ownership-session-security

name	ownership-session-security
description	Session ownership and authorization workflow.
origin	pi-crew
triggers	["cancel run","respond to task","cross-session action","ownership verify","session security"]

ownership-session-security

Use this skill for cross-session safety and trust-boundary work.

Source patterns distilled

• Pi session IDs: ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId() from Pi core ExtensionContext
• pi-crew ownership: TeamRunManifest.ownerSessionId, src/extension/team-tool/run.ts, cancel.ts, respond.ts
• Path safety: src/utils/safe-paths.ts, src/state/state-store.ts, src/state/mailbox.ts
• Destructive actions: src/extension/team-tool/lifecycle-actions.ts, src/worktree/cleanup.ts

Rules

• Propagate the active Pi session ID into TeamContext for every production tool/command path.
• New runs should record ownerSessionId when available.
• For owned runs, cross-session actions that mutate state must be rejected unless explicit force/admin semantics are designed and tested.
• Legacy runs without ownerSessionId may remain permissive for backward compatibility, but document this behavior.
• User/LLM-controlled path fields (cwd, import paths, artifact paths, task IDs) must be normalized and contained under an allowed base.
• Use resolveContainedPath, resolveRealContainedPath, assertSafePathId, and symlink checks rather than ad-hoc startsWith checks.
• Destructive management actions must require confirm: true; referenced resource deletes must require force: true where applicable.

Enforcement — Ownership Session Security Gate

Before mutating run state or cross-session operations, verify:

• Session ID propagated into TeamContext for production paths
• ownerSessionId verified before respond/cancel/mutate operations
• Path fields (cwd, import, artifact) normalized and contained under allowed base
• Safe path helpers used (resolveContainedPath, assertSafePathId) not startsWith checks
• Destructive actions require explicit confirm/force parameters

If ANY answer is NO → Stop. Verify ownership before mutating state.

Anti-patterns

• Assuming ctx.sessionId exists directly on Pi context.
• Letting cwd: ../other-project move run state into another project.
• Letting respond/cancel mutate a foreign owned run.
• Trusting task IDs, run IDs, or artifact paths from tool params without validation.

Verification

cd pi-crew
npx tsc --noEmit
node --experimental-strip-types --test test/unit/cancel-ownership.test.ts test/unit/respond-tool.test.ts test/unit/cwd-override-security.test.ts test/unit/api-artifact-security.test.ts
npm test