kill-chain-analysis
Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
基于 SOC 职业分类
Benchmark mode marker — engagement objective is flag capture. Generic engagement rules apply unchanged.
Exploit Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1 — vulnerable template allows arbitrary SAN, enabling user impersonation up to domain admin.
BloodHound ingestion + canonical Cypher queries for AD attack-path enumeration. Run after collector dumps zip; promotes findings into the knowledge graph.
NetExec (CrackMapExec successor) — unified SMB/LDAP/MSSQL/WinRM/RDP/SSH/FTP/VNC protocol auth + post-auth modules. 200+ modules incl. BloodHound auto-ingest, ESC1-15 scanning, PrintNightmare, LDAP relay.
Active Directory attack lane — BloodHound ingestion, Kerberoasting, ADCS ESC scanning, DCSync, LAPS extraction.
Red team engagement lifecycle management — initiation, phase transitions, go/no-go gates, deconfliction, emergency procedures, completion.
| name | kill-chain-analysis |
| description | Kill chain analysis and attack path decision-making — findings analysis, attack vector selection, target prioritization, phase transitions. |
| allowed-tools | Read |
| metadata | {"subdomain":"orchestration","when_to_use":"analyze findings, select attack vector, prioritize targets, which technique, attack path, next attack, choose approach, alternative vector, blocked what next","tags":"kill-chain, decision-making, attack-path, target-prioritization, technique-selection","mitre_attack":"TA0043, TA0001, TA0002, TA0003, TA0004, TA0005, TA0006, TA0007, TA0008"} |
When selecting the next action, evaluate in order:
opsec skill before noisy actionsRead recon/ outputs and categorize:
| Finding Type | Indicates | Next Action |
|---|---|---|
| Web apps with known CVEs | Web exploitation path | exploit → web techniques |
| AD services (88/389/636) | AD attack surface | exploit → AD techniques (after initial access) |
| Exposed credentials (OSINT) | Credential-based access | exploit → credential stuffing/spray |
| Cloud misconfigs (S3/blob) | Cloud attack path | exploit → cloud-specific techniques |
| VPN/remote access services | Network perimeter entry | exploit → VPN/RDP exploitation |
| Employee emails + breach data | Social engineering path | exploit → phishing (if in scope) |
Rank available vectors by:
Score = (Success Probability × Impact) / Detection Risk
1. Valid credentials from OSINT → High prob, High impact, Low noise
2. Known web CVE (public exploit) → High prob, Med impact, Med noise
3. AD misconfiguration (no patch) → Med prob, High impact, Med noise
4. Password spray against O365 → Med prob, High impact, High noise
5. Zero-day or custom exploit → Low prob, High impact, Low noise
Always prefer: credentials > misconfigurations > known CVEs > brute force
Once a foothold is established, analyze:
| Context | Decision |
|---|---|
| Low-privilege user on workstation | Prioritize: privesc → cred dump → lateral to server |
| Service account on server | Prioritize: cred dump (may have cached admin creds) → lateral |
| Domain user credentials | Prioritize: AD enumeration → Kerberoasting → DCSync path |
| Local admin on single host | Prioritize: cred dump → check for cached domain creds → lateral |
| Already domain admin | Prioritize: objective completion → evidence collection → reporting |
Objective BLOCKED
│
├── WHY did it fail?
│ ├── Defense mechanism (WAF/EDR/IDS)
│ │ → Consult defense-evasion skill → retry with evasion
│ │
│ ├── Missing prerequisite (need creds/access/info)
│ │ → Identify which prior phase provides it → re-order objectives
│ │
│ ├── Target hardened / not vulnerable
│ │ → Check findings for alternative target → redirect attack
│ │
│ └── Tool failure / environment issue
│ → Retry with different tool or approach
│
├── Is there an ALTERNATIVE path?
│ ├── YES → Craft new delegation with adjusted approach
│ └── NO → Mark BLOCKED, document reason, proceed to next objective
│
└── Should we REVISIT later?
├── YES (new intel may help) → Keep status BLOCKED, note in lessons_learned.md
└── NO (dead end) → Mark BLOCKED permanently
| Original Approach | Alternative When Blocked |
|---|---|
| SQLi on web app | SSTI, deserialization, SSRF, or move to different web app |
| Kerberoasting | AS-REP roasting, ADCS abuse, password spray |
| LSASS dump blocked by EDR | nanodump, comsvcs.dll, MiniDumpWriteDump via syscall |
| WinRM blocked | PsExec, WMI, DCOM, RDP, SMB exec |
| Password spray lockout | Low-and-slow spray, single-password-multiple-users |
Use this to map OPPLAN objective phases to ATT&CK tactics:
| OPPLAN Phase | ATT&CK Tactic | Sub-Agent |
|---|---|---|
| Recon | TA0043 Reconnaissance | recon |
| Initial Access | TA0001 Initial Access | exploit |
| Execution | TA0002 Execution | exploit |
| Persistence | TA0003 Persistence | postexploit |
| Privilege Escalation | TA0004 Privilege Escalation | postexploit |
| Defense Evasion | TA0005 Defense Evasion | exploit / postexploit |
| Credential Access | TA0006 Credential Access | postexploit |
| Discovery | TA0007 Discovery | recon / postexploit |
| Lateral Movement | TA0008 Lateral Movement | postexploit |
| Collection | TA0009 Collection | postexploit |
| Exfiltration | TA0010 Exfiltration | postexploit |
When multiple targets are available, prioritize: