// Optimize Juicebox costs. Trigger: "juicebox cost", "juicebox billing", "juicebox budget".
Scan a source tree for command-injection vulnerable patterns: shell=True calls in Python subprocess, os.system / os.popen with interpolated strings, Node child_process.exec with template literals, Ruby backticks / Kernel#system / Kernel#exec with interpolation, Go exec.Command with shell wrapping, PHP system / passthru / shell_exec / backticks with $-interpolation, Java Runtime.exec with concatenated args. Use when: pre-commit gate on code that calls out to shell utilities, audit of file-processing / archive-handling / image-conversion code, post-bug-report investigation for "we shell out to a tool." Threshold: any shell-invocation API called with a string that contains a variable interpolation, OR shell=True with anything other than a fixed literal. Trigger with: "scan command injection", "shell=True audit", "find exec calls", "check os.system".
Scan a source tree for dynamic-code-execution APIs that an attacker can hijack: Python eval / exec / compile, JavaScript eval / Function() / setTimeout(string), Ruby eval / instance_eval / class_eval, Java ScriptEngine, PHP eval / assert($str), .NET Activator.CreateInstance / Reflection.Emit with dynamic input. Use when: pre-commit gate on any application that parses user-uploaded code (rule engines, formula evaluators, plugin systems), or post-bug-report when "we run user-supplied expressions." Threshold: any call to eval / exec / Function / similar where the argument is not a string literal. Trigger with: "scan eval", "find dynamic exec", "audit eval calls", "code injection patterns".
Scan a source tree for unsafe-by-default deserialization APIs: Python pickle.loads / cPickle / shelve / dill, Ruby Marshal.load / YAML.load (pre-3.1 default), Java ObjectInputStream.readObject, PHP unserialize, .NET BinaryFormatter / NetDataContractSerializer, Node.js node-serialize, JavaScript JSON.parse with reviver containing eval. Use when: pre-commit gate on services that accept binary blobs, audit of legacy job-queue code (workers deserializing tasks), post-bug-report when "we accept user-uploaded archives." Threshold: any call to a known-unsafe deserialization API on data that originates from user input, network, file upload, or untrusted storage. Trigger with: "scan deserialization", "pickle audit", "java readObject scan", "yaml.load check".
Scan a source tree for SQL-injection vulnerable patterns: string concatenation into queries, f-string interpolation in SQL, string-format substitution into raw queries, deprecated cursor methods (cursor.execute with % formatting), Knex / Sequelize raw() with template interpolation, sequelize.query with replacements. Use when: pre-commit code review, post-feature SQL-touching release, inheriting a legacy codebase that predates ORMs, or post-bug-report investigation. Threshold: any source line where SQL keywords (SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE / FROM / WHERE) appear in a string that's being built via concatenation, f-string, %-format, or .format() with variable input. Trigger with: "scan for sqli", "sql injection patterns", "check raw queries", "audit cursor.execute".
Scan a source tree for weak cryptographic primitives: MD5 / SHA-1 used for security purposes, DES / 3DES / RC4 ciphers, ECB block mode, custom-built crypto (XOR loops, hand-rolled HMAC), hardcoded IVs, predictable random (Math.random / java.util.Random for crypto seeds), missing certificate verification (verify=False, rejectUnauthorized: false). Use when: pre-merge gate on crypto-touching code, audit before SOC2 / PCI assessment, post-incident review when "we found a weakness in our token signing." Threshold: any call to a known-weak algorithm with non-test context, OR cert verification explicitly disabled, OR a custom crypto loop pattern. Trigger with: "scan weak crypto", "find MD5 usage", "check ECB mode", "audit ssl verify", "weak random".
Scan a source-code tree for hardcoded credentials embedded in source files: AWS access keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, Slack tokens, Anthropic API keys, OpenAI keys, JWT signing secrets, generic base64-encoded passwords, RSA / SSH private keys, and high-entropy string literals that pattern-match common credential shapes. Use when: pre-commit gate before pushing a feature branch, audit before SOC2, post-incident scan after a leak, or inheriting a codebase you didn't write. Threshold: any source file contains a string that matches a canonical credential regex (AWS AKIA prefix, GitHub ghp_ prefix, etc.) OR a string with Shannon entropy above 4.5 in a field context (key=, token:, secret=). Trigger with: "scan secrets", "credential scan", "find hardcoded keys", "leak check".
| name | juicebox-cost-tuning |
| description | Optimize Juicebox costs. Trigger: "juicebox cost", "juicebox billing", "juicebox budget". |
| allowed-tools | Read, Write, Edit, Grep |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| license | MIT |
| author | Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io> |
| tags | ["saas","recruiting","juicebox"] |
| compatibility | Designed for Claude Code |
| Feature | Cost Driver |
|---|---|
| Search | Per query |
| Enrichment | Per profile |
| Contact data | Per lookup |
| Outreach | Per message |
const quota = await client.account.getQuota();
console.log(`Searches: ${quota.searches.used}/${quota.searches.limit}`);
if (quota.searches.used > quota.searches.limit * 0.8) console.warn('80% quota used');
See juicebox-reference-architecture.