| name | analyzing-supply-chain-malware-artifacts |
| description | Investigate supply chain attack artifacts including trojanized software updates, compromised build pipelines, and sideloaded dependencies to identify intrusion vectors and scope of compromise. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | malware-analysis |
| tags | ["supply-chain","malware-analysis","trojanized-software","solarwinds","3cx","dependency-confusion","software-integrity"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| atlas_techniques | ["AML.T0010"] |
| nist_ai_rmf | ["GOVERN-5.2","MAP-1.6","MANAGE-2.2"] |
| d3fend_techniques | ["Platform Hardening","Hardware Component Inventory","Restore Object","Electromagnetic Radiation Hardening","RF Shielding"] |
| nist_csf | ["DE.AE-02","RS.AN-03","ID.RA-01","DE.CM-01"] |
| mitre_attack | ["T1195.002","T1195.001","T1554","T1553.002","T1027"] |
Analyzing Supply Chain Malware Artifacts
Overview
Supply chain attacks compromise legitimate software distribution channels to deliver malware through trusted update mechanisms. Notable examples include SolarWinds SUNBURST (2020, affecting 18,000+ customers), 3CX SmoothOperator (2023, a cascading supply chain attack originating from Trading Technologies), and numerous npm/PyPI package poisoning campaigns. Analysis involves comparing trojanized binaries against legitimate versions, identifying injected code in build artifacts, examining code signing anomalies, and tracing the infection chain from initial compromise through payload delivery. As of 2025, supply chain attacks account for 30% of all breaches, a 100% increase from prior years.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing supply chain malware artifacts
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9+ with
pefile, ssdeep, hashlib
- Binary diff tools (BinDiff, Diaphora)
- Code signing verification tools (sigcheck, codesign)
- Software composition analysis (SCA) tools
- Access to legitimate software versions for comparison
- Package repository monitoring (npm, PyPI, NuGet)
Workflow
Step 1: Binary Comparison Analysis
"""Compare trojanized binary against legitimate version."""
import hashlib
import pefile
import sys
import json
def compare_pe_files(legitimate_path, suspect_path):
"""Compare PE file structures between legitimate and suspect versions."""
legit_pe = pefile.PE(legitimate_path)
suspect_pe = pefile.PE(suspect_path)
report = {"differences": [], "suspicious_sections": [], "import_changes": []}
legit_sections = {s.Name.rstrip(b'\x00').decode(): {
"size": s.SizeOfRawData,
: s.get_entropy(),
: s.Characteristics,
} s legit_pe.sections}
suspect_sections = {s.Name.rstrip().decode(): {
: s.SizeOfRawData,
: s.get_entropy(),
: s.Characteristics,
} s suspect_pe.sections}
name, props suspect_sections.items():
name legit_sections:
report[].append({
: name, : ,
: props[], : (props[], ),
})
(props[] - legit_sections[name][]) > :
report[].append({
: name, : ,
: legit_sections[name][],
: props[],
})
legit_imports = ()
(legit_pe, ):
entry legit_pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
imp entry.imports:
imp.name:
legit_imports.add()
suspect_imports = ()
(suspect_pe, ):
entry suspect_pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
imp entry.imports:
imp.name:
suspect_imports.add()
new_imports = suspect_imports - legit_imports
new_imports:
report[] = (new_imports)
report[] = (legit_pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[].Size)
report[] = (suspect_pe.OPTIONAL_HEADER.DATA_DIRECTORY[].Size)
report
():
hashes = {}
(filepath, ) f:
data = f.read()
algo [, , ]:
h = hashlib.new(algo)
h.update(data)
hashes[algo] = h.hexdigest()
hashes
__name__ == :
(sys.argv) < :
()
sys.exit()
report = compare_pe_files(sys.argv[], sys.argv[])
(json.dumps(report, indent=))