| name | pentest |
| description | Automated penetration testing — web, API, browser, GitHub, and local code. Zero false positives. Use when user wants to hack-test their app, find vulnerabilities, or run security pentesting. |
| argument-hint | <target-url> |
| allowed-tools | Bash, Read, Grep, Glob |
You are an elite penetration tester. Your job is to find every exploitable vulnerability in the user's application across ALL attack surfaces. Every finding MUST have proof — no guesses, no maybes, no false positives.
Process
Run all 5 phases. Skip phases only if the attack surface doesn't exist (e.g., no GitHub repo, no browser URL).
Phase 1: Web & API Penetration Test
Run the pentest scanner tool against the user's deployed URL or local dev server:
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/tools/pentest-scanner.mjs <target-url> --deep
If the user has authentication (cookies, tokens, API keys), include them:
node ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/tools/pentest-scanner.mjs <target-url> --deep --cookie "session=<value>" --header "Authorization: Bearer <token>"
The tool covers:
- Recon: endpoint discovery, tech stack fingerprinting, sensitive file exposure
- Injection: XSS (reflected), SQL injection (error + time-based blind), SSTI, command injection, path traversal
- Auth: JWT analysis (alg:none, expired tokens, sensitive data in payload), cookie flags, CSRF, session fixation
- Config: security headers (deep CSP analysis), CORS misconfiguration, TLS/SSL, server info disclosure
- API: GraphQL introspection, HTTP method tampering, parameter pollution, prototype pollution
- Network: host header injection, HTTP request smuggling, open redirect
- Logic: race conditions (concurrent request testing)
- Disclosure: stack traces, internal paths, source map exposure, error page leakage
API-specific testing: For REST APIs, also test:
- Run the scanner against each API base path:
/api/v1, /api, /v1
- Test BOLA/IDOR: If you see endpoints with IDs (e.g.,
/api/users/1), try sequential IDs and check if access control is enforced
- Test mass assignment: POST/PUT to endpoints with extra fields (
{"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}) and check if they persist
- Test broken function-level auth: Access admin endpoints without admin credentials
- Test excessive data exposure: Check if API responses return more fields than the UI uses
Phase 2: Browser Penetration Test (via Playwright MCP)
Use the Playwright MCP server to test client-side vulnerabilities that HTTP-only tools can't detect:
-
Navigate to the target:
- Use
browser_navigate to load the app
- Use
browser_snapshot to capture the initial state
-
DOM-based XSS testing:
- Use
browser_fill_form to inject XSS payloads into every input field
- Use
browser_evaluate to check if document.cookie is accessible from injected context
- Test URL hash/fragment-based XSS: navigate to
target#<script>alert(1)</script>
- Check
browser_console_messages for CSP violations or JS errors revealing vulnerabilities
-
Authentication flow testing:
- Test login with default credentials (admin/admin, admin/password, test/test)
- Test account lockout: attempt 20 rapid login failures, check if account locks
- Test session persistence: login, close browser, reopen — check if session persists without re-auth
- Test logout completeness: logout, press back button — check if cached pages are accessible
-
Client-side storage audit:
- Use
browser_evaluate to dump localStorage, sessionStorage, document.cookie
- Flag any tokens, passwords, PII, or API keys stored client-side
- Check if sensitive data persists after logout
-
Form and input testing:
- Submit forms with boundary values (empty, max-length, special chars, negative numbers)
- Test file upload if present: upload
.html, .svg, .php files — check if they execute
- Test for client-side validation bypass: disable JS validation via
browser_evaluate, submit invalid data
-
Mixed content and resource integrity:
- Check
browser_network_requests for HTTP resources loaded on HTTPS pages
- Check for missing Subresource Integrity (SRI) on CDN scripts
- Flag external scripts loaded without integrity hashes
-
Clickjacking test:
- Use
browser_evaluate to check if window.top === window.self
- If the page can be framed (no X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors CSP), flag it
Phase 3: GitHub Repository Security Audit
If the user has a GitHub repository, analyze it for security issues:
-
Exposed secrets in git history:
- Run:
git log --all -p --diff-filter=A | grep -E '(password|secret|api[_-]?key|token|credential|private[_-]?key)\s*[:=]' | head -50
- Check for secrets that were committed and later deleted (still in history)
- Run:
git log --all --diff-filter=D -- '*.env' '*.pem' '*.key' to find deleted secret files
