gh-export
Formats all confirmed pentest findings from findings.json into copy-pasteable GitHub issue markdown blocks, following the AppSec reporting guide template.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Formats all confirmed pentest findings from findings.json into copy-pasteable GitHub issue markdown blocks, following the AppSec reporting guide template.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
Deep web exploitation beyond initial scanning. Covers SQLi (blind, OOB, second-order), NoSQL injection, GraphQL injection (introspection, batching, mutation abuse), XSS (reflected/stored/DOM with source-sink analysis), SSTI (Jinja2/Twig/Freemarker/ERB RCE), SSRF chains, file upload bypass (polyglots), XXE (blind, DOCX/SVG, Content-Type switching), deserialization (Java/PHP/Python/.NET), command injection, path traversal / LFI wrapper bypasses, race conditions, CSRF, JWT attacks (none/key confusion/kid injection), HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE/TE.CL/H2), CRLF injection, open redirect chains, CORS exploitation, web cache deception/poisoning, OAuth misconfiguration, prototype pollution, session management, and business logic flaws. Uses sqlmap, commix, xsser, wapiti, davtest, and manual http payloads - every technique includes real payloads and code. Chains from /pentester or /api-security, into /post-exploit on RCE, and into /ai-redteam when an LLM/AI endpoint is found.
Reverse shell generation and listener management. Generates platform-specific reverse shell payloads (bash, python, php, powershell, java, ruby, perl, netcat, socat, msfvenom) and sets up listeners in the Kali container. Supports one-liner generation, encoded payloads for WAF/filter bypass, listener setup with session capture, and shell stabilization. Chains from /pentester, /metasploit, or /post-exploit when command execution is confirmed.
White-box source code security review structured around OWASP ASVS 5.0 (427 verification requirements across 16 chapters). Reads and understands application source code to build a security-aware knowledge base that enriches all downstream skills. Covers: tech stack identification, route/endpoint mapping, authentication and authorization architecture, dangerous function patterns, source-to-sink data flow tracing, IaC review, dependency analysis, ASVS compliance mapping, and LLM integration security (prompt injection, tool abuse, output handling, RAG poisoning, MCP server patterns). When LLM/AI framework usage is detected, automatically reviews OWASP LLM Top 10 patterns from source code and chains into /ai-redteam with white-box context for live endpoint testing. Chains into /pentester, /threat-modeling, /web-exploit, /api-security, /cloud-security, /analyze-cve, /credential-audit, and /ai-redteam — providing white-box context that transforms black-box testing into targeted, informed assessment.
Post-exploitation workflow. Covers privilege escalation (Linux SUID/sudo/kernel, Windows UAC/service/token), persistence assessment, local enumeration, credential harvesting, and pivot preparation. Structured workflows for Linux and Windows targets using impacket, netexec, john, linpeas/winpeas, and standard Kali tools. Includes kernel exploit reference tables, GTFOBins exploitation chains, Potato attack selection, Docker/container escapes, DLL hijacking, SSH key harvesting, credential recovery from memory, and Windows token manipulation. Chains from /pentester or /credential-audit when access is obtained.
Software supply-chain and CI/CD security assessment. Covers dependency confusion (internal/private package names that resolve on public registries — extracted from package.json, requirements.txt, pom.xml, go.mod, Gemfile, .csproj), typosquatting and namespace hijacking, lockfile integrity and resolved-URL tampering, malicious install hooks (npm postinstall, pip setup.py, gem extensions), and unmaintained/abandoned-package takeover risk. Plus CI/CD pipeline review: GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / CircleCI misconfigurations — pull_request_target abuse, unpinned action SHAs, secrets leaked in logs, over-broad OIDC trust, and poisoned pipeline execution (PPE, direct and indirect). Assesses SLSA provenance gaps. White-box first: reads manifests, lockfiles, and workflow YAML from a local codebase. Uses semgrep, trufflehog, and registry probes. Chains from /codebase or /pentester; into /analyze-cve for confirmed vulnerable versions and /cloud-security when a pipeline holds cloud OIDC trust.
