Skip to main content

security-scan-diff

Scan for malicious code in git diff between a tag/commit and HEAD

Source facts

Repository
dyoshikawa/rulesync
Last source activity
March 30, 2026 at 03:32
Detected SKILL.md language
English
Stars
1,512
Forks
159

Install options

The review-first prompt is selected by default. You can switch to a direct command or download a local copy.

Review the source files

Read SKILL.md and any companion files shown by SkillsMP before deciding whether to install.

Showing SKILL.md

SKILL.md
Source instructions · Read-only preview
name
security-scan-diff
description
Scan for malicious code in git diff between a tag/commit and HEAD
targets
["*"]
target_ref = $ARGUMENTS If target_ref is not provided, ask the user which tag or commit to compare against HEAD. ## Overview Thoroughly check for malicious code in the diff between `${target_ref}` and the latest commit (HEAD). ## Steps 1. Verify the target ref exists and get the diff scope. - Run `git log ${target_ref}..HEAD --oneline` to list commits. - Run `git diff ${target_ref}..HEAD --stat` to get file change statistics. - Categorize changed files into: CI/CD workflows, source code, and config/docs. 2. Execute the following security reviews in parallel using subagents: - Call security-reviewer subagent to review CI/CD and workflow files (`.github/`, `scripts/`) for: - Secret exfiltration - Script injection (`${{ github.event.* }}` direct expansion in `run:`) - Suspicious external URLs/API connections - Privilege escalation or token misuse - Malicious command execution (`curl | bash`, `eval`, base64 decode execution) - Supply chain attack patterns (suspicious npm packages, unsigned action references) - Dangerous `pull_request_target` usage - Call security-reviewer subagent to review source code files (`src/`) for: - Arbitrary code execution (`eval`, `Function` constructor, suspicious `child_process` usage) - Path traversal (`../..` directory escape) - Command injection (user input passed directly to shell commands) - Suspicious external communication (`fetch`, `http.request`, `axios` to external URLs) - Unauthorized filesystem operations - Credential/token leakage (hardcoded tokens, logging sensitive values) - Dependency tampering (suspicious `package.json` changes) - Backdoor patterns (obfuscated code, suspicious conditionals, hidden functionality) - Prototype pollution and deserialization vulnerabilities - Supply chain attacks (suspicious new dependency packages) - Call security-reviewer subagent to review config and documentation files for: - Suspicious dependencies or scripts in `package.json` - Suspicious registries or URLs in lockfiles - Security rule relaxation in config schemas or linter configs - Suspicious settings in devcontainer or editor configs - Phishing URLs in documentation - Malicious instructions in AI rule/subagent/skill definitions 3. Integrate the results from all subagents and produce a unified report in the following format: ``` ## Security Review Report: ${target_ref} -> HEAD ### Conclusion - Whether malicious code was detected or not ### Check Results Summary Table | Check Item | Result | |------------|--------| | ... | ... | ### Findings (if any) | Severity | Description | File | Risk | |----------|-------------|------|------| | ... | ... | ... | ... | ### Recommendations (if any) - Actionable recommendations for each finding ### Positive Observations - Good security practices found in the diff ```
View on GitHub