vuln-hunter

name	vuln-hunter
description	Hunt for vulnerabilities in a running debuggee by analyzing imports/exports, triaging attack surface, and iteratively testing for bugs with PoC generation.
allowed-tools	mcp__x64dbg__list_sessions, mcp__x64dbg__connect_to_session, mcp__x64dbg__get_debugger_status, mcp__x64dbg__read_memory, mcp__x64dbg__get_register, mcp__x64dbg__get_all_registers, mcp__x64dbg__set_register, mcp__x64dbg__disassemble, mcp__x64dbg__set_breakpoint, mcp__x64dbg__clear_breakpoint, mcp__x64dbg__list_breakpoints, mcp__x64dbg__step_over, mcp__x64dbg__step_into, mcp__x64dbg__go, mcp__x64dbg__pause, mcp__x64dbg__run_to_return, mcp__x64dbg__set_comment, mcp__x64dbg__set_label, mcp__x64dbg__get_symbol, mcp__x64dbg__get_label, mcp__x64dbg__eval_expression, mcp__x64dbg__execute_command, mcp__x64dbg__refresh_gui, mcp__x64dbg__get_memory_map, mcp__x64dbg__trace_over, mcp__x64dbg__trace_into, mcp__x64dbg__write_memory, mcp__x64dbg__allocate_memory, mcp__x64dbg__assemble, mcp__x64dbg__get_latest_event, mcp__x64dbg__wait_for_event, mcp__x64dbg__start_session, mcp__x64dbg__terminate_session, mcp__x64dbg__disconnect, AskUserQuestion, Bash, Read, Write, Skill

vuln-hunter

Hunt for vulnerabilities in a running debuggee. Performs import/export reconnaissance, triages attack surface by I/O context, then iteratively tests for bugs (buffer overflows, integer wraps, logic flaws, etc.) and builds proof-of-concept exploits.

Prerequisites

• The target program must be loaded in x64dbg and paused (at entrypoint or a function of interest)
• Be conservative with the context window — disassemble on demand, read memory on demand, do not dump large regions speculatively

Instructions

1. Connect and verify state

Confirm the debugger is connected and the debuggee is paused:

1. Call mcp__x64dbg__get_debugger_status — verify status is paused
2. If running, call mcp__x64dbg__pause
3. Call mcp__x64dbg__get_register for rip (64-bit) or eip (32-bit) to determine bitness and current location
4. Call mcp__x64dbg__get_memory_map to get an overview of loaded modules

Note the main module name and base address for subsequent steps.

IF the debuggee looks packed (e.g., entry point is in a non-standard section, imports look obfuscated, or YARA signatures match known packers), run the /find-oep skill first to unpack and find the real entry point.

2. Reconnaissance — imports and exports

The goal is to identify all program entry points that handle external (attacker-controllable) input.

2a. Enumerate imports and exports

Use the LIEF-based enumeration script to parse the PE's imports, exports, and security features:

Bash("python ${SKILL_DIR}/enum_imports.py <target_pe_path> --output imports.json")

Packed binaries: LIEF parses the on-disk PE, so packed binaries will show only the packer's minimal IAT (e.g. GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA). For packed targets:

1. Unpack first (e.g. via /find-oep)
2. Take a /state-snapshot to dump all memory to disk
3. Re-run the script with --snapshot-dir <snapshot_dir> --base <module_base> to parse the resolved IAT from the memory dump instead

Read the output and the generated JSON. Categorize each import by I/O context:

Category	Example APIs
Network	recv, recvfrom, WSARecv, InternetReadFile, HttpQueryInfo, WinHttpReadData, getaddrinfo
File	ReadFile, CreateFileA/W, fread, fgets, MapViewOfFile, NtReadFile, mmioOpen, mmioRead
Registry	RegQueryValueExA/W, RegGetValueA/W, RegEnumValueA/W
Environment	GetEnvironmentVariableA/W, getenv
Command line	GetCommandLineA/W, CommandLineToArgvW
Clipboard / UI	GetClipboardData, GetWindowTextA/W, GetDlgItemTextA/W
IPC / Pipes	ReadFile on pipe handles, PeekNamedPipe, TransactNamedPipe
Memory / String	memcpy, strcpy, strcat, sprintf, wcscat, lstrcpyA/W, MultiByteToWideChar — these are sinks, not sources, but are critical for buffer overflow detection
Allocation	malloc, HeapAlloc, VirtualAlloc, LocalAlloc, GlobalAlloc — track buffer sizes

Also note dangerous formatting/conversion functions: sprintf, vsprintf, swprintf, sscanf, atoi, atol, strtol — these may be involved in format string or integer conversion bugs.

Exports indicate externally callable interfaces (DLL entry points, COM interfaces, etc.) that may accept untrusted input.

2c. Find cross-references to I/O functions

For each interesting import identified above, find where it is called in the main module.

