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macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-bind-v100-8-8 |
| description | Ensure Zones are Signed with NSEC or NSEC3 (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","dnssec"] |
| cis_id | 8.8 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.11 Benchmark v1.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-345"] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
The NSEC records are used to prove that a name does not exist, by providing the name before it, and the name after it. NSEC3 records are similar, while using a hash to link records in order to make zone enumeration much more difficult. Either record type will securely validate a negative answer that a name does not exist.
The DNSSEC RRSIG records allows verification of the integrity and authenticity of answers for names which exist. However when the authoritative name server answers that a name does not exist. The nonexistent answer is not signed, and cannot be securely signed. An attacker could take advantage of this by spoofing nonexistent name answers to prevent resolving legitimate names. The NSEC and NSEC3 records provide a means for a DNSSEC validating resolver to verify the authenticity of nonexistent answer.
Not specified.
To audit the authoritative name server, use the delv command on a independent DNSSEC validating resolver to query a nonexistent name of the authoritative name server. The response should be a "negative response, fully validated" similar to the following example.
$ delv @8.8.8.8 nosuch-name.isc.org
;; resolution failed: ncache nxdomain
; negative response, fully validated
; nosuch-name.isc.org. 3200171710 IN \-ANY ;-$NXDOMAIN
; isc.org. SOA ns-int.isc.org. hostmaster.isc.org. 2020031004 7200 3600
24796800
. . .
A non-compliant response will not contain the "fully validated" response. For example:
$ delv @8.8.8.8 nosuch-name.example.com
;; validating example.com/SOA: no valid signature found
;; validating example.com/NSEC: no valid signature found
;; resolution failed: ncache nxdomain
; negative response, unsigned answer
; nosuch-name.example.com. 3200171710 IN \-ANY ;-$NXDOMAIN
. . .
An NSEC record and NSEC signatures are generated automatically by BIND for DNSSEC signed zones. If the audit fails, then verify that the zone has a valid signature and has delegated trust from the parent domain as in the previous recommendations "8.5 Ensure each Zone has a Valid Digital Signature" and "8.6 Ensure Full Digital Chain of Trust can be Validated" The signed zone file, or a zone transfer can also be checked for NSEC signatures. With a command such as:
$ dig @127.0.0.1 example.org AXFR | grep -w 'NSEC'
example.org. 86400 IN NSEC www.example.org. A NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY TYPE65534
example.org. 86400 IN RRSIG NSEC 8 2 86400 20200325222408 20200224212408 4236
. . .
Converting NSEC signing to NSEC3 signing is helpful to prevent zone walking of the linked NSEC records which easily reveal all of the names in a zone. The NSEC3 algorithm creates a linked list of signed hash values, instead of names to prevent the simple disclosure of all names. The rndc signing command can be used to convert NSEC signing to NSEC3 signing. For example:
# rndc signing -nsec3param 1 0 10 auto example.org
nsec3param request queued
<wait, check the named logs to ensure the zone has been re-signed>
. . .
zone example.org/IN (signed): sending notifies (serial 2020031005)
. . .
# dig @127.0.0.1 example.org AXFR +onesoa | grep NSEC
example.org. 0 IN RRSIG NSEC3PARAM 8 2 0 20200422125535
20200323125407 42363 example.org. CCHlbQud0W2XrNlmYHO. . . Kg7ltg==
example.org. 0 IN NSEC3PARAM 1 0 10 74139101AD2E623E
. . .
For signed domains the NSEC records and signatures are generated by default.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v7 | N/A | N | N | N |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Defense Evasion | T1562 Impair Defenses |