Cloud-native identity federation attacks across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Covers OIDC CI/CD trust abuse (IAM role trust policies that trust token.actions.githubusercontent.com, GitLab, CircleCI, or Terraform Cloud with over-broad sub/aud conditions), workload-identity abuse (EKS IRSA, GKE Workload Identity, AKS pod-managed-identity — Kubernetes ServiceAccount token to AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity to cloud credentials), and the full SSRF to IMDSv2 to role to credential chain walked end to end. Also covers ECS/Fargate task-role metadata (169.254.170.2), Azure IMDS managed-identity token theft, GCP metadata service-account tokens, and cloud-credential pivoting from a shell (~/.aws/credentials, gcloud creds, kubeconfig, CI env, projected SA tokens). Taught as attack PATTERNS to reason from. Uses aws/az/gcloud CLIs, kubectl, curl, jwt_tool, and http probing. Chains from /pentester, /cloud-security, or /web-exploit (on a confirmed SSRF); into /post-exploit and /cloud-security once credentials are obtained.
| name | gh-export |
| description | Formats all confirmed pentest findings from findings.json into copy-pasteable GitHub issue markdown blocks, following the AppSec reporting guide template. |
| argument-hint | [optional: path to findings.json] |
| user-invocable | true |
Read findings.json from the current pentest session and produce one copy-pasteable GitHub issue markdown block per confirmed finding.
Each block follows the AppSec reporting guide format — concrete impact, reproducible steps, raw PoC — so developers can act immediately without back-and-forth.
findings.json from the repo root (or the path provided in $ARGUMENTS if given)findings[].findings (skip diagram entries):
pocs/ for any .http file whose name contains a keyword from the finding title — if found, read it and paste the content into the PoC blockhttp(action="request", ...) with method PATCH, url http://localhost:7777/api/findings/{finding.id}, body {"gh_issue": "<the formatted markdown block>"}, and headers {"Content-Type": "application/json"} — this couples the block to the finding in the dashboardgh-issues.md in the repo root, separated by ---, with a header line # GitHub Issues — <target> — <date> at the top. Create or overwrite the file.--- separator between themX issue(s) ready to file — saved to gh-issues.md and copied above.For every finding, output exactly this structure (omit ## Browsers Verified In for non-browser/non-web findings):
**Summary:** <one sentence: what the vulnerability is and which component/endpoint is affected>
**Impact:** <what an attacker can concretely do — name the data exposed, the privilege gained, or the service disrupted. Never write "could lead to" — write "allows an attacker to". One short paragraph.>
**Severity Level:** <Critical | High | Medium | Low>
## Steps To Reproduce:
1. <exact first step — full URL, parameter name, payload>
2. <exact second step>
3. <what to observe in the response that confirms the issue>
## PoC
```
<paste the raw curl command, HTTP request from pocs/*.http, or tool output excerpt that proves exploitability>
```
## Supporting Material/References:
* <CVE ID if applicable, otherwise omit this line>
* Affected target: <target URL or file path from the finding>
* Tool: <tool_used value from the finding>
* <any additional evidence: key excerpt from raw tool output>
## Remediation
<if the finding has a `remediation` field, include this section — otherwise omit it entirely>
**Effort:** <effort level> | **Breaking change:** <Yes/No>
```diff
<paste the diff from remediation.diff, or show before/after from remediation.before and remediation.after>
```
**File:** <remediation.file>:<remediation.line>
**Verification:** <remediation.verification — how to confirm the fix worked>
**References:**
* <each URL from remediation.references>
description and evidence fields; never invent hypothetical consequencesreproduction field, use its command as the primary reproduction step. Otherwise include full URLs and exact payloads so a developer can reproduce without asking questions.http file exists in pocs/, paste its full content; if the finding has reproduction.command, include that; otherwise extract the most relevant raw evidence line from the evidence fieldremediation field, include the ## Remediation section with the diff, effort level, verification step, and references. If no remediation exists, omit the section entirelyCritical, high → High, medium → Medium, low → LowThis block is maintained by SkillOpt-Sleep. Edits here are proposed offline, validated against your past tasks, and adopted only after you approve them. Hand-edits outside this block are never touched.