用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
直接命令不会经过审查 Prompt;运行前请先检查来源。
npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill cis-nginx-v300-2-2-1命令会保持在同一行。复制前请横向滚动并检查完整内容。
想先保存到本地?可下载 SkillsMP 当前能够提供的文件。
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-nginx-v300-2-2-1 |
| description | Ensure that NGINX is run using a non-privileged, dedicated service account (Manual) |
| category | cis-nginx |
| version | 3.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","nginx","web-server","reverse-proxy","account-security","basic-configuration"] |
| cis_id | 2.2.1 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS NGINX Benchmark v3.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["nginx","linux","web-server"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
The NGINX master process typically runs as root to bind to privileged ports and manage resources, but it spawns worker processes to handle the actual client traffic. The user directive in the main configuration designates the operating system account under which these worker processes run.
Running worker processes under a non-privileged, dedicated service account limits the damage an attacker can cause in the event the NGINX process is compromised. This account should be exclusively dedicated to NGINX, have no login capabilities, and possess no elevated system privileges.
If an attacker successfully exploits a vulnerability in a worker process (e.g., via a buffer overflow or Remote Code Execution), they inherit the permissions of the user account running that process. Using a privileged account like root significantly increases the risk of lateral movement. A dedicated, locked-down service account ensures that an attacker cannot access other services, modify sensitive system files, or easily escalate privileges, effectively reducing the impact of the compromise.
Changing the NGINX user requires that ownership and permissions for all runtime directories (logs, caches, PID files) are updated to match the new account. Incorrect permissions will prevent NGINX from starting or writing necessary logs. Additionally, the dedicated user must remain strictly unprivileged; adding it to groups like sudo or wheel would negate the security benefit.
1. Identify Configured User:
Inspect the running configuration to find the user directive:
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -i "^user"
Evaluation: Verify that a specific user is defined (e.g., user nginx; or user www-data;). If missing, NGINX might run as nobody or the user used at compile time.
2. Verify User Privileges:
Check the UID and group membership of the identified user (e.g., nginx):
id nginx
Evaluation:
root, wheel, sudo).3. Check Sudo Access:
Ensure the user cannot execute commands via sudo:
sudo -l -U nginx
Evaluation: Output should indicate "User nginx is not allowed to run sudo".
1. Create/Harden User (if missing):
If no user exists, create a system user with a no login shell:
useradd -r -d /var/cache/nginx -s /sbin/nologin nginx
2. Configure NGINX:
Set the user directive in the main context of nginx.conf:
user nginx;
3. Lock User Account:
Ensure the account cannot be used for login:
usermod -s /sbin/nologin nginx
usermod -L nginx
Official packages usually create and configure a dedicated user (e.g., nginx or www-data). If compiled from source without arguments, the user defaults to nobody.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v8 | 5.4 Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts | Y | Y | Y |
| v7 | 4.3 Ensure the Use of Dedicated Administrative Accounts | Y | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1078 - Valid Accounts |