t1098-005-device-registration

name	T1098.005_device-registration
description	Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account.
category	configuration
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1098.005","persistence","privilege-escalation","windows","identity-provider","sub-technique"]
technique_id	T1098.005
tactic	persistence
all_tactics	["persistence","privilege-escalation"]
platforms	["Windows","Identity Provider"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005
tech_stack	["windows","identity"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-276"]
chains_with	["T1098","T1098.001","T1098.002","T1098.003","T1098.004","T1098.006","T1098.007"]
prerequisites	["T1098"]
severity_boost	{"T1098":"Chain with T1098 for deeper attack path","T1098.001":"Chain with T1098.001 for deeper attack path","T1098.002":"Chain with T1098.002 for deeper attack path"}

T1098.005 Device Registration

Sub-technique of: T1098

High-Level Description

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account.

Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.

Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.

Kill Chain Phase

• Persistence (TA0003)
• Privilege Escalation (TA0004)

Platforms: Windows, Identity Provider

What to Check

• Identify if Device Registration technique is applicable to target environment
• Check Windows systems for indicators of Device Registration
• Check Identity Provider systems for indicators of Device Registration
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (1 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Manual Testing

1. Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Device Registration by examining the target platforms (Windows, Identity Provider).

2. Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1098.005 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.