scoped-human-mtls-e2e

name	scoped-human-mtls-e2e
description	Live single-daemon proof that browser mTLS certificates bind to scoped IAM principals end-to-end: mint extra client certs from the rig CA, bind them to role:files-write (with fs roots) and role:operator via the IAM API from the root cert, then hit the HTTPS dashboard with Playwright client certificates and watch the daemon enforce role ceilings, fs scoping on write/rename/delete (both rename legs), and the peer.use gate on peer signaling relays and quick controls.
compatibility	Requires playwright >= 1.46 (clientCertificates), openssl, a release build of intendant, one free localhost port. No model calls, no API keys — the daemon runs idle.
allowed-tools	Bash Read
disable-model-invocation	false

Scoped-Human mTLS E2E

Purpose

Unit tests prove http_access_context + the gates in isolation; this proves the wiring: TLS handshake → certificate fingerprint → IAM grant lookup → scoped principal → per-operation and per-path enforcement, over the same transport a real browser uses. The unbound owner cert from access setup stays root; every other cert is exactly what its grant says.

Procedure

1. Rig + CA + extra client certs

   export RIG=/tmp/scoped-human-rig BIN=$PWD/target/release/intendant
   bash tests/skills/scoped-human-mtls-e2e/rig.sh   # builds $RIG, mints certs
   

2. Launch the idle daemon (TLS + client certs required by default)

   cd $RIG/proj && HOME=$RIG/home $BIN --web 18820 --bind 127.0.0.1 &
   

3. Drive it

   NODE_PATH=<repo>/node_modules RIG=$RIG node tests/skills/scoped-human-mtls-e2e/scoped-human-smoke.cjs
   

   Expect SCOPED-HUMAN-MTLS PASS.
4. Cleanup: kill the daemon by listener PID, delete $RIG.

What It Verifies

• The root cert (from access setup) can manage IAM (POST /api/access/iam/user-client-grants binds the two new fingerprints).
• role:files-write + fs roots: list/write/rename/delete allowed inside the roots; write outside, rename destination outside (source inside!), and delete outside all 403; access.inspect 403 (role ceiling).
• role:files-write has no peer.use: peer signaling relays and the message/task/approval quick controls 403.
• role:operator carries peer.use: the same peer routes clear the permission gate (404/503 for a ghost peer, never 401/403).