security-review

name	security-review
description	Security analysis for Azure-hosted Python services. Checks for managed identity, secret exposure, input validation, RBAC, and OWASP-style vulnerabilities. Use when reviewing endpoints, auth code, infra changes, or any user-input handling.

Security Review

Perform a security-focused review adapted to the KB Agent project — an Azure-hosted pipeline with managed identity everywhere.

Risk Context

This project processes knowledge base content and serves it via a conversational agent. Security issues can lead to:

• Unauthorized access to Azure resources (AI Search, Storage, Cosmos DB)
• Data leakage from the knowledge base
• Prompt injection via user queries to the agent
• Path traversal via blob storage operations

Checklist

Authentication & Authorization

• DefaultAzureCredential used for all Azure SDK clients — no keys or connection strings
• Entra ID Easy Auth configured on Container Apps for user-facing endpoints
• RBAC role assignments defined in infra/azure/infra/main.bicep — never assigned manually
• Cosmos DB uses native RBAC (Built-in Data Contributor via cosmos-db-role.bicep) — no connection strings
• No hardcoded API keys, tokens, or secrets in source code
• .env files are gitignored — they contain local dev credentials from azd -C infra/azure env get-values

Input Validation

• All external input validated at API boundaries (HTTP handlers, function triggers)
• Blob paths and names sanitized to prevent path traversal
• Image URLs match known patterns (/api/images/...)
• User queries to the agent are not used to construct raw API calls without validation
• No raw string interpolation in Azure SDK calls (search queries, blob paths)

Secrets & Configuration

• No os.getenv() calls that return secrets into logs
• No secrets in Bicep outputs (outputs are visible in deployment logs)
• App settings in Container Apps do not contain keys — use managed identity references
• .env.sample files document required variables without values

Infrastructure Security

• HTTPS everywhere — no HTTP endpoints in production
• Container Apps ingress configured with TLS
• Storage accounts: public access disabled (re-enabled for dev via make dev-enable-storage)
• New Azure resources use managed identity — no keys in app settings
• RBAC follows least-privilege principle

Dependencies

• No known vulnerable dependencies
• Third-party packages pinned (not using * ranges)
• Dependencies added to the correct service's pyproject.toml

Output Format

Rate each finding:

• CRITICAL — Exploitable vulnerability, must fix immediately
• HIGH — Significant risk, fix before merge
• MEDIUM — Defense-in-depth issue, should address
• LOW — Best practice suggestion

Include specific file + line references, the vulnerability type, and a concrete fix.