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macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-nginx-v300-4-1-7 |
| description | Ensure Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) stapling is enabled (Manual) |
| category | cis-nginx |
| version | 3.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","nginx","web-server","reverse-proxy","tls-ssl","encryption"] |
| cis_id | 4.1.7 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS NGINX Benchmark v3.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["nginx","linux","web-server"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
OCSP stapling allows a server to efficiently deliver certificate revocation information to the client, improving performance and privacy. The server caches the OCSP response from the Certificate Authority (CA), eliminating the need for the client to make a separate connection. For robust security, certificates should be issued with the OCSP Must-Staple extension, which transforms the traditional "soft-fail" behavior into a "hard-fail," ensuring clients always receive and validate a current revocation status.
OCSP stapling is a critical mechanism for distributing certificate revocation status. Without it, clients might not be aware that a server's certificate has been compromised, allowing for potential man-in-the-middle attacks. The OCSP Must-Staple extension is essential as it mitigates the inherent weakness of optional OCSP ("soft-fail"), where a browser might proceed with a connection if it doesn't receive a staple. By enforcing a "hard-fail", Must-Staple ensures that a compromised certificate can be reliably blocked.
If OCSP Must-Staple is used, a misconfiguration on the server (e.g., a firewall blocking outbound OCSP queries, an incorrect DNS resolver) will cause clients to reject the certificate and refuse to connect, leading to a service outage. This "hard-fail" behavior is intentional for security but requires diligent configuration and monitoring of the OCSP stapling mechanism.
Run the following command to inspect the fully loaded NGINX configuration for the four required directives:
nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -E \
'^\s*(ssl_stapling|ssl_stapling_verify|ssl_trusted_certificate|resolver)'
Verify that the output contains the following directives with appropriate values within the relevant http or server blocks:
ssl_stapling on;ssl_stapling_verify on;ssl_trusted_certificate /path/to/your/chain.pem;resolver A.B.C.D;If any of these four directives are missing, this recommendation is not fully implemented.
Follow this procedure to enable a robust OCSP stapling configuration:
ssl_trusted_certificate# Example for a server block
server {
# ... other directives ...
# OCSP Stapling
ssl_stapling on;
ssl_stapling_verify on;
# Path to the certificate chain (Root CA + Intermediates) for verification
ssl_trusted_certificate /etc/nginx/ssl/full_chain.pem;
# DNS resolver for NGINX to query the CA's OCSP server
resolver 8.8.8.8 1.1.1.1 valid=300s;
}
OCSP stapling is not enabled by default.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v8 | 3.10 Encrypt Sensitive Data in Transit | N | Y | Y |
| v7 | 14.4 Encrypt All Sensitive Information in Transit | N | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Credential Access | T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle |
| Defense Evasion | T1556 - Modify Authentication Process |