Preferred approach — IAT byte-pattern search via Python/LIEF:

The most reliable way to find xrefs is to search the .text section for byte patterns that reference IAT entries. This works even when the debugger's findcalls command fails or returns incomplete results. Write and run an inline Python script:

import lief, struct

binary = lief.parse("<target_pe_path>")
disk_base = binary.optional_header.imagebase   # e.g. 0x400000
runtime_base = <module_base>                    # e.g. 0x160000
rebase = runtime_base - disk_base

# Get .text section bytes
text = [s for s in binary.sections if s.name == '.text'][0]
text_data = bytes(text.content)
text_va = disk_base + text.virtual_address

# For each import, compute IAT VA using DISK base (not runtime base!)
for imp in binary.imports:
    for entry in imp.entries:
        disk_iat_va = disk_base + entry.iat_address

        # Search for FF 15 <iat_va_le> (call dword ptr [IAT]) — direct callers
        pattern_call = b'\xff\x15' + struct.pack('<I', disk_iat_va)
        # Search for FF 25 <iat_va_le> (jmp dword ptr [IAT]) — thunk stub
        pattern_jmp = b'\xff\x25' + struct.pack('<I', disk_iat_va)

        # Find all occurrences in .text
        for i in range(len(text_data) - 5):
            chunk = text_data[i:i+6]
            if chunk == pattern_call:
                caller_runtime = text_va + i + rebase
                # Record direct caller
            elif chunk == pattern_jmp:
                thunk_runtime = text_va + i + rebase
                # Record thunk address

        # For thunks: also find E8 <rel32> callers of the thunk
        if thunk_found:
            thunk_disk = thunk_runtime - rebase
            for i in ((text_data) - ):
                 text_data[i] == :
                    rel32 = struct.unpack(, text_data[i+:i+])[]
                    target = text_va + i +  + rel32
                     target == thunk_disk:
                        caller_runtime = text_va + i + rebase
                        

Key detail: IAT addresses in on-disk code use the PE's ImageBase (e.g. 0x400000), NOT the runtime base address. The code is not patched for ASLR relocation — the loader fixes up IAT entries at runtime, but the FF 15/FF 25 instruction operands remain as disk addresses. Always use binary.optional_header.imagebase for IAT VA computation.

Fallback approach — debugger commands:

If the Python approach is impractical, use mcp__x64dbg__execute_command with the findcalls command:

mcp__x64dbg__execute_command("findcalls <import_address>")

Record each call site address. These are the xrefs — the primary targets for triage.

Important: Be selective. Focus on the most security-relevant imports first (network inputs, file reads, string copies). Do not enumerate xrefs for every import — that would bloat the context.

3. Triage areas of interest

For each xref group (organized by I/O function), evaluate the surrounding context:

1. Disassemble 30–50 instructions around each call site using mcp__x64dbg__disassemble
2. Identify the containing function — look for the function prologue (push rbp/ebp; mov rsp/esp pattern or similar) and note the function's start address
3. Consider the actor — who provides the input?
   • Remote attacker (network) → highest risk
   • Local attacker (file, registry, environment) → medium risk
   • Authenticated user (UI, clipboard) → lower risk but still relevant
4. Consider the sink — where does the input end up?
   • Fixed-size stack buffer → stack overflow potential
   • Heap buffer with unchecked size → heap overflow potential
   • Format string argument → format string vulnerability
   • Integer used in allocation size → integer overflow/wraparound
   • Used in control flow decision → logic flaw potential
5. Label each triaged function with a descriptive name via mcp__x64dbg__set_label (e.g., vuln_candidate_recv_handler, vuln_candidate_file_parser)
6. Comment each call site with a brief risk note via mcp__x64dbg__set_comment

After triaging, present the ranked list to the user:

## Triaged Attack Surface

| Rank | Address | Function | I/O Source | Sink | Risk |
|------|---------|----------|------------|------|------|
| 1    | 0x...   | ...      | Network    | Stack buffer | High |
| 2    | 0x...   | ...      | File       | Heap alloc   | Medium |
| ...  | ...     | ...      | ...        | ...          | ... |

Ask the user via AskUserQuestion: "Here is the triaged attack surface. Which targets should I investigate? (all / specific ranks / let me choose)"

4. Bug hunting (iterative)

For each selected target, perform the following loop. Do one target at a time to stay focused and conserve context.

4a. Deep analysis of the target function

1. Disassemble the full function (from prologue to retn) using mcp__x64dbg__disassemble
2. If the function is complex (>100 instructions), use /decompile via Skill("decompile") for a higher-level view
3. Identify:
   • Buffer sizes — look for sub rsp, N (stack frame), push N / mov ecx, N before HeapAlloc/malloc, static .data/.bss buffers
   • Length checks — are sizes validated before copy? Look for cmp, ja/jb guards
   • Integer arithmetic — addition/multiplication on sizes before allocation (wrapping potential). Look for add, imul, shl on values derived from input
   • Loop bounds — are they controlled by attacker input?
   • Format strings — is user input passed as format argument (first arg) to sprintf/printf family?
   • Logic flaws — off-by-one in comparisons, signed/unsigned confusion (jl vs jb), TOCTOU patterns
   • Side effects — does the function write to global state, file, or registry based on unchecked input?

