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macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-bind-v100-4-4 |
| description | Restrict Access to All Key Files (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","tsig"] |
| cis_id | 4.4 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.11 Benchmark v1.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
The TSIG keys should be readable only by the named and root accounts. No other user accounts or groups should have read access. Note that BIND often creates a session key on startup for usage by nsupdate -l. Both the $BIND_HOME and $RUNDIR are included since the session key should also have the recommended permissions.
The secret key protects the authenticity and integrity of TSIG communications and disclosure of a key would allow an attacker to perform the authenticated operations such as rndc administrative operations, zone transfers or dynamic updates.
Not specified in the PDF.
Perform the following to audit the recommendation:
key_file.txt in a tmp directory with the command below. If the RUNDIR is a subdirectory of BIND_HOME, which is typical for a chroot'ed directory, then some key files may be found twice. Duplicates are removed by the final sort command.# find $BIND_HOME $RUNDIR -type f | xargs fgrep -l secret | sort -u > $TMPDIR/key_files.txt
# find $(cat $TMPDIR/key_files.txt ) \! \( -user root -o -user named \) -ls
# find $(cat $TMPDIR/key_files.txt ) \! \( -group root -o -group named \) -ls
# find $(cat $TMPDIR/key_files.txt ) -perm /022
rm $TMPDIR/key_files.txt
Perform the following for remediation:
# find $BIND_HOME $RUNDIR -type f | xargs fgrep -l secret | sort -u > $TMPDIR/key_files.txt
# xargs -a $TMPDIR/key_files.txt chown -R root
# xargs -a $TMPDIR/key_files.txt chgrp -R named
# xargs -a $TMPDIR/key_files.txt chmod o-r
rm $TMPDIR/key_files.txt
Ownership, Group and Permissions are correct for any default key files.
Not specified in the PDF.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v6 | 14.4 Protect Information With Access Control Lists | N | Y | Y |
| v7 | 14.6 Protect Information through Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |