t0839-module-firmware

name	T0839_module-firmware
description	Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices.
category	configuration
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","ics","t0839","persistence","impair-process-control"]
technique_id	T0839
tactic	persistence
all_tactics	["persistence","impair-process-control"]
platforms	["ICS"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839
tech_stack	["ics"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-276"]
chains_with	[]
prerequisites	[]
severity_boost	{}

T0839 Module Firmware

High-Level Description

Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.

This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices.

An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following:

• Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time.
• Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return.
• Random Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator.
• A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise.
• Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.

Kill Chain Phase

• Persistence (TA0110)
• Impair Process Control (TA0106)

Platforms: ICS

What to Check

• Identify if Module Firmware technique is applicable to target ICS environment
• Check ICS/SCADA systems for indicators of Module Firmware
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (12 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Identify Attack Surface

Determine if the target ICS/SCADA environment is susceptible to Module Firmware by examining operational technology systems and network architecture.

Assess Existing Defenses