auditing-code-security

name	auditing-code-security
description	Audit code against OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities with structured findings. Use when reviewing code for security issues or conducting security audits.
compatibility	Designed for Claude Code
metadata	{"allowed-tools":"Read, Grep, Glob, WebSearch, WebFetch","argument-hint":["file-or-directory"],"stability":"stable","content-hash":"sha256:1fe9fc0023ad3221ad15390f00036732376243b3f77f8137ebab5824ee1747d8"}

OWASP Top 10 Code Security Audit

Scope: $ARGUMENTS

When to Use

• Security review before release or merge
• Auditing new features for vulnerability exposure
• Periodic security posture assessment
• Compliance-driven code review

Workflow

1. Identify scope — files, modules, or full codebase
2. Scan each OWASP category using the checklist below
3. Record findings in the output table
4. Assign severity (Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info)
5. Propose remediation for each finding

Workflow Mode (full-codebase scope)

When auditing a whole codebase or many modules and the Workflow tool is available, fan the ten OWASP categories out in parallel instead of scanning them one after another:

Workflow({
  scriptPath: "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/workflows/audit-owasp.js",
  args: { scope: "<dir>",
          skillPath: "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/auditing-code-security/SKILL.md" }
})

args reaches the script as a JSON string (the script parses it). One read-only agent scans the scope per category (A01–A10) and returns structured findings; render them with the Output Format below. Fall back to the inline per-category scan (steps 1–5) when the Workflow tool is unavailable. The agents are read-only, so the only permission to pre-grant is the Workflow tool.

OWASP Top 10 Checklist

A01: Injection

• SQL queries use parameterized statements (no string concatenation)
• OS command execution uses allowlists, not user input
• LDAP queries use proper escaping
• XPath queries parameterized
• ORM queries avoid raw SQL where possible

A02: Broken Authentication

• Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (not MD5/SHA1)
• Session tokens are cryptographically random
• Session expiration and rotation implemented
• Multi-factor authentication available for sensitive operations
• Account lockout or rate limiting on login

A03: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Output encoding applied for HTML, JS, CSS, URL contexts
• Reflected input never rendered without sanitization
• Stored user content sanitized before display
• DOM manipulation uses safe APIs (textContent, not innerHTML)
• Content-Security-Policy headers configured

A04: Insecure Direct Object References

• Authorization checked before resource access
• Object IDs not guessable (use UUIDs or indirect references)
• Horizontal privilege escalation prevented
• File paths validated (no directory traversal)

A05: Security Misconfiguration

• Debug mode disabled in production
• Default credentials changed
• Error messages don't expose stack traces or internals
• Unnecessary HTTP methods disabled
• Security headers present (HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc.)

A06: Sensitive Data Exposure

• PII encrypted at rest and in transit
• TLS 1.2+ enforced for all connections
• Sensitive data not logged
• API responses don't over-expose data
• Cache-Control headers prevent caching of sensitive responses

A07: Missing Function-Level Access Control

• Every endpoint checks authentication
• Role-based authorization enforced server-side
• Admin functions not accessible to regular users
• API routes match UI access controls

A08: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

• Anti-CSRF tokens on state-changing requests
• SameSite cookie attribute set
• Origin/Referer header validation
• State-changing operations require POST/PUT/DELETE (not GET)

A09: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

• Dependencies up to date
• No packages with known CVEs
• Dependency lock files committed
• Automated vulnerability scanning in CI

A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

• User-supplied URLs validated against allowlist
• Internal network access blocked from user-controlled requests
• DNS rebinding protections in place
• Redirect chains limited and validated

Output Format

Present findings as:

#	Category	Severity	File:Line	Description	Remediation
1	A01 Injection	Critical	src/db.py:42	Raw SQL with f-string	Use parameterized query
2	A03 XSS	High	templates/profile.html:18	Unescaped user input	Apply output encoding

Severity Definitions

• Critical — Exploitable now, data breach or RCE risk
• High — Exploitable with moderate effort, significant impact
• Medium — Requires specific conditions, limited impact
• Low — Minor issue, defense-in-depth concern
• Info — Best practice recommendation, no direct risk