prep-permissions

name	prep-permissions
description	Analyze the active task plan and .claude/.prove.json to configure .claude/settings.local.json with scoped permission rules. Use before orchestrator, autopilot, or implementation. Triggers on "prep permissions", "setup permissions", "configure permissions", "allow tools", "stop asking me".

Prep Permissions

Configure .claude/settings.local.json with scoped tool permissions for the active task.

Operator-invoked only. This skill is run by hand before a session; it is NOT auto-wired into orchestrator or workflow dispatch. The orchestrator does not call it, and subagents do not re-derive per-agent scoping — the git worktree wall plus this one workspace settings.local.json are the enforcement surfaces.

Phase 1: Gather Context

Read these files (skip missing ones):

1. Active run's plan.json under .prove/runs/<branch>/<slug>/ — task list, deps, and per-task bounds. Use: claude-prove run-state show --kind plan --format json --branch <branch> --slug <slug>
2. .prove/plans/plan_*/05_implementation_plan.md — file paths, commands
3. .claude/.prove.json — validator and reporter commands
4. .claude/settings.local.json — existing rules to preserve
5. Project root — check for go.mod, package.json, Cargo.toml, pyproject.toml, Makefile, project.godot

Phase 2: Build Permission Rules

Generate permissions.allow and permissions.deny rules with the most specific patterns possible.

Baseline

Bash(git *)
Bash(mkdir *)
Edit
Write

From .claude/.prove.json

Each validator/reporter command becomes a Bash rule:

• "command": "go build ./..." -> Bash(go build *)
• "command": "./.prove/notify.sh" -> Bash(./.prove/notify.sh *)

From auto-detected toolchain (when no .prove.json)

Indicator	Rules
go.mod	Bash(go build *), Bash(go test *), Bash(go vet *), Bash(go mod *), Bash(go run *)
package.json	Bash(npm *), Bash(npx *)
Cargo.toml	Bash(cargo *)
pyproject.toml	Bash(python *), Bash(pip *), Bash(pytest *), Bash(mypy *), Bash(ruff *)
Makefile	Bash(make *)
project.godot	Bash(godot *)

From task plan

Scan for mentioned tools:

• Database migrations -> Bash(migrate *), Bash(goose *), etc.
• Docker -> Bash(docker *), Bash(docker-compose *)
• Scripts -> Bash(bash scripts/*), Bash(./scripts/*)

Orchestrator/full-auto mode

• Bash(bash $PLUGIN_DIR/scripts/*) — prove helper scripts
• Agent(principal-architect), Agent(general-purpose), Agent(Explore), Agent(Plan)

From declared task bounds (plan.json tasks[].bounds)

Each task MAY declare bounds. All sub-fields are optional; absent = unbounded (skip). When present, translate each sub-field to native permissions or prompt guidance per this table:

bounds sub-field	Translation
tools.allow[]	Append each pattern verbatim to permissions.allow
tools.deny[]	Append each pattern verbatim to permissions.deny
write[] (path globs)	ADVISORY. Permission deny rules block what they match — there is no "deny everything outside X" form — so write scope cannot be a permission rule. The git worktree is the write wall; render the allowed write paths into the task-prompt guidance (Phase 3). Emit NO permission rule. (A hard native per-path wall would need a PreToolUse hook — out of scope.)
read[] (path globs)	ADVISORY. There is no native read-deny surface — render the allowed read paths into the task-prompt guidance (Phase 3), do not emit a permission rule.
budgets.{tokens,tool_calls,wall_clock_s}	ADVISORY ONLY. No daemon enforces these. Render them into the task-prompt guidance as soft ceilings; the native subagent timeout is the only hard floor. Emit NO permission rule.

Example — task with bounds: { write: ["src/auth/**"], tools: { allow: ["Bash(go test *)"], deny: ["Bash(git push *)"] }, budgets: { tokens: 200000 } }:

• permissions.allow gains Bash(go test *)
• permissions.deny gains Bash(git push *)
• Prompt guidance gains: "write scope (worktree wall): src/auth/**; read scope advisory; soft budget: ~200k tokens"

Union model (known limitation)

There is ONE workspace settings.local.json — the UNION of every task's rules — so with parallel tasks, task A inherits task B's allowed tools (not per-task isolated). Accepted for now; per-worktree isolation (a scoped settings.local.json per task worktree) is deferred until cross-task tool bleed matters and Claude Code is confirmed to honor a worktree-local settings file from the subagent's CWD.

Require user approval (do not add to allow)

• Bash(rm *), Bash(git push *), Bash(git reset *) — destructive ops
• Bash(curl *), Bash(wget *) — network calls
• Bash(sudo *) — elevated privileges
• Anything touching .env, credentials, or secrets

A task-declared tools.deny rule for any of these is honored as-is; never move a task's deny into allow.

Phase 3: Confirm with User

Present rules grouped by category (git, build/test, file ops, orchestrator, task-bound deny, still-requires-approval), plus the advisory write/read/budgets guidance derived from bounds. Use AskUserQuestion with header "Permissions": "Approve" / "Modify".

Phase 4: Write Configuration

1. Read existing .claude/settings.local.json if present
2. Merge new permissions.allow with existing rules (deduplicate)
3. Merge permissions.deny (toolchain + task-bound tools.deny rules), preserving existing permissions.deny/permissions.ask entries
4. Write the file (create .claude/ if needed). Only modify settings.local.json, not the shared settings.json.
5. Remind the user to restart Claude Code and confirm .claude/settings.local.json is in .gitignore