detecting-weak-cryptography

name	detecting-weak-cryptography
description	Scan a source tree for weak cryptographic primitives: MD5 / SHA-1 used for security purposes, DES / 3DES / RC4 ciphers, ECB block mode, custom-built crypto (XOR loops, hand-rolled HMAC), hardcoded IVs, predictable random (Math.random / java.util.Random for crypto seeds), missing certificate verification (verify=False, rejectUnauthorized: false). Use when: pre-merge gate on crypto-touching code, audit before SOC2 / PCI assessment, post-incident review when "we found a weakness in our token signing." Threshold: any call to a known-weak algorithm with non-test context, OR cert verification explicitly disabled, OR a custom crypto loop pattern. Trigger with: "scan weak crypto", "find MD5 usage", "check ECB mode", "audit ssl verify", "weak random".
allowed-tools	["Read","Bash(python3:*)","Glob","Grep"]
disallowed-tools	["Bash(rm:*)","Bash(curl:*)"]
version	3.0.0-dev
author	Jeremy Longshore <[e-mail]>
license	MIT
compatibility	Designed for Claude Code
tags	["security","static-analysis","cryptography","pentest"]

Detecting Weak Cryptography

Overview

Weak cryptography (CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values) shows up when engineers use the convenient API instead of the cryptographic one. hashlib.md5(password) is faster to type than the correct bcrypt/argon2 invocation; Math.random() returns a number quickly without needing to know about crypto.randomBytes().

The fix is universal: use the modern primitive. SHA-256 for general hashing, bcrypt/argon2/scrypt for passwords, AES-GCM for encryption, HMAC-SHA256 for signing, secrets / crypto.randomBytes / SecureRandom for randomness.

When the skill produces findings

Finding	Severity	Threshold	Affected control
MD5 used in security context	HIGH	hashlib.md5, MessageDigest.MD5, CryptoJS.MD5	CWE-327
SHA-1 used in security context	HIGH	hashlib.sha1, etc.	CWE-327
DES / 3DES cipher	CRITICAL	DESCrypto, "DES/CBC", "DESede"	CWE-327
RC4 cipher	CRITICAL	"ARC4", "RC4"	CWE-327
AES ECB mode	CRITICAL	"AES/ECB" or MODE_ECB	CWE-327
Hardcoded IV (initialization vector)	CRITICAL	IV literal in source	CWE-329
Custom XOR-based "encryption"	CRITICAL	XOR loop over bytes	CWE-327
Predictable random for crypto seed	CRITICAL	Math.random / java.util.Random / random.random for keys	CWE-330
TLS cert verification disabled	CRITICAL	verify=False, rejectUnauthorized:false, ServerCertificateValidationCallback returning true	CWE-295
Hardcoded HMAC secret	HIGH	Long literal in HMAC constructor	CWE-321
Insecure password hashing (no salt, no KDF)	CRITICAL	hashlib.sha256(password) without bcrypt/argon2	CWE-916

Prerequisites

• Python 3.9+
• Source tree on local filesystem

Instructions

Run

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-weak-cryptography/scripts/scan_weak_crypto.py /path/to/repo

Options: --output, --format, --min-severity, --include-tests, --languages, --allow-md5-checksums (excludes MD5 used in non-security contexts like content-addressable storage).

Interpret

CRITICAL = direct cryptographic break available against the algorithm. CVEs, public attack tools, sometimes pre-computed tables (rainbow tables for MD5/SHA-1).

HIGH = algorithm collision-broken (MD5, SHA-1) but the specific use case may tolerate the weakness (file-deduplication checksums, non-security HMAC). Verify the usage context.

Remediation

See references/PLAYBOOK.md for per-primitive migration. Modern defaults: SHA-256/SHA-3 for hashing, AES-256-GCM for encryption, HMAC-SHA-256 for signing, secrets-grade random for keys, bcrypt / argon2id for password storage.

Examples

Pre-merge gate

python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/detecting-weak-cryptography/scripts/scan_weak_crypto.py \
    --min-severity high $(git diff --name-only main...HEAD | tr '\n' ' ')

CI

- name: Weak-crypto scan
  run: |
    python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/detecting-weak-cryptography/scripts/scan_weak_crypto.py \
        . --min-severity high

Output

JSON / JSONL / Markdown. Exit codes: 0 / 1 / 2.

Error Handling

False positives common on:

• MD5 used for content-addressable storage (caches, content hashes) where collision resistance against ATTACKERS isn't needed — use --allow-md5-checksums.
• HMAC-MD5 — broken against adversaries but acceptable as an integrity check inside a TLS session where the channel is already authenticated.

Verify each finding by reading whether the algorithm's failure mode (collision, preimage, etc.) is actually exploitable in context.

Resources

• references/THEORY.md — Per-primitive attack model (why MD5 / SHA-1 are collision-broken, why ECB leaks structure, why Math.random is non-crypto-grade)
• references/PLAYBOOK.md — Per-language modern-crypto recipes (Python cryptography library, Node crypto, Java JCA with modern algorithms, Go crypto/rand + crypto/cipher AEAD)