用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt;运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill cis-bind-v100-10-2命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地?可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-bind-v100-10-2 |
| description | Ensure BIND Processes Run in the named_t Confined Context Type (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","selinux"] |
| cis_id | 10.2 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.11 Benchmark v1.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux","selinux"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-732"] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
SELinux includes customizable targeted policies that may be used to confine the BIND named server to enforce least privileges so that the server has only the minimal access to specified directories, files and network ports. Access is controlled by process types (domains) defined for the named process. There are about a dozen related types defined in a default named SELinux policy. The default SELinux policies work well for a default BIND installation, however testing of the SELinux policies with the specific BIND operations is highly recommended. All directories and files to be accessed by the named server process must have security labels with appropriate types. The following file context types are a sample of the most commonly used:
named_cache_t - Directories and files with dynamically updated contentsnamed_conf_t - Directories and Configuration files to be read, but not updatednamed_exec_t - BIND related ExecutablesThe seinfo may be used list the types that are configured. For example, the following will list the relevant types that begin with named_
# seinfo -t | grep ' named_'
The semanage fcontext command may be used to list file context mapping. For example:
# semanage fcontext -l | grep ':named_'
With the proper implementation of SELinux, vulnerabilities in the BIND named server may be prevented from being exploited due to the additional restrictions. For example, a vulnerability that allows an attacker to read inappropriate system files may be prevented from execution by SELinux because the inappropriate files are not labeled with necessary named specific context. Likewise writing to an unexpected directory or execution of unexpected content can be prevented by similar mandatory security labels enforced by SELinux.
Not specified.
Perform the following steps to determine if the recommended state is implemented: Check that the BIND named process is confined to the named_t SELinux context. The type is listed in the third colon separated field and should be named_t.
# ps -eZ | grep named
system_u:system_r:named_t:s0 1792 ? 00:00:00 named
The service is non-compliant if the output does not show a process type or shows a process type other than .
named_tIf the running named process is not confined to the named_t SELinux context. Then check the labeled context for the named binaries and set the binary files to have a context of named_exec_t as shown below. The named-checkconf executable should have named_checkconf_exec_t type.
# ls -Z /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/named-checkconf /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/named
system_u:object_r:named_checkconf_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0 /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
If the executable files are not labeled correctly, they may be relabeled with the chcon command, as shown, however the file system labeling is based on the SELinux file context mapping polices and the file system will on some occasions be relabeled according to the policy.
# chcon -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
# chcon -t named_checkconf_exec_t /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
Since the file system may be relabeled based on SELinux policy, it's best to check the SELinux policy with semanage fcontext -l option. If the policy is not present, then add the pattern to the policy using the --add option. The restorecon command shown below will restore the file context label according to the current policy, which is required if a pattern was added.
# ### Check the Policy
# semanage fcontext -l | grep '/usr/sbin/named*'
/usr/sbin/named regular file system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0
/usr/sbin/named-checkconf regular file
system_u:object_r:named_checkconf_exec_t:
s0
# semanage fcontext -l | grep /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
/usr/sbin/unbound-anchor regular file system_u:object_r:named_exec_t:s0
# ### Add to the policy, if not present
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/named
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_exec_t /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
# semanage fcontext --add -f f -t named_checkconf_exec_t /usr/sbin/named-checkconf
# ### Restore the file labeling accord to the SELinux policy
# restorecon -v /usr/sbin/named /usr/sbin/named-checkconf /usr/sbin/unbound-anchor
Restarting the BIND named service will also be required.
The name_t is the default type for ISC BIND named if SELinux is enabled.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v6 | 14.4 Protect Information With Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| v7 | 14.6 Protect Information through Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism |