spring-security-baseline

name	spring-security-baseline
description	Minimum Spring Security 7 configuration patterns and review baseline. Use when designing or reviewing authentication, authorization, CSRF, CORS, secrets handling, or input validation.
when_to_use	["Phase 3 (Plan) — designing auth/authz for an endpoint.","Phase 7 (Code review) — security rubric of `08-code-review.md`."]
authoritative_references	["https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/reference/index.html","https://owasp.org/Top10/"]

Spring Security baseline

What every endpoint must declare

In 03-design.md, for each new/changed endpoint:

• AuthN: Anonymous? Bearer (JWT)? Session? mTLS?
• AuthZ: What role/scope/claim is required?
• Input validation: Bean Validation on the DTO (@NotNull, @Size, @Pattern, …) PLUS service-layer invariants.
• Output: Does the response include any field the caller is not allowed to see?
• Audit: Should this action be logged with structured fields (actor, subject, outcome)?

If any of these is unclear, write a Q-NNN — do not pick a default.

Default SecurityFilterChain (resource server, JWT)

@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
@EnableMethodSecurity
class SecurityConfig {

    @Bean
    SecurityFilterChain api(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
        http
            .securityMatcher("/api/**")
            .authorizeHttpRequests(a -> a
                .requestMatchers("/api/public/**").permitAll()
                .anyRequest().authenticated())
            .oauth2ResourceServer(o -> o.jwt(Customizer.withDefaults()))
            .csrf(csrf -> csrf.disable())                // stateless API
            .sessionManagement(s -> s.sessionCreationPolicy(STATELESS))
            .headers(h -> h
                .contentSecurityPolicy(c -> c.policyDirectives("default-src 'none'"))
                .referrerPolicy(r -> r.policy(STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN)));
        return http.build();
    }
}

CSRF is disabled only for stateless APIs. If sessions are used, CSRF is on.

Method-level authorization

Prefer @PreAuthorize with SpEL using JWT claims:

@PreAuthorize("hasAuthority('SCOPE_orders:write') and #orderId == authentication.token.claims['order_id']")
public Order apply(@PathVariable UUID orderId, @Valid @RequestBody ApplyGiftCardRequest req) { ... }

Secrets

• Never commit secrets. Use environment variables or a secrets manager.
• application.yml references ${VAR}; absence fails fast at startup.
• Tests use Testcontainers; secrets there are throwaway.

Input validation

Two layers:

1. Boundary — Bean Validation on DTO + @Valid on controller method.
2. Service — re-check invariants that depend on the entity state (e.g. "card not yet redeemed" is a service-layer check, not a DTO check).

Never trust client-supplied IDs. Always re-resolve to a domain object scoped by the caller.

Logging & observability

• Log security events at INFO with structured key/values: actor=<sub>, action=apply_gift_card, outcome=denied, reason=card_redeemed.
• Never log PII, secrets, full JWT, full card number. Mask: code=ABC***.

Review rubric (used by code-reviewer)

• No endpoint without an explicit requestMatchers decision (default-deny).
• No permitAll() on a state-changing endpoint.
• No @PreAuthorize SpEL referencing user-supplied data unchecked.
• No @CrossOrigin("*") in production code.
• No raw SQL with string concatenation.
• No reflective bean access on user input.
• No @JsonProperty exposing internal entity fields.
• CSRF state matches whether the API is stateful.
• Sensitive data is masked in logs.
• OWASP Dependency Check has no new High/Critical CVEs (or one waiver per CVE in dependency-check-suppressions.xml).