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web-recon
Web application enumeration — directory/file fuzzing, virtual host discovery, API endpoint enumeration, CMS scanning, WAF detection, JavaScript analysis.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Web application enumeration — directory/file fuzzing, virtual host discovery, API endpoint enumeration, CMS scanning, WAF detection, JavaScript analysis.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
| name | web-recon |
| description | Web application enumeration — directory/file fuzzing, virtual host discovery, API endpoint enumeration, CMS scanning, WAF detection, JavaScript analysis. |
| allowed-tools | Bash Read Write |
| metadata | {"subdomain":"reconnaissance","when_to_use":"web recon, directory fuzzing, ffuf, gobuster, API enumeration, vhost discovery, JavaScript analysis, CMS scan, wpscan, WAF detection, parameter fuzzing, GraphQL","tags":"ffuf, gobuster, api-enum, vhost, cms-scan, waf-detection, javascript-analysis","mitre_attack":"T1595.003, T1592.004"} |
Web application recon goes beyond port scanning — it maps the application layer: routes, APIs, parameters, technologies, and authentication surfaces. This skill covers web-specific enumeration following OWASP Testing Guide methodology.
# Basic directory fuzzing
ffuf -u https://<target>/FUZZ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -mc 200,301,302,403
# With file extensions
ffuf -u https://<target>/FUZZ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt \
-e .php,.asp,.aspx,.jsp,.html,.js,.json,.xml,.txt,.bak,.old,.sql,.zip,.tar.gz
# Filter by response size (exclude default pages)
ffuf -u https://<target>/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt -fs <default_size>
# Recursive scanning (depth 2)
ffuf -u https://<target>/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt -recursion -recursion-depth 2
# Throttled for stealth
ffuf -u https://<target>/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt -rate 10 -mc 200,301,302,403
# Common sensitive paths
for path in .env .git/config .htaccess robots.txt sitemap.xml \
wp-config.php web.config server-status .DS_Store \
backup.sql dump.sql database.sql .svn/entries \
crossdomain.xml clientaccesspolicy.xml; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://<target>/$path")
echo "$code $path"
done
# vHost fuzzing via Host header
ffuf -u https://<target_ip>/ -H "Host: FUZZ.<target>" \
-w /usr/share/wordlists/subdomains.txt -fs <default_size>
# With TLS SNI
ffuf -u https://FUZZ.<target>/ -w /usr/share/wordlists/subdomains.txt \
-mc 200,301,302,403 -fs <default_size>
Why vHost discovery matters:
# Common API paths
ffuf -u https://<target>/api/FUZZ -w /usr/share/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt -mc 200,201,401,403,405
# Version enumeration
for v in v1 v2 v3; do
ffuf -u "https://<target>/api/$v/FUZZ" -w api-wordlist.txt -mc 200,201,401,403
done
# Check for Swagger/OpenAPI docs
for doc in swagger.json openapi.json api-docs docs/api swagger/v1/swagger.json; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://<target>/$doc")
echo "$code $doc"
done
# Common GraphQL endpoints
for path in graphql graphiql playground api/graphql; do
# Introspection query
curl -s -X POST "https://<target>/$path" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{__schema{types{name}}}"}' | head -c 200
echo " → $path"
done
Look for in responses:
api_key, apiKey, access_token, bearer, jwtAuthorization header patterns# GET parameter fuzzing
ffuf -u "https://<target>/page?FUZZ=test" -w /usr/share/wordlists/params.txt -mc 200 -fs <default_size>
# POST parameter fuzzing
ffuf -u "https://<target>/login" -X POST \
-d "FUZZ=test" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-w /usr/share/wordlists/params.txt -mc 200 -fs <default_size>
# Header fuzzing
ffuf -u "https://<target>/" -H "FUZZ: test" \
-w /usr/share/wordlists/headers.txt -mc 200 -fs <default_size>
# Download all JS files
curl -s https://<target> | grep -oP 'src="[^"]*\.js"' | cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
[[ "$js" == http* ]] || js="https://<target>$js"
echo "=== $js ==="
curl -s "$js" | grep -oP '["'"'"'](/[a-zA-Z0-9_/\-\.]+)["'"'"']' | sort -u
done
# Look for API keys, secrets, endpoints in JS
curl -s "https://<target>/main.js" | grep -oiE '(api[_-]?key|secret|token|password|auth)["\s]*[:=]["\s]*[a-zA-Z0-9+/=_\-]{8,}'
# Check for exposed source maps
curl -sI "https://<target>/main.js" | grep -i sourcemap
curl -s "https://<target>/main.js.map" | head -c 100
# wpscan (comprehensive)
wpscan --url https://<target> --enumerate vp,vt,u,dbe --api-token <WP_API_TOKEN>
# Quick checks
curl -s "https://<target>/wp-json/wp/v2/users" | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s "https://<target>/xmlrpc.php" -d '<methodCall><methodName>system.listMethods</methodName></methodCall>'
curl -s "https://<target>/?author=1" -I | grep Location
# Version detection
curl -s "https://<target>/administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml" | grep -oP '<version>\K[^<]+'
curl -s "https://<target>/CHANGELOG.txt" | head -5
# wafw00f
wafw00f https://<target>
# Manual detection via response patterns
curl -s "https://<target>/?id=1' OR '1'='1" -I | grep -iE '(server|x-cdn|cf-ray|x-sucuri|x-aws)'
# Known WAF indicators
# Cloudflare: CF-RAY header, __cfduid cookie
# AWS WAF: x-amzn-requestid header
# Akamai: AkamaiGHost server header
# Imperva: X-CDN header, incap_ses cookie
# Common auth paths
for path in login signin auth authenticate oauth/authorize \
api/auth api/login admin/login wp-login.php; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://<target>/$path")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "$code https://<target>/$path"
done
Set-Cookie headers after loginAuthorization: Bearer eyJ... patterns/oauth/authorize, /oauth/token endpointsX-API-Key or Authorization: ApiKey is accepted./
├── ffuf_<target>_dirs.json # Directory fuzzing results
├── ffuf_<target>_vhosts.json # Virtual host discovery
├── ffuf_<target>_api.json # API endpoint fuzzing
├── web_sensitive_<target>.txt # Sensitive file check results
├── js_endpoints_<target>.txt # Extracted JS endpoints
├── wpscan_<target>.json # WordPress scan (if applicable)
└── web_recon_<target>_summary.md # Consolidated web findings
Red team engagement lifecycle management — initiation, phase transitions, go/no-go gates, deconfliction, emergency procedures, completion.
Mandatory first-turn startup procedure — checks for existing engagements, resume/new selection, workspace initialization.
Final engagement report generation — executive summary, technical report, findings aggregation, attack path narrative, detection gap matrix, remediation roadmap.
Decepticon orchestrator patterns — delegation, state management, adaptive re-planning, context handoff protocols.
Use when setting up, running, or managing the Botron autonomous red team agent — Docker-based multi-provider LLM pentesting framework. Covers install, demo, service management, testing, and provider configuration.
Sliver C2 framework operations — server connection, listener setup, implant generation, BOF/Armory extensions, post-implant operations, HTTP C2 profiles.