convergence-security

name	convergence-security
description	Three-layer security audit: access controls, audit trail, and code scanning. Use before shipping anything that touches auth, payments, user data, or external integrations. Combines OWASP Top 10, STRIDE threat modeling, and secrets archaeology.

Security Audit

Think carefully and step-by-step before responding — missed vulnerabilities are harder to find than to exploit, so reason deeply at each layer.

Three-layer security check: what can the agent access, what did it do, and is the output secure.

The Rule

IF YOU WOULDN'T GIVE IT TO AN INTERN, DON'T GIVE IT TO YOUR AGENT.

When to Use

• Before shipping features touching auth, payments, or user data
• When adding new endpoints, webhooks, or external integrations
• Periodic audit (monthly recommended)
• When reviewing third-party dependencies or MCP server configs

Layer 1 — Access Controls

Check that credentials and permissions are scoped to minimum needed.

1. Token scoping — Are API tokens scoped to specific repos/resources, or using personal/org-wide tokens?
2. MCP server configs — Are secrets in plain text? Are they rotated? Check .claude/settings.json and any MCP configs
3. Env var exposure — Block dangerous env vars from agent access: NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
4. File access — Is the agent's file access restricted to the project directory?

Layer 2 — Audit Trail

Verify that agent actions are logged and reviewable.

1. Session logging — Are session transcripts saved? (Claude Code: ~/.claude/projects/)
2. Hook-based logging — Are hooks configured to log shell commands with timestamps?
3. Git trail — Are changes committed with clear messages attributable to agent vs human?

Layer 3 — Code Scanning

Scan the codebase for vulnerabilities.

OWASP Top 10

Category	What to Check
A01: Broken Access Control	Missing auth checks on endpoints, IDOR (accessing other users' resources by changing IDs)
A02: Cryptographic Failures	Hardcoded secrets, weak hashing, missing encryption for sensitive data
A03: Injection	SQL injection (raw SQL, string interpolation), command injection (unsanitized shell args), template injection
A04: Insecure Design	Missing rate limiting, no abuse prevention, overly broad APIs
A05: Security Misconfiguration	Debug mode in production, default credentials, verbose error messages
A06: Vulnerable Components	Dependencies with known CVEs. Run npm audit, bundle audit, or equivalent
A07: Auth Failures	Weak password policy, missing MFA, session fixation
A08: Data Integrity	Missing input validation, unsigned data, unverified downloads
A09: Logging Failures	Security events not logged, no alerting on suspicious activity
A10: SSRF	User-supplied URLs fetched server-side without validation

Secrets Archaeology

Search git history for leaked credentials:

git log -p --all | grep -iE "(api_key|secret|password|token|AKIA|sk-|ghp_|xoxb-)" | head -50

Check for:

• .env files tracked by git (should be in .gitignore)
• CI configs with inline secrets (should use secret stores)
• Hardcoded database URLs with credentials

STRIDE Threat Model

For new attack surfaces introduced by the change:

Threat	Question
Spoofing	Can someone fake an identity to access this?
Tampering	Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
Repudiation	Can someone deny they performed an action?
Information Disclosure	Can sensitive data leak through this path?
Denial of Service	Can this be used to crash or exhaust resources?
Elevation of Privilege	Can this bypass authorization?

Dependency Supply Chain

1. Run package manager audit
2. Check for postinstall scripts in production dependencies
3. Verify lockfiles exist and are tracked by git

Output

Write findings to docs/convergence/security/YYYY-MM-DD-audit.md.

Categorize findings:

• Critical — blocks ship. Leaked secrets, exploitable injection, auth bypass
• High — must fix soon. Missing TLS, unprotected webhooks, known CVEs
• Medium — should fix. Missing rate limiting, verbose errors, logging gaps
• Low — minor. Configuration inconsistencies, cosmetic security headers

Each finding must include: file path, line number (if applicable), description, and specific remediation steps.

Anti-Patterns

Bad	Why	Do Instead
"It's an internal tool"	Internal tools get compromised too	Audit everything
Skipping git history search	Leaked secrets persist in history even after deletion	Always search history
"Dependencies are fine"	Supply chain attacks are real	Run audit, check install scripts
Scanning only new files	Changed files may have introduced vulnerabilities	Scan the full diff
"We'll add auth later"	Auth is not a feature, it's a requirement	Add auth first