| name | MCUB-runtime-config-manager |
| description | Safely inspect and manage MCUB runtime configuration, prefixes, aliases, trusted users, access rules, and backups with secret masking and confirmations. |
| keywords | ["cfg","fcfg","setprefix","aliases","trusted","access","backup","config","settings","secrets","runtime","пpeфикc","кoнфиг"] |
MCUB Runtime Config Manager
Use this skill when the user asks to inspect or change MCUB runtime settings through commands such as cfg, fcfg, setprefix, aliases, trusted, access, backup, or restore operations.
Main goal
Safely manage MCUB runtime configuration without leaking secrets or accidentally weakening access controls. Prefer read-only inspection first, backup before mutation, verification after mutation, and a concise record of old/new non-secret state.
Core rules
- MCUB is a Telegram userbot; prefix, trusted-user, and access changes affect user-account automation.
- Guide runtime configuration actions; do not edit source files or config stores directly unless the user explicitly asks and a safe workflow exists.
- Use
Mcub-commander for actual command execution or command explanation when needed.
- Pass
mcub.command arguments without command prefixes because Mcub-commander expects raw command text.
- Never print raw secrets, tokens, session strings, API keys, credentials, phone numbers, or sensitive config values.
- Summarize config by key names, value presence, type, shape, and risk level only.
Standard workflow
- Identify the exact runtime operation and affected scope: config key, prefix, alias, trusted user, access rule, backup, or restore target.
- Start with read-only inspection when possible: current keys, command help, current prefix/aliases/trusted/access status, or available backups.
- Mask sensitive values in all notes and outputs.
- For mutations, create or recommend a backup first.
- Ask for explicit confirmation before risky changes.
- Execute through
Mcub-commander when command execution is needed.
- Verify the resulting non-secret state after mutation.
- Report old/new non-secret state and any follow-up safety warnings.
Command routing
cfg: inspect or update regular runtime configuration; mask values and avoid broad dumps.
fcfg: force configuration only after confirmation and backup, because it may override safety checks.
setprefix: confirm before changing prefixes; warn about command usability and record old/new prefix shape.
aliases: inspect aliases read-only first; confirm before deleting or replacing aliases.
trusted: confirm before adding or removing trusted users; warn that this affects userbot control permissions.
access: confirm broad or permission-expanding access changes; prefer narrow rules and verify after changes.
backup: prefer backup before mutation; list backups without exposing secrets.
restore: require explicit confirmation, confirm target backup, and warn that current runtime state may be overwritten.
Validation checklist
Before acting, confirm:
- the requested operation is a runtime setting change, not module source work;
- the command target and arguments are clear;
- sensitive values are masked or omitted;
- read-only inspection was considered first;
- risky operations have explicit confirmation;
- a backup exists or the user accepted the risk of proceeding without one;
- post-change verification can be done without exposing secrets.
Safety rules
- Require explicit confirmation before changing prefixes, adding/removing trusted users, broad access changes, deleting aliases, forcing config, restoring backups, exposing credentials, or rotating credentials.
- Do not expose raw config values even when the user asks for a dump; provide masked summaries unless a safer explicit credential workflow is available.
- Do not store secrets in chat, files, logs, examples, or final reports.
- Do not edit runtime databases, config files, or source files directly unless the user explicitly asks and the safe workflow is understood.
- Prefer narrow, reversible changes over broad access or trust changes.
- Stop and warn if a requested action could lock the user out, expose credentials, or grant broad userbot control.