Enforcement — Secure Agent Orchestration Review Gate

Before reporting security findings, verify:

• All trust boundaries examined (parent↔child, user↔task packet, project↔package skills, etc.)
• Must-check findings covered: unsafe defaults, path containment, prompt injection, secrets, destructive commands, ownership races, supply chain
• Finding format complete: severity, path/symbol, scenario, fix, verification
• Must-fix security issues separated from hardening suggestions
• Verification commands provided for each finding

If ANY answer is NO → Stop. Complete security review before reporting.

Finding Format

Include severity, path/symbol, scenario, fix, and verification. Separate must-fix security issues from hardening suggestions.

Anti-Patterns

• Don't skip checking for unsafe defaults in configuration
• Don't trust agent output without verifying path containment
• Don't skip prompt injection checks when processing user input
• Don't skip secrets detection in environment and config files
• Don't skip checking for ownership race conditions in concurrent operations