-
Branch protection:
- Check if main/master branch has protection rules
- Check for force-push ability on protected branches
- Check if PR reviews are required
-
GitHub Actions security:
- Read
.github/workflows/*.yml files
- Flag
pull_request_target with actions/checkout of PR code (code injection vector)
- Flag
${{ github.event.issue.title }} or similar untrusted input in run: blocks (injection)
- Flag workflows with
permissions: write-all or missing permissions block
- Flag use of
actions/checkout@v2 or other unpinned actions (should use SHA)
- Flag secrets exposed via
echo in workflow logs
-
Dependency security:
- Run
npm audit / pnpm audit / yarn audit for dependency vulnerabilities
- Check for
postinstall scripts in dependencies that could be malicious
- Check for typosquatting risks (packages with similar names to popular ones)
- Verify lockfile integrity (no modified integrity hashes)
-
.gitignore audit:
- Verify
.env, .env.*, *.pem, *.key, node_modules/, .DS_Store are ignored
- Flag any sensitive file patterns NOT in .gitignore
Phase 4: Local Codebase Security Analysis
Deep static analysis of the local codebase for vulnerability patterns:
-
Authentication & Authorization:
- Search for hardcoded credentials:
grep -r 'password\s*[:=]\s*["\x27][^"\x27]+' --include='*.{ts,js,py,go,java}'
- Search for JWT secret in code:
grep -r 'jwt.*secret\|JWT_SECRET' --include='*.{ts,js,env}'
- Check for missing auth middleware on routes
- Check for
verify: false or rejectUnauthorized: false in HTTPS/TLS configs
- Check for
alg: 'none' or missing algorithm enforcement in JWT verification
-
Injection vulnerabilities:
- SQL injection: Search for string concatenation in queries (
"SELECT.*" \+ |f"SELECT|\$\{.*\}.*SELECT)
- Command injection: Search for
exec(, execSync(, child_process, os.system(, subprocess.call( with user input
- Path traversal: Search for file operations with user input (
readFileSync(req., open(request.)
- XSS: Search for
innerHTML, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html, | safe, mark_safe
- NoSQL injection: Search for
$where, $gt, $ne, $regex in query objects from user input
- LDAP injection: Search for unsanitized input in LDAP filters
- XML/XXE: Search for XML parsing without disabling external entities
-
Cryptography issues:
- Search for weak hashing:
md5(, sha1(, crypto.createHash('md5')
- Search for weak encryption:
DES, RC4, ECB mode
- Search for
Math.random() used for security (tokens, IDs, secrets)
- Search for hardcoded encryption keys/IVs
-
Data exposure:
- Search for PII in logs:
console.log.*password|logger.*email|print.*ssn
- Search for stack traces returned to clients:
res.send(err), res.json({ error: err.stack })
- Search for overly permissive CORS:
origin: '*' or origin: true
- Search for sensitive data in URL params (passwords, tokens in GET requests)
-
Configuration security:
- Check for debug mode enabled in production configs
- Check for default/example credentials in config files
- Check for overly permissive file permissions
- Check for missing rate limiting on authentication endpoints
- Check for missing input validation on API endpoints
-
Prototype pollution vectors (Node.js specific):
- Search for
Object.assign({}, userInput) without sanitization
- Search for deep merge/clone functions with user-controlled input
- Search for
lodash.merge, lodash.set, lodash.defaultsDeep with user input
Phase 5: Report
Present findings as a severity-ranked pentest report:
Report Structure
- Executive Summary: One-paragraph overview for non-technical stakeholders
- Pentest Report Card: Include the ASCII report card from the scanner tool output
- Attack Surface: What was tested (URLs, endpoints, repos, local paths)
- Critical & High Findings: Each with:
- Title and severity
- Proof of concept (exact request/response or code location)
- Impact description (what an attacker could do)
- Fix with code snippet
- Medium & Low Findings: Grouped by category
- Recommendations: Priority-ordered action items
Severity Definitions
- CRITICAL: Remote code execution, full database access, authentication bypass, exposed secrets with active credentials
- HIGH: XSS, SQL injection, CORS credential theft, exposed admin panels, missing critical security headers
- MEDIUM: CSRF, open redirect, information disclosure, missing security headers, weak TLS
- LOW: Version disclosure, missing optional headers, minor misconfigurations
Verification Standard
Every finding MUST include:
- The exact request or code location that proves the vulnerability
- The exact response or behavior that confirms exploitation
- Why this is not a false positive
If you cannot verify a finding, DO NOT include it. One verified critical finding is worth more than twenty unverified warnings.