pentest-cloud

name	pentest-cloud
description	Cloud security pentest — AWS/Azure/GCP IAM analysis, lateral path, container escape pattern, serverless abuse advisory. Triggers on cloud pentest, AWS, Azure, GCP, IAM, S3 misconfig, EC2 metadata, Azure AD, GCP IAM, Pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudGoat.
license	MIT
compatibility	Works with Claude Code
allowed-tools	Read Write Edit Bash Grep
metadata	{"author":"badi","homepage":"https://github.com/fatihkan/badi-skills/tree/main/skills/pentest-cloud","badi-version":">=1.24.0","category":"pentest","scope":"advisory","inspired-by":"0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents cloud-security"}

pentest-cloud

AWS / Azure / GCP pentest methodology. IAM lateral path, public asset enum, container escape pattern.

Triggers

• "AWS pentest"
• "Azure AD test"
• "GCP IAM enum"
• "S3 public bucket"
• "EC2 metadata abuse"
• "IMDSv2 bypass"
• "Pacu / ScoutSuite / Prowler usage"

Cloud-Provider Specific

AWS

Attack Surface	Test
S3 public read/write	aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request
EC2 IMDSv1	curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
Lambda env leak	Lambda invoke + env var dump
IAM privilege esc	iam:CreateAccessKey, iam:AttachUserPolicy, sts:AssumeRole
CloudTrail bypass	sts:GetSessionToken (logged as user, not source)
Misconfigured IAM	* action on * resource
Cross-account roles	external Principal "arn:aws:iam::OTHER:root"
Resource policy	S3 bucket policy with "Principal": "*"
SSM RunCommand	EC2 to OS via SSM session manager

Azure

Attack Surface	Test
Anonymous storage container	https://<acc>.blob.core.windows.net/<container>?restype=container&comp=list
Azure AD enumeration	UserList API anonymous
Service Principal abuse	Excessive RBAC role assignment
Managed Identity	VM -> token endpoint -> assume role
Azure DevOps PAT	Repo scan for PAT in code
Key Vault	RBAC misconfig, public access

GCP

Attack Surface	Test
GCS public bucket	gsutil ls gs://<bucket> (no auth)
Compute metadata	curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
IAM lateral	iam.serviceAccounts.actAs, iam.roles.update
GKE container	RBAC misconfig + IMDS reach

Recommended Commands

# QUIET — AWS misconfig audit (read-only IAM)
prowler aws --profile <profile> --severity high,critical

# QUIET — ScoutSuite multi-cloud audit
scout aws --profile <profile> --report-dir ./scout-report

# MODERATE — Pacu enumeration (Pacu CLI)
# Pacu is tied to its db; --modules for specific recon

# MODERATE — Azure recon
roadtools roadrecon auth --device-code
roadtools roadrecon gather

# MODERATE — GCP enum (enumerates the whole project, careful)
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list --project=<project>

IAM Privilege Escalation Patterns

AWS PrivEsc (common 25):

1. iam:CreateAccessKey on another user
2. iam:CreateLoginProfile on another user
3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile on another user
4. iam:AttachUserPolicy + ManagedPolicy AdministratorAccess
5. iam:AttachGroupPolicy
6. iam:AttachRolePolicy
7. iam:PutUserPolicy (inline policy)
8. iam:PutGroupPolicy
9. iam:PutRolePolicy
10. iam:AddUserToGroup
11. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
12. iam:PassRole + service action (lambda, ec2)
13. sts:AssumeRole (broad principal)
14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode + lambda:InvokeFunction
15. lambda:CreateFunction + iam:PassRole
... (automated with Pacu modules)

Container Escape (K8s)

# QUIET — pod RBAC check (kubectl in pod)
kubectl auth can-i --list

# Pod escape signal:
# - hostPID: true
# - hostNetwork: true
# - privileged: true
# - hostPath mount /
# - Capabilities: SYS_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE

# Service account token
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token

# IMDSv1 reach from pod
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Output Template

## Cloud Pentest — <account>

### IAM Path
- User: dev-readonly
- Excessive: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy on role "prod-admin"
- Path: dev-readonly -> update trust policy -> sts:AssumeRole prod-admin -> *
- Time-to-DA: 2 minutes

### Public Asset
- S3 bucket "company-backups" — anonymous list + read (1.2TB exposure)
- 3 prod EC2 instances IMDSv1 only -> SSRF chain risk

### Defensive Recommendations
- IAM policy review: iam:* actions only for the break-glass account
- S3 bucket policy: Principal "*" forbidden (block public access at account level)
- EC2 metadata: IMDSv2 required (hop limit 1)

Out-of-Scope

• Deleting / writing production data
• Creating resources (careful not to incur cost — engagement cost limit)
• 3rd party services (Stripe, SendGrid) — out-of-scope by default