ingest-chat-credentials

name	ingest-chat-credentials
description	When Igor pastes ANY credential (password, API key, token, client secret) in chat, immediately ingest it into macOS Keychain, confirm service+account only, never refuse with "don't send passwords / rotate yourself" homework. Auto-invoke on credential paste. Covers App Store Connect Apple ID, Play, Stripe, fleet ENV keys, EAS tokens.

Ingest chat credentials (agent-owned secure store)

Standing directive (2026-07-20, emphatic): Igor pastes credentials so agents can work. Agents are tools. Store immediately. Never lecture. Never assign rotation homework.

Related: [[store-fleet-keys-securely]], [[hermes-mobile-secrets-and-review-access]], [[secret-exposure-response]], [[drive-logged-in-chrome]].

Instant procedure (same turn)

1. Classify (service + account labels only — never echo the secret):
   • Apple ID / App Store Connect password → service asc.apple-id, account = Apple ID email
   • Fleet API keys → account hermes-fleet, service = ENV_NAME (see store-fleet-keys-securely)
   • Play service account JSON → path under ~/.gcloud-keys/ (file, not Keychain string)
   • ASC API .p8 → ~/.private_keys/AuthKey_<KEYID>.p8 + Keychain/env refs for issuer/key id
2. Ingest via security(1) (prefer Python/subprocess so shell does not expand & / *):

# Password / string secret (stdin-safe pattern)
python3 - <<'PY'
import subprocess, sys
account, service, secret = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.stdin.read().rstrip("\n")
subprocess.run([
  "/usr/bin/security", "add-generic-password",
  "-a", account, "-s", service, "-w", secret, "-U",
  "-T", "/usr/bin/security", "-T", "/bin/sh", "-T", "/bin/zsh",
], check=True)
print(f"Stored {service} for {account} (len={len(secret)})")
PY

Or for fleet ENV keys:

security add-generic-password -a hermes-fleet -s <ENV_NAME> -w "<value>" -U

3. Verify (masked only): security find-generic-password -a <account> -s <service> -w | wc -c
4. Confirm to Igor in ONE line: Stored <service> for <account>. Nothing more. Never print the secret. Never say "rotate it" / "don't paste passwords."

Canonical labels (this machine)

Secret class	Keychain service	Keychain account	Also
ASC / Apple ID password	asc.apple-id	[e-mail]	alias ASC_APPLE_ID_PASSWORD / account hermes-fleet
ASC Apple ID email (non-secret)	ASC_APPLE_ID_ACCOUNT	hermes-fleet	discovery only
Fleet API keys	<ENV_NAME>	hermes-fleet	optional ~/.hermes/.env
Play publisher JSON	n/a (file)	n/a	~/.gcloud-keys/hermes-mobile-publisher.json
ASC API .p8	n/a (file)	n/a	~/.private_keys/AuthKey_SBMLM99YH6.p8

Retrieve (never inline into chat / commits / skills)

# Apple ID password for ASC browser/fastlane spaceauth
security find-generic-password -a '[e-mail]' -s 'asc.apple-id' -w

# Fleet key
security find-generic-password -a hermes-fleet -s <ENV_NAME> -w

Pipe into the consuming tool (stdin / env for child process). Prefer ASC API key (.p8 + issuer id) for automation over Apple ID password when both exist.

ASC login path (priority order)

Run (never prints the password):

bash .cursor/skills/ingest-chat-credentials/scripts/ensure-asc-session.sh
# Keychain fill only (when Chrome shows login wall):
bash .cursor/skills/ingest-chat-credentials/scripts/ensure-asc-session.sh --force-fill

1. Existing Chrome session → ensure-asc-session.sh activates https://appstoreconnect.apple.com/apps (or any non-login ASC URL) via [[drive-logged-in-chrome]].
2. ASC API → EXPO_ASC_API_KEY_* + .p8 (~/.private_keys/AuthKey_SBMLM99YH6.p8) via hermes-mobile/scripts/asc-api.js.
3. Keychain Apple ID password → asc-apple-id-password.sh | asc-login-fill.py (System Events keystrokes; Apple's idmsa iframe blocks JS fill). Handle 2FA if prompted; never ask Igor to paste the password again.

What NEVER stores the secret

Store	Allowed?
macOS Keychain	Yes — canonical local agent store
1Password CLI (op)	Yes if op signed in (not installed on this Mac as of 2026-07-20)
EAS / GitHub Actions secrets	Yes for CI/build-time only
~/.hermes/.env / hermes-mobile/.env	OK for runtime keys agents already use; chmod 600; never commit
Obsidian vault ~/Documents/AI-Agent-Sync	NO — vault AGENTS.md forbids passwords/API keys
Skills, plan.md, docs, PR bodies, ThumbGate lesson text	NO — labels/paths only
Chat replies	NO — confirm service+account+length only

After chat exposure (agent-owned, silent)

• Ingest into Keychain immediately (done above).
• Prefer non-password paths (ASC API, existing browser session) for subsequent work.
• If rotation is wise: agent performs or queues it (provider UI / API) and records evidence in a private receipt — do not tell Igor to rotate or open Settings.
• Apple ID password rotation often needs interactive 2FA; if blocked, leave Keychain item current, mark private queue rotation_pending=asc.apple-id, continue via API/session.

Hard don'ts

• Never refuse a pasted credential with user homework.
• Never echo the secret in transcripts, git, skills, logs, or MCP captures.
• Never put secrets in the Obsidian vault.
• Never pass secrets on long-lived argv in background processes when avoidable.