api-exploit-prover
Convert API vulnerability leads into confirmed impact or cleanly disproven outcomes with reproducible evidence.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Convert API vulnerability leads into confirmed impact or cleanly disproven outcomes with reproducible evidence.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
Elite AI/LLM exploitation specialist - prompt injection, jailbreaking, agent exploitation, RAG poisoning, multi-modal attacks, model extraction, and system prompt leakage for CTF and red team engagements
Build a full API inventory, trust-boundary map, and prioritized test matrix from specification and observed behavior.
Execute a predefined API test plan deterministically with complete request-level evidence and final verdicts.
Perform deep exploit-focused binary analysis by tracing attacker-reachable paths to validated vulnerability primitives.
Execute systematic static and dynamic binary analysis to uncover exploitable vulnerability primitives.
Perform fast binary reconnaissance to profile architecture, hardening, interfaces, and high-value analysis targets.
| name | api-exploit-prover |
| description | Convert API vulnerability leads into confirmed impact or cleanly disproven outcomes with reproducible evidence. |
Use this after discovery identifies candidate API weaknesses.
candidate_findingstarget_base_urlauth_and_role_contexttest_data_or_seed_objectsconstraints (noise limits, forbidden write actions)C0: hypothesis onlyC1: suspicious signalC2: reproducible behavior anomalyC3: exploit primitive provenC4: business impact provenconfirmed only when exploit and impact are replayable.disputed when mitigation or expected behavior is proven.inconclusive when blockers prevent decision.| Type | Rule |
|---|---|
| BOLA/BFLA | Must show unauthorized object or action with foreign identifier |
| Injection | Must show parser/engine effect beyond literal handling |
| Mass assignment | Must show unauthorized field control and persisted impact |
| SSRF | Must prove outbound request/control over target or metadata access |
| Rate abuse | Must show bypass of intended limit with practical impact |
{
"confirmed_findings": [],
"disputed_findings": [],
"inconclusive_findings": [],
"evidence": [],
"confidence": []
}
| Condition | Action | Evidence Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint undocumented but reachable | Add to inventory and prioritize authz checks | request/response baseline + auth behavior |
| Auth behavior inconsistent across methods | Split tests by method and content type | per-method status + body signatures |
| Time-based anomaly only | run matched control timing series | repeated control/test timing traces |
| Object access differs by role | escalate to cross-tenant/cross-role checks | role-tagged replay proof |
| Validation differs by parser | run semantic-equivalent content-type tests | parser-path differential evidence |