assistant-security

name	assistant-security
description	Analyze threats, vulnerabilities, dependencies, and attack surfaces. Use for explicit security work or changes to auth, input, or sensitive data.
triggers	[{"pattern":"security review|security audit|security analysis","priority":85,"reminder":"This request matches assistant-security. You MUST invoke the Skill tool with skill='assistant-security' BEFORE proceeding."},{"pattern":"security|threat model|vulnerability|attack surface|owasp|cve|dependency check","priority":75,"reminder":"This request matches assistant-security. You MUST invoke the Skill tool with skill='assistant-security' BEFORE proceeding."}]

Security Tools

Contracts

Contract	File	Purpose
Input	contracts/input.yaml	Analysis type, scope, severity threshold
Output	contracts/output.yaml	Findings with severity, remediation, and risk level
Phase Gates	contracts/phase-gates.yaml	Scope → Analyze → Report pipeline gates
Handoffs	contracts/handoffs.yaml	Subagent dispatch contracts (currently none)

Rules:

• Every finding must have severity, impact, and remediation — observations without fixes are not actionable
• Severity levels follow the 4-level scale consistently
• Findings must be evidence-based — cite specific code, config, or dependency

On-demand security analysis. Use when touching auth, inputs, dependencies, or preparing for review.

Goal

Identify concrete security risks with evidence, severity, impact, and remediation that can be acted on before release or merge. Keep the analysis practical and company-safe: local-first, no secret exposure, no unapproved external scanners, and no generic security essays.

Success Criteria

• Scope, analysis type, and severity threshold are explicit.
• Findings cite specific code, config, dependency, or threat paths.
• Each finding includes severity, impact, and smallest useful remediation.
• Residual risks and unassessed areas are called out separately from findings.

Constraints

• Do not report generic security advice without evidence in the reviewed surface.
• Ask only when missing scope or access prevents a trustworthy security conclusion.
• Treat exploitable vulnerabilities and secret exposure as blockers, not nits.
• Do not paste, log, or repeat secrets. Redact values and cite only the file/location.
• Do not require external SaaS scanners, remote code upload, or unapproved dependency installs; use local/repo-native checks when available.

Available Tools

Tool	File	When to use
Threat Model	threat-model.md	New features, auth changes, external integrations. STRIDE analysis.
Code Review	code-review.md	Before merging PRs touching auth, input handling, data access. OWASP Top 10.
Dependency Audit	dependency-audit.md	Before releases, after adding packages, periodic CVE checks.
Attack Surface	attack-surface.md	Starting security work, after adding endpoints/integrations.

Usage

Read the relevant tool file when the situation calls for it.

When to use which tool:

• Starting a new feature with external input -> Attack Surface first, then Threat Model
• Adding/updating NuGet packages -> Dependency Audit
• PR touches auth, sessions, or data access -> Code Review (OWASP)
• New API endpoints or integrations -> Threat Model (STRIDE)

Deep analysis: For thorough threat modeling, also load prompts/threat-model.md — it provides a detailed prompt pack for comprehensive STRIDE analysis.

Practical Review Checklist

Always scan relevant surfaces for:

• Secrets exposure: committed tokens, private keys, credentials, .env leaks, sensitive logs.
• Auth and authorization: missing checks, confused roles, tenant isolation, IDOR, privilege escalation.
• Input handling: validation gaps, injection paths, unsafe parsing, untrusted file names.
• Data access: SQL/NoSQL injection, overbroad queries, missing row-level filters, unsafe migrations.
• Shell/process execution: command injection, unsanitized arguments, PATH/env trust, unsafe temp files.
• Path and file operations: path traversal, unsafe extraction, symlink races, broad delete/write.
• Network and integrations: SSRF, webhook verification, TLS assumptions, replay handling, timeout/retry abuse.
• Serialization: unsafe deserialization, object injection, prototype pollution, untrusted YAML/XML.
• Dependency/config risk: vulnerable packages, dangerous debug flags, permissive CORS, exposed admin endpoints.
• Privacy/logging: PII leakage, customer data in telemetry, excessive error detail.

Only report checklist items with evidence in the reviewed scope. If a category is relevant but unassessed, list it under residual risk rather than inventing a finding.

Finding Template

### [severity] Short title

- Category: injection | auth bypass | secret exposure | unsafe dependency | etc.
- File: file path or `project-level`
- Description: what the security issue is
- Evidence: file:line/config/dependency/threat path, with secrets redacted
- Attack path: how an attacker or misuse reaches the issue
- Impact: data, integrity, availability, compliance, or privilege impact
- Remediation: smallest useful fix
- Verification: command/test/manual check that would prove the fix

The contract-required fields are severity, category, description, impact, and remediation; include them exactly in every finding. Use lowercase severity values (critical, high, medium, low) when producing structured output.

Severity Scale

All tools use a consistent 4-level scale:

• CRITICAL: Immediate exploitation risk, data breach potential
• HIGH: Significant vulnerability, needs fix before release
• MEDIUM: Should fix, but not immediately exploitable
• LOW: Minor concern, fix when convenient

Output

Return:

• Status - completion state and confidence for the security analysis.
• Risk summary - overall result and scope assessed.
• Findings - actionable items with severity, impact, evidence, and remediation.
• Evidence - specific code, config, dependency, or threat path for each finding.
• Residual risk - accepted risks, assumptions, or areas not assessed.
• Blockers - missing access, missing context, or follow-up questions required for confidence.

Stop Rules

• Stop and ask when required source, dependency, or deployment context is unavailable and affects severity.
• Stop and escalate immediately if a secret, credential, or active exploit path is found.
• Do not finalize a clean security result when important scope was inaccessible; report the residual risk.