| name | analyzing-rat-command-and-control |
| description | Analyzes remote access trojan command-and-control by mapping the RAT command set, identifying the C2 transport and beacon parameters, and cataloging operator capabilities from static strings and config. Activates for requests to analyze RAT C2, map a trojan command handler, or identify remote-access capabilities and C2 transport. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | malware-analysis |
| tags | ["malware-analysis","rat","command-and-control","c2","capability-mapping"] |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | analyst-ai-pack |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| mitre_attack | ["T1219","T1071","T1105"] |
| d3fend | ["D3-NTA","D3-SDA"] |
| references | ["MITRE ATT&CK T1219 Remote Access Software — https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/","MITRE ATT&CK T1071 Application Layer Protocol — https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"] |
Analyzing RAT Command and Control
When to Use
- You have a RAT sample and need to map its command set (shell, file ops, screenshot, keylog,
webcam, proxy), C2 transport, and beacon parameters.
- You are cataloging operator capabilities for detection and impact assessment.
Do not use this to operate the RAT or connect to its C2 — characterize capabilities from inert
static analysis.
Prerequisites
- The RAT sample (read inertly), optionally with an extracted config.
Safety & Handling
- Read bytes statically; defang C2 endpoints; never connect to the C2.
Workflow
Step 1: Map command handlers and capabilities
python scripts/analyst.py profile sample.bin
Matches command-keyword and API patterns for capability classes: remote shell, file transfer,
screenshot/keylog/webcam, persistence, proxy/relay, and self-update.
Step 2: Identify the C2 transport
Detect HTTP(S), raw TCP, TLS, DNS, or messaging-platform transport from imports/strings, plus
beacon intervals/user-agents where present.
Step 3: Build the capability matrix
Summarize capabilities and transport, mapping to ATT&CK.
Step 4: Defang and report
Defang endpoints and produce IOCs.
Validation
- Capabilities are grouped into classes with the matched evidence.
- The C2 transport is identified from concrete imports/strings.
- Findings map to ATT&CK T1219/T1071.
Pitfalls
- Generic API presence (e.g.,
gdi32) misread as screenshot capability — corroborate with command
handlers.
- Commodity RAT builders sharing strings across families — avoid over-attribution.
- Encrypted command sets requiring config decryption first.
References