4b. Formulate a hypothesis

Based on the analysis, describe the suspected vulnerability:

• Type: buffer overflow, integer overflow, format string, use-after-free, logic flaw, etc.
• Trigger: what input triggers it (e.g., "a recv buffer > 256 bytes when the stack buffer is 256")
• Impact: what happens if triggered (crash, code execution, info leak, etc.)

Present the hypothesis to the user.

4c. Prepare instrumentation

Set up the debugger to observe the target code path:

1. Set a breakpoint at the function entry via mcp__x64dbg__set_breakpoint
2. Set breakpoints at key points: the dangerous call (e.g., strcpy), the length check (if any), the return
3. If fine-grained observation is needed, use /tracealyzer via Skill("tracealyzer") to trace through the function

4d. Generate a test input

Create an input that should trigger the suspected bug. Use Bash to write a Python script that generates the payload:

• For network targets: a Python socket script that sends crafted data
• For file targets: a Python script that writes a crafted file to disk
• For other I/O: an appropriate delivery mechanism

The test input should be diagnostic first — use recognizable patterns (e.g., "A" * 300 for overflow, "%x" * 20 for format string) to confirm the bug before refining to a PoC.

Write the script to ./exploits/test_<target_name>.py.

4e. Trigger and observe

1. Tell the user what input to provide, or if the test script can deliver it automatically, run it via Bash
2. Call mcp__x64dbg__go to resume execution
3. Wait for a breakpoint hit or exception via mcp__x64dbg__wait_for_event or mcp__x64dbg__get_debugger_status
4. When paused:
   • Read registers via mcp__x64dbg__get_all_registers
   • Read the stack and relevant buffers via mcp__x64dbg__read_memory
   • Disassemble at the current location via mcp__x64dbg__disassemble
   • Check if the hypothesis is confirmed (e.g., buffer overwritten past boundary, EIP/RIP control, crash at expected location)
5. Document findings with comments and labels

4f. Assess result

• Bug confirmed: proceed to PoC development (step 5)
• Bug not triggered: refine the hypothesis or input, revisit the analysis. Consider:
  • Was the code path actually reached? Check if breakpoints were hit
  • Are there additional checks that prevent the bug?
  • Is the input being transformed before reaching the sink?
• Program crashed unexpectedly: analyze the crash context. If the target needs restarting:
  • Use mcp__x64dbg__execute_command("InitDebug") to restart, or
  • Ask the user to restart the target if needed
  • Re-apply breakpoints and instrumentation

Repeat steps 4a–4f for each target until bugs are found or all targets are exhausted.

5. Proof-of-concept development (iterative)

For each confirmed bug, develop a PoC that demonstrates impact.

5a. Design the PoC

Plan a PoC that demonstrates a meaningful impact:

• Crash PoC (minimum): input that reliably crashes the target
• Info leak PoC: input that causes the target to reveal memory contents
• Code execution PoC: input that achieves a small demonstration — e.g., spawning calc.exe, writing a marker file, or connecting back to a listener

Consider the target's mitigations:

• ASLR, DEP/NX, stack cookies, CFG — check with mcp__x64dbg__get_memory_map (look at page protections) and examine the binary's PE headers
• Adjust PoC strategy based on mitigations present

5b. Write the PoC script

Write a Python PoC script to ./exploits/poc_<vuln_name>.py. The script should:

• Be self-contained and well-commented
• Include a description of the vulnerability at the top
• Generate the exploit payload
• Deliver it to the target (network send, file write, etc.)
• Print status messages so the user can follow along

5c. Test the PoC

1. Ensure the target is running and instrumented (breakpoints at key locations)
2. Run the PoC script via Bash (or ask the user to trigger it if manual interaction is required)
3. Observe the result in the debugger
4. If the PoC fails:
   • Analyze why (wrong offset, mitigation blocked it, timing issue, etc.)
   • Refine the payload and retry
   • If the target crashed, restart it (see step 4f)
5. If the PoC succeeds:
   • Document the full exploitation chain
   • Capture relevant register/memory state as evidence

Repeat steps 5a–5c until the PoC is reliable or the user decides to move on.

6. Report generation

Ask via AskUserQuestion: "Would you like a markdown vulnerability report?"

If yes, read the report template at ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/vuln-hunter/report_template.md and fill in every section based on findings. Write the completed report to ./reports/vuln_report_<timestamp>.md via Write. Omit table rows or sections that have no findings, but preserve the overall